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This dissertation examines the role of firm embeddedness in its global business 
network with regards to the adoption of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practices. 
Global business networks refer to the nexus of inter-firm and intra-firm relationships, in 
which focal actors are engaged. These networks are focal firm specific, span multiple 
countries and involve different types of economic relationships between the focal actor 
and its business partners. This study argues that global business networks affect a focal 
organization’s CSR adoption decisions, since they provide access to resources and 
information and also channel CSR-related institutional influences from the various 
countries where the focal firm’s business partners are located.  
The firm is exposed to a multiplicity of institutional forces concerning CSR 
because of its ties to business partners located in countries with varying CSR institutional 
requirements. Therefore, how should the firm prioritize these influences? In order to 
answer this question, this dissertation considers two aspects of the environment in which 
the firm operates, namely its institutional and its economic embeddedness in the global 
business network. In the context of this study, institutional embeddedness refers to the 
CSR-related norms rules, beliefs and the uniformity (or lack thereof) of these. Economic 
embeddedness is defined as the type and quantity of economic resources that flow  
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through a network and determine the degree of dependence of the focal firm on a specific 
business partner. A firm’s institutional and economic embeddedness are considered 
jointly because economic ties channel the institutional forces that are present within the 
global business networks. Based on their strength and nature they also contribute to 
shaping the intensity with which these forces are experienced by the focal actors. 
Therefore, an actor’s economic and institutional embeddedness represent the building 
blocks of the main constructs of interest of this study. These capture the strength of the 
institutional requirements concerning CSR within the global business network, their 
heterogeneity, and whether the firm operates in contexts with more stringent 
requirements for CSR than those of its home country. Results indicate that these factors 
are all important drivers of a firm’s decision to adopt CSR practices. They also show that 
a focal firm’s foreign direct investment- (FDI-) based relationships are more effective 
channels for the diffusion of institutional influences than trade-based relationships. 
This dissertation makes several theoretical contributions. First, it contributes to 
the international business research area by expanding the conceptualization of the global 
space where MNCs operate. This has traditionally been analyzed in terms of its intra-firm 
network (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990). This work extends the conceptualization of this 
space to also include the organization’s inter-firm ties. It also contributes to the emergent 
interest among international business scholars for considering both the “constraining” and 
“enabling” effects of institutional forces (e.g., Kostova, Roth & Dacin, 2008; Saka-
Helmhout & Geppert, 2011). In addition, the dissertation contributes to organizational 
theory by narrowing the existing gap between institutional and network perspectives 
about organizational behavior, by making explicit the role that networks play as conduits 
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for the diffusion of institutional practices (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2008). The second 
contribution to organizational theory focuses on the embeddedness research area, by 
answering recent calls to focus not only on the structure of network ties, but also on their 
content, which are here explored in terms of the firm’s institutional and economic 
embeddedness. This work also provides a nuanced investigation of the firm’s 
embeddedness, by measuring and modeling the intensity and types of economic 
exchanges between the focal firm and its business partners as constitutive elements of the 
intensity with which the focal actor perceives these institutional influences that emerge 
from the global business network. This dissertation also contributes to CSR research by 
expanding the analytical focus in order to make sense of the firm’s CSR adoption 
decisions beyond the traditional firm and national boundaries and to also consider the 
complex composite of institutional forces that emerge from firm’s embeddedness in the 
global business network.  
To conduct the study, longitudinal data was collected from a diverse range of 
sources. The sampling history extends from 2007 to 2011, and the number of sampled 
corporations is 710. The sample in this study consists of publicly traded U.S. firms listed 
on the Russell 3000 index, which includes the largest U.S. multinationals in terms of 
market capitalization, with matching information from the Kinder, Lydenberg and 
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Increasingly, business organizations whether domestic companies or multinational 
corporations (MNCs), are expected to demonstrate social responsibility, transparency, 
and accountability in their operations to their global customers and other stakeholders 
(Levy & Kaplan, 2008). This trend dates back to the early 1990s (World Bank, 2002, 
2003) when a number of MNCs began addressing social and environmental conditions in 
their global business networks, by developing codes of conduct that stipulate social, 
environmental, and ethical requirements for their suppliers (Locke & Romis, 2007). Since 
then, firms’ global networks of trade- and FDI-based relationships (i.e., their global 
business networks) have increasingly been regarded as important channels for stimulating 
the improvement of local suppliers’ social, environmental and ethical performance (e.g., 
Locke, Amengual, & Mangla, 2009). The concept of global business network is akin to 
that of “global supply chain” (Ernst & Kim, 2002) or “global production network” (Levy, 




While there is growing anecdotal evidence of the global diffusion of CSR-related 
practices in general (e.g., Levy & Kaplan, 2008), there is only limited systematic 
theorizing on this process (e.g. Guler, Guillén & Muir Macpherson, 1999). Furthermore, 
there is little research on the diffusion of CSR practices within a firm’s global business 
network. Only a handful of studies have focused on this context. This suggests that 
certain characteristics of the economic networks in which the firm operates, such as asset 
specificity, trust among network participants, and presence of socially responsible lead 
multinational buyers, can be critical drivers in a firms’ decision to become more socially 
responsible (see Locke & Romis, 2007; McKinsey, 2006, 2008). Nonetheless, scholars 
have developed incomplete understandings of the drivers and barriers to CSR adoption 
that firms might face within their global business networks. The objective of this 
dissertation is to add to this line of research by providing an in-depth theoretical and 
empirical examination of this phenomenon.  
1.1 Research question 
I am particularly interested in understanding the role of firm embeddedness in its 
global business network, with regards to the decision to adopt CSR practices. CSR 
practices include a broad range of actions “within the firm, such as changing methods of 
production to reduce environmental impact or changing labor relationships both within 
the firm and across the firm’s value chain, as well as actions outside the firm, such as 
making infrastructure investments in local communities or developing philanthropic 
community initiatives” (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams & Ganapathi, 2007: 836). For 
example, these practices can include implementing codes of conduct (Kolk & Van 
Tulder, 2002a, 2002b; Tulder, Wjk & Kolk, 2009), international standards (e.g., Guler et 
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al., 2002), such as ISO 9000 or ISO 14000 (Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Delmas, 2002), 
ethical product and purchasing specifications (Starcher, 2005), stakeholder engagement 
routines, and philanthropic initiatives (Galaskiewicz, 1991). 
As with most organizational practices, CSR is strongly influenced by the 
institutional environment in which the firm is embedded, including its regulations, social 
knowledge, and social norms (Busenitz, Gomez & Spencer, 2000; Kostova & Roth, 
2002). Further, countries vary in the degree to which their institutional environments 
enforce or facilitate CSR actions (Williams & Aguilera, 2008). An interesting question 
related to practice adoption, which has been studied in international management, 
concerns how firms, and MNCs in particular, respond to the complex institutional effects 
of doing business in multiple national environments (Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Zaheer, 
1999). I build on this research because the global business network context is somewhat 
similar to the context of the MNC. Both expose firms to influences from multiple 
countries. For example, while  a firm might operate in a home country whose national 
laws are not favorable for CSR, its top buyer might be embedded in a CSR-oriented 
environment thus not only engaging in high levels of CSR but also expecting such 
behaviors from their partners. In such a scenario, the firm is exposed to differing CSR-
related logics, which makes the decision to engage in CSR less straightforward. What 
mechanisms explain which pressures this firm is likely to prioritize then? How does a 
firm cope with the impediments to “resolve ambiguities and conflicts of what the 
situation is and what experience is relevant; … and what the appropriate match and action 
are?” (March & Olsen, 2004: 7). In this dissertation I begin unpacking the nature of the 
complex embeddedness experienced by the focal firm in the context of the global 
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business network. While similar to the context of the MNC, global business networks 
have one notable theoretical distinction that entities in these networks are related to their 
partners through both inter- and intra-organizational ties, rather than only intra-
organizational ties.  
1.2 Research framework 
In order to capture the global business network context, I develop a model of CSR 
adoption under conditions of complex embeddedness, where the firm is responding to 
multiple and possibly divergent influences from the various institutional contexts that 
make up its global business network. I propose that an organization facing such complex 
influences concerning CSR prioritizes some over others (Oliver, 1991), based on the 
pattern of the relationships within the network (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta 
& Lounsbury, 2011).  
I explore two types of firm embeddedness: institutional and economic 
embeddedness. Institutional embeddedness refers to the institutional content of a firm’s 
global business network, in particular its CSR-related beliefs, norms and rules, and the 
uniformity (or lack thereof) of these forces among the various institutional contexts that 
make up the firm’s business network. Economic embeddedness captures the intensity of 
the trade and FDI-based economic relationships in which the focal firm is engaged and 
make up the global business network (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990). Considering both 
institutional and economic embeddedness facilitates the examination of the combined 
effects of the multiple institutional environments where a firm does business and the 
strength of the economic relationships with its business partners. It also allows for 
exploration of both the “constraining” and “enabling” aspects of the social structure that 
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surrounds firms within their global business network (Giddens, 1976). As the multiplicity 
of institutional messages concerning the importance of CSR within the firm’s global 
business network increases, I find that firms become less likely to adopt CSR practices 
solely because of isomorphic-related reasons, and instead become more likely to rely on 
an evaluation of the pros and cons associated with adoption. I posit that the complex 
embeddedness experienced by firms within their global business network stimulates their 
self-reflexivity, by forcing the firm to reflect upon alternative paths of action before 
choosing one (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). This view is consistent with recent advances 
in institutional theory that point to the ability of organizations to learn by inferring the 
“potential efficiency benefits for themselves,” based on the combined experiences of 
those actors that have previously adopted a practice (Haunschild & Chandler, 2008: 640). 
I argue that constraining and enabling institutional pressures can coexist within the same 
field, and that certain field-level conditions facilitate their emergence and interactive 
relationship towards a firm’s adoption of CSR practices.  
In brief, my model suggests that as firms embedded in global business networks 
face mounting levels of institutional diversity across their various operating contexts, 
they also face ambiguity concerning what represents appropriate courses of action in 
terms of CSR practice adoption. In order to operate legitimately, and thus effectively, 
across these multiple institutional environments that make up the global business 
network, the firm cannot simply conform to one set of CSR-related expectations and 
requirements. If it did, it would risk alienating stakeholders in other institutional contexts. 
Therefore, the firm needs to make sense of this complexity, and develop innovative 
solutions that would allow it to thrive across the various institutional contexts in which it 
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operates. As the firm tackles this complex institutional environment and tries to make 
sense of it and develop an appropriate course of action, it can also learn from the variety 
of institutional messages from which it is surrounded. In this context, I consider learning 
as the firm’s ability to encode its understanding of the external environment into new 
CSR-related routines (Levitt & March, 1988). Because of the institutional complexity 
surrounding the firm, learning opportunities coexist with coercive influences. This is 
most likely to be the case when the CSR-related messages emerging from within the 
global business network have a high degree of consistency among them. Such a scenario 
induces firms to conformity; they no longer prioritize certain pressures over others, as 
they do when this consistency is lacking.  
The presented model of a firm’s adoption of CSR practices is aligned with recent 
developments in institutional theory focusing on the relationships between environmental 
complexity and the “awareness, skill and reflexivity” of organizations (Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006: 219; see also, Greenwood et al., 2011; Kostova, Roth & Dacin, 2008; 
Kraatz & Block, 2008). It complements this area of theory by explaining how firms with 
greater exposure to global markets, through their global business networks, do not seem 
as constrained by their home country institutional environments in their adoption 
decisions. Instead, many are able to transcend their home countries’ institutional 
constraints as they adopt practices that are consistent with the requirements of other 
institutional environments (see Hoskisson et al., 2000). Previously, scholars have 
postulated that these dynamics are at play in emerging market firms (see Child & 




1.3 Contributions to theory 
This dissertation aims to make several theoretical contributions. First, it seeks to 
contribute to the international business research area by expanding the conceptualization 
of the global space in which MNCs operate; this is traditionally analyzed in terms of its 
intra-firm network (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990). It does so by expanding the analytical 
focus to the firm’s inter-firm relationships, in order to fully capture the institutional 
forces to which it is exposed. It also seeks to contribute to the emergent interest among 
international business scholars,   considering both the “constraining” and “enabling” 
effects of institutional forces (e.g., Kostova, Roth & Dacin, 2008; Saka-Helmhout & 
Geppert, 2011). It does so by studying the concurrent importance of considering both 
strength and heterogeneity of institutional forces within the firm’s global business 
network, which can exercise separate as well as joint influences on the focal actor’s 
adoption decisions. 
In the organizational theory area, the dissertation aims at narrowing the gap 
between institutional and network perspectives about organizational behavior by making 
explicit the role that networks play as conduits for the diffusion of institutional practices, 
as well as the co-constitutive relationship between networks and institutions (Owen-
Smith & Powell, 2008). It does so by investigating the diffusion of CSR-related practices 
through the organizational network ties within global business networks in which firms 
operate. It also suggests a more encompassing effect of these networks: relational as well 
as structural characteristics, the quality of the type of economic ties in which the firm is 
engaged, and their relative importance towards explaining the firm’s adoption of CSR-
related practices.  
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The second contribution it attempts to make to organizational theory is in the 
embeddedness research area. The dissertation answers recent calls to focus not only on 
the structure of network ties, but also on their content (DiMaggio, 1992; Emirbayer & 
Goodwin, 1994; Powell & Smith-Doerr, 1994). It does so by considering both the 
economic and institutional content of networks. This work also responds to calls for 
greater attention to “the complexity, strength, and intensity of embeddedness” (Dacin et 
al., 1999: 337) by measuring and modeling the intensity and types of economic 
exchanges between the focal firm and its business partners.  
This dissertation also aims at contributing to the CSR research area. Past research 
has examined the firm’s CSR adoption decisions as the result of forces located within the 
traditional firm- and national-level boundaries. This study examines how the complex 
composite of institutional forces that emerge from the firm’s embeddedness in the global 
business network can shape decisions related to the adoption of CSR-related practices.  
1.4 Managerial implications 
This study has several practical implications. First, it identifies some of the 
challenges and opportunities associated with making sense of institutional expectations 
emerging from the firm’s business network. For example, this study suggests that the 
intensity of the CSR-related institutional requirements, channeled through a firm’s global 
network of business partners and the institutional heterogeneity among them, can drive 
the firm’s decision to upgrade its CSR-related practices. However, this study’s findings 
also show that these two forces can work at cross-purposes when the firm is 
simultaneously exposed to the highest levels of commitment to CSR and the highest 
levels of within network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR. In this case, the firm is 
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less likely to adopt CSR practices. Therefore, conflicting demands from the firm’s 
business network may make it difficult for the firm to correctly assess and internalize the 
cues it receives from its external environment. Additionally, results suggest that certain 
relationships tend to play a more influential role in decision-making in the CSR area, 
regardless of the strength of the overall network pressures or heterogeneity. Results also 
indicate that individual institutional environments with more stringent CSR-related 
expectations tend to have significant influence on the focal firm’s adoption decisions in 
the CSR area. Taken together, the results highlight the importance of careful selection of 
business partners, given their contribution to the firm’s ability to absorb and integrate 
information about specific sets of practices. They also indicate that successful CSR 
management requires that the firm be concerned with what happens inside its “walls”, as 
well as with the CSR trends that emerge from within its global business network. In 
addition, the model presented in this work offers a useful set of analytical tools that can 
be used to gauge the type of strategies and resources that the firm might need to deploy to 
avoid CSR-related crises from within its global business network. 
1.5 Organization of the dissertation 
The dissertation consists of six chapters. Following this introduction, the second 
chapter provides a review of the relevant literatures for the development of the theoretical 
model presented in chapter three. Chapter four describes the study design and 
methodology. Chapter five presents empirical results and robustness tests. Finally, 
chapter six presents the discussion and conclusions, describes more extensively the 
theoretical and practical implications associated with this research, its limitations, and 







This chapter reviews the relevant literatures for the development of the proposed 
embeddedness approach to firm’s adoption of CSR practices. It starts by reviewing the 
literature focused on the study of the global diffusion of CSR practices, which provides 
growing evidence about the importance of global business networks as relevant contexts 
for this process. These works emphasize the importance of firm characteristics, of the 
quality of inter- and intra-firm organizational relationships, and of other network 
characteristics such as asset specificity, power and dependence as important drivers of the 
adoption of CSR practices by local firms. However, this literature often seems to 
investigate CSR diffusion processes in a context-free manner, without taking into 
consideration the complex forces from the wider social context that might contribute to 
shaping firm’s adoption decisions. To address this gap, the presented model also draws 
on those literatures that have developed useful analytical tools to make sense of the role 
of context with regards to diffusion processes. Organizational institutionalism and the 
embeddedness approach in organizational theory offer these conceptual tools and help 
bringing context into the main analytical framework. Specifically, these literatures help to 
explain how a manifestation of organizational change (in the case of this study—the 
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adoption of CSR practices) is shaped by field level forces and their interaction with 
important organizational filters such as firm’s economic dependence on the business 
partners that make up the global business network. In addition, relevant contributions 
from the embeddedness research area are reviewed because they have provided some of 
the essential theoretical tools to conceptualize organizations as entities immersed in 
networks of institutional forces and economic relationships, which contribute to shaping 
firm’s behavioral outcomes (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994). 
Because of the global nature of the forces considered in this study to explain 
firm’s decision to adopt CSR practices, the model also draws on a number of theoretical 
contributions from the field of international business that have provided effective 
conceptualizations of the global space where multinational actors operate. As it is 
suggested in the introductory chapter of the dissertation, the case of the global business 
network is conceptually similar to that of the MNC network. However, it is also different, 
because traditional conceptualizations of MNC networks include only intra-firm 
relationship, while the global business network expands the analytical scope to also 
include inter-firm relationships.  
2.1 CSR in global business networks  
There is a growing body of evidence concerning the global diffusion of CSR 
(Levy & Kaplan, 2008). In addition, several practitioners and scholars identify global 
FDI-based and trade-based networks as important channels through which these practices 
can spread across countries (e.g., Lund-Thomsen & Nadvi, 2010; Locke & Romis, 2007; 
Millington, 2008; McKinsey, 2006, 2008, 2009). In parallel, a growing body of research 
focuses explicitly on the distinctive contribution of foreign multinational buyers to the 
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diffusion of CSR across global supply chains, especially among local suppliers in 
developing countries (e.g., Hughes, Wrigley & Buttle, 2008; Jørgensen, Pruzan-
Jørgensen, Jungk & Cramer, 2003; Jørgensen & Knudsen, 2006; Palpacuer & Tozanli, 
2008; Pietrobelli & Saliola, 2008; Schmitz & Knorringa, 2000; Spencer, 2008; Studer, 
Tsang, Welford & Hills, 2008). For example, Maignan and McAlister (2003) observe that 
many global buyers develop programs for training/education of suppliers, monitoring, 
ratings of suppliers’ practices, certifications of individual suppliers by an industry 
association, labeling schemes (by the buying organization, industry association, and/or 
government agencies), and various discretionary intercompany initiatives. While some 
organizations do not engage in any of these activities, more proactive buyers can adopt 
several of these initiatives simultaneously.  
Scholars have paid a great deal of attention to the specific motivations that guide 
the decision to adopt CSR practices by firms that are embedded in global business 
networks. For example, Maignan and McAlister (2003) show that global buyers’ 
involvement in these initiatives  can be driven by their own corporate values, if they 
emphasize the importance of CSR; by a legitimacy seeking motive, if their primary 
stakeholders demand compliance with certain social and environmental standards and can 
exercise a certain amount of normative and coercive power to this end; and/or by a profit 
motive, if they believe that there is an opportunity to increase profits by cutting costs 
(e.g., via process innovation), avoid negative publicity and thus potential consumer 
boycotts, or increase market share by appealing to more CSR-sensitive markets (Bansal 
& Roth, 2000; Maignan, Hillebrand & McAlister, 2002). Research in this area has paid 
special attention to organizations’ desire to effectively manage risk as a very important 
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motivating factor for engaging in CSR. Firms often adopt CSR practices to mitigate the 
risk of being exposed to the criticisms and concerns from NGOs, the public and 
customers that might perceive the firm as not being responsible or responsible enough 
towards its stakeholders (Awaysheh & Klassen, 2010). Others point out that risk 
management considerations to engage in CSR extend beyond the firm’s boundaries, to 
also include their global business partners. This is because increasingly firms are 
perceived to be responsible for what happens in their global business networks 
(McKinsey, 2013). Therefore their engagement in CSR initiatives or their attempts at 
spreading CSR among their business partners can also be motivated by the desire to 
mitigate their exposure to legitimacy threats that might emerge from their global business 
network (Druckman, 2005). Growing anecdotal evidence emphasizes the importance of 
firms’ desire to meet customers’ expectations as a key motivating factor for the adoption 
of CSR practices (e.g., Adriana, 2009; Forbes, 2012).  
Scholars have also investigated multinational buyers’ contribution to the 
emergence of the transnational institutional infrastructure concerning CSR in various 
ways, including their participation in industry-level initiatives aimed at developing 
coordinated standards-setting bodies and codes (Nadvi, 2008). For instance, the 
Electronics Industry Code of Conduct (EICC, 2010) is an attempt by the leading brand 
manufacturers, component producers and contract manufacturers in the computer-related 
electronics sector to agree on a common code addressing health safety, labor and 
environmental concerns. Multinational buyers have also played a major role in shaping 
the global debate surrounding firms’ responsibilities about labor standards (e.g., Frenkel, 
2001; Mosley, 2010) and climate change mitigation (e.g., Levy & Kolk, 2002). Kolk, 
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Levy and Pinkse (2008) indicate that by the mid-1990s many American MNCs directed 
their energies towards contesting international regimes that would cap on greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions through industry groups such as the Global Climate Coalition (GCC) 
and the Climate Council. These associations played a major role in influencing the United 
States’ decision not to join the Kyoto Protocol (Levy & Egan, 2003). Such efforts were 
aimed at deterring policies that not only would have increased costs of managing GHG 
emissions for the focal firms, but also for their suppliers, since these costs would have 
been passed upstream. In contrast, European corporations were more receptive to climate 
policy measures and therefore more actively contributed to their institutionalization in the 
old continent. Wal-Mart offers another example of MNCs’ ability to influence suppliers’ 
behaviors around the globe in the area of green management initiatives. Since 2005, the 
company has been proactively involved in an effort to motivate its suppliers to “race to 
the top” (Plambeck, 2007) to improve the environmental sustainability of its supply 
chain. In 2007, Wal-Mart’s 60,000 suppliers were asked to use a web-based scorecard 
that calculates each product’s packaging against nine sustainability metrics (Plambeck, 
2007). Beginning in 2008, Wal-Mart started to use this system to evaluate suppliers’ 
environmental performance, and thus their ability to contribute to the company’s stated 
goal to reduce the packaging used by all of its suppliers by five percent between 2008 and 
2013 (Plambeck, 2007). 
All in all, this review of the literature on the global diffusion of CSR shows a 
growing interest for this topic. The works reviewed in this section explain diffusion of 
CSR practices based on certain characteristics of buyer-supplier relationships, certain 
network characteristics such as power, dependence, and organizational drivers such as 
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firm’s exposure to pressures from important stakeholders ranging from customers to the 
governments and NGOs. However, most of this research fails to properly take into 
consideration the complex forces from the wider social context in which these firms are 
embedded. Moreover, scholars are yet to tackle the issue of how pluralistic institutional 
environments (Kraatz & Block, 2008) might influence the diffusion of CSR practices 
within global business networks; how managers of firms facing multiple and varying 
institutional regimes concerning CSR might cope with this complexity in their decision 
making processes; and which factors might be more likely to shape their decisions in this 
area.  
To develop a model that addresses these gaps, it is useful to turn to those 
literatures that have focused on the role of context with regards to practice diffusion 
processes. Diffusion and embeddedness approaches in organizational theory and the field 
of international business offer such conceptual tools, and are thus reviewed in the 
remainder of this chapter.  
2.2 Diffusion research 
The study of the spread of ideas and behaviors falls under the general heading of 
the diffusion of innovation, which Rogers defined as the process by which innovation is 
communicated through certain channels among the members of a social system (2005: 3). 
While scholars trace the origins of diffusion research to Tarde’s 1903 book on The Laws 
of Imitation, Ryan and Gross (1943) popularized this approach with their landmark study 
on the spread of hybrid-corn use among Iowa farmers. Since then, several thousand 
studies on the diffusion of innovation have appeared (Wejnert, 2002). For Rogers, 
paradigmatic cases of the diffusion of innovations include attempts by public health 
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workers to persuade Andean villagers to boil water, and to convince Korean couples to 
use birth control methods. In organizational sociology, classic diffusion studies include 
Coleman, Katz and Mentzel’s (1966) study of the spread of tetracycline prescription 
within four physician communities, and Hagerstrand’s (1967) investigation of the 
diffusion of telephone technology across rural Sweden.  
Diffusion processes have been discussed across a number of disciplines. In the 
sociological subfield of organizational studies, Strang (2010) finds that three 
complementary lines of inquiry shape existing discussions about diffusion, namely social 
network, managerial cognition, and institutional approaches, briefly reviewed below. In 
social network analysis, researchers have focused their studies on the impact of strong 
social ties on the diffusion of innovation (Strang & Soule, 1998), given that frequent 
interactions allow for effective information exchange about the character, motivations, 
and effects of diffusing practices. In addition, when strong relationships are generated by 
similarities among the actors involved, they tend to further reinforce pressures for 
conformity (Strang & Soule, 1998). For example Morris (1981) shows that strong 
relationships among black churches, colleges, and movement organizations such as the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference facilitated the diffusion of protest tactics in 
the civil rights movement. However, while strong ties favor socialization, they also tend 
to channel redundant information (Granovetter, 1973), and thus might slow the 
emergence of new ideas. For example, Carpenter, Esterling and Lazer’s (2003) study of 
the emergence of innovations within policy networks finds that friends within policy 
networks share information with friends, before they share it with acquaintances. This 
social rule is illustrated by a lobbyist quote in Milbrath’s classic study: “My contacts trust 
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me, and I think their trust is well placed. Most of the things they tell me are not of a 
secret nature; it’s just a development that they have discovered which they think I could 
be interested in. It is very difficult to get information if you go out digging out for it… 
Actually you get much better information from people who know you, know what your 
interests are, and know that they can trust you” (1963: 260). Similarly, Friedkin (1982) 
shows that strong ties are more important for promoting information flows about 
organizational activities within an organizational subsystem, while weak ties are more 
important than strong ties in promoting information flows about activities outside an 
organizational subsystem. In a seminal article about the strength of weak ties, 
Granovetter (1973) shows that weak ties can perform as powerful channels for new ideas, 
as the related sources of information tend have little overlap. Strang and Soule (1998) 
point to board interlocks as an example of relatively weak interpersonal ties that allow 
managers to gain a glimpse into what other firms do (Useem, 1984), thereby facilitating 
the diffusion of information about “high” corporate strategies. Board interlocks, however, 
do not provide the kind of “mutual socialization” that is produced by “cohesive 
interpersonal relations” (Strang & Soule, 1998). Burt (1987) identifies structural 
equivalence within a network as another meaningful channel for the diffusion of 
innovations. For example, Galaskiewicz and Burt (1991) find that corporate officers had 
very similar perspectives on local charities. Competing firms tend to be very responsive 
to each other’s efforts at innovation (Strang & Soule, 1998). Relatedly, Osterman (1994) 
shows that Japanese managerial and production practices diffused more rapidly among 
firms exposed to external competition. Others have shown that firms tend to imitate other 
firms in their industry (Fligstein, 1985, 1990), and that states with similar political 
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systems imitate each other’s policies (Zhou, 1993).  Adopters of new practices are also 
influenced by central actors’ prestige. For example, Fligstein (1990) posits that 
managerial styles can flow from central firms to the larger business community as they 
prove their usefulness in addressing new political and economic challenges.  
Perhaps one of the most common findings in diffusion research is that spatial 
proximity favors diffusion, as it facilitates all kinds of interactions and influence (Strang 
& Soule, 1998). For example, Knoke (1982) demonstrated positive effects of geographic 
proximity on municipal reform and Davis and Greve (1997) point to the diffusion of 
golden parachutes via local business communities. Somewhat related to this stream is the 
work in economic geography, whose findings also support the notion that geographic 
proximity with competitors can be beneficial (e.g., Marshall, 1920; Krugman, 1991), as 
local accumulation of knowledge and trained labor lead to information spillovers. 
Famous examples include the Silicon Valley, which became the center of the technology 
industry as a result of tight networks of local firms (Saxenian, 1994); Detroit, Michigan, 
which became the capital of the auto industry by having fertile early training grounds (see 
Klepper, 2002); and Akron, Ohio, which produced a successful tire industry (Buenstorf 
and Klepper, 2005). Other relevant works in this tradition include Herrigel (1996), Locke 
(1995), McDermott (2002), Piore and Sabel (1984). 
2.2.1 Organizational institutionalism and diffusion 
Organizational institutionalism (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983) makes sense of how organizations are influenced by their environments, broadly 
interpreted as including a variety of legal and regulatory authorities, belief systems, and 
taken for granted understandings (Strang, 2010). Its neo-institutional variant draws 
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heavily on the Carnegie School’s work in cognitive psychology (e.g., Simon, 1947; 
March & Simon, 1958; Cyert & March, 1963), which argued that while actors strive to 
make rational choices (i.e., fully informed), they often find themselves making decisions 
with less than complete information. Simon and his colleagues showed how managers’ 
understanding of their organization’s external environment is often imprecise. Their 
understanding of how changes to the external environment might influence their 
organization can also be incomplete. Ambiguity and uncertainty are typical components 
of the decision making process, and are particularly common in the interorganizational 
arena, “inasmuch as the environment is made up of less than fully informed organizations 
that are making strategic choices in light of the strategic choices of other uninformed 
organizations” (Galaskiewicz & Wasserman, 1989: 454). Therefore, managers look for 
direction outside their organization boundaries, trying to model their behaviors upon 
those organizations they perceive as more successful, or based on societal expectations 
and/or existing rules and regulations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
From this vantage point, diffusion has a triple significance (Scott, 2008). First, the 
extent to which a practice is diffused is also an indicator of the growing strength of an 
institutional structure. From this point of view, studies of institutional diffusion may be 
regarded as studies of increasing institutionalization. As a process, institutionalization 
refers to “social patterns that, when reproduced, owe their survival to relatively self-
activating social processes” (Jepperson, 1991: 145). Selznick argues that 
“institutionalization is the emergence of orderly, stable social integrating patterns out of 
stable, loosely organized, or narrowly technical activities. The underlying reality—the 
basic source of stability and integration—is the creation of social entanglements or 
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commitments. Most of what we do in everyday life is mercifully free and reversible. But 
when actions touch important interests and salient values or when they are embedded in 
networks of interdependence, options are more limited. Institutionalization constrains 
conduct in two main ways: by bringing it within a normative order, and by making it 
hostage to its own history” (1992: 232). For example, Tolbert and Zucker’s (1983) study 
of the diffusion of municipal civil service reform in the United States at the turn of the 
century finds that as growing numbers of organizations adopt a program or policy, it 
becomes “progressively institutionalized, or widely understood to be a necessary 
component of rationalized organizational structure” (35). They also show that civil 
service procedures were adopted much more rapidly by cities when the state mandated 
them and the process of adoption was directed by a single source. Second, studies of 
diffusion are also studies of “institutional effects”, because early or late adoption is seen 
as dependent upon the “changing strength of the institutions” and also because of the 
“varying characteristics of the adopting organization” (Scott, 2008: 132). For example, 
Mezias (1990) studies the adoption of new procedures for reporting income tax credits by 
the 200 largest nonfinancial firms in the United States. He finds that a number of 
organization-level factors influence adoption, including whether the firm is under 
jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Casile and Davis-Blake (2002) find 
that business schools located in public universities are more responsive to changes in 
accreditation standards than those affiliated with private colleges. Also, numerous studies 
find that size is an important organizational attribute, with larger organizations being 
more prone to early adoption (e.g., Dobbin et al., 1988). In addition, several studies show 
that organizations that operate within or are more closely aligned with the public sector 
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are more likely to be responsive to regulatory and normative pressures (e.g., Dobbin et 
al., 1988). Third, the diffusion of a new form or practice is also an instance of 
institutional change, usually convergent change (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996), although 
in more recent times scholars have turned their attention to forms of divergent or 
contested institutional change. For example, Kraatz and Zajac (1996) report that the trend 
among liberal arts colleges toward offering professional programs, an innovation that 
faced significant opposition among traditional liberal arts colleges, did not seem to fit 
standard processes of institutionalization. Subsequently, Kraatz and Moore (2002) show 
that this institutionally contested form of change was facilitated by the arrival of 
organizational leaders with past involvement with similar contested practices at other 
organizations that operated on the periphery of the field. 
Together, network and neo-institutional perspectives provide interpenetrating 
accounts of the process of diffusion (Strang, 2010). For example, Davis and Greve (1997) 
find that the legitimacy of the diffusing practice influences the ability of an 
interorganizational network to perform as a “transmission belt” (Strang, 2010: 8). 
Galaskiewicz and Wasserman (1989) show that, under conditions of uncertainty, 
managers are especially likely to mimic the behavior of organizations to which they have 
some kind of network tie via boundary-spanning personnel. Similarly, Westphal, Gulati 
and Shortell (1997) illustrate how the impact of network ties on organizational learning 
depends on whether the diffusing practice has symbolic legitimacy. 
In recent times, the passive imagery associated with much diffusion research in 
organizational sociology has been called into question (Strang, 2010). Many critics have 
been particularly dissatisfied with how actors tend to be presented as “enacting scripts 
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written by others” (Strang, 2010: 10). The limitations of such an approach are all the 
more evident when cross-country diffusion processes are considered, where practices and 
ideas are transmitted through overlapping network of relations that often blur territorial 
and jurisdictional boundaries (Djelic & Quak, 2008). In these contexts, actors are more 
likely to be exposed to multiple and at time conflicting pressures, thus increasing the 
level of uncertainty and ambiguity in their decision making processes and their levels of 
self-reflexivity (Seo & Creed, 2002). Another point of criticism concerns the fact that 
most diffusion studies tend to focus only on the formal adoption of an innovation, with 
little attention paid to what follows (Strang, 2010). Indeed, most researchers do not 
discriminate between short-lived efforts at change and institutionalized ones (Strang, 
2010), with some important exceptions (e.g., Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002). 
However, this focus would add to our understanding of diffusion processes because it 
enables the identification of the different mechanisms and processes at play in these 
scenarios – what drives the implementation of a new practice or idea does not always 
coincide with what drives its institutionalization. Kostova (1999) and Kostova and Roth 
(2002) argue this point and differentiate between drivers’ of a subsidiary’s practice 
implementation and internalization. Additionally, while classic institutional theory 
accounts of organizational change emphasize decoupling, whereby organizations publicly 
affirm certain principles but do not implement them in their actual work (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977), they have tended to overlook the fact that ideas and practices change as 
they diffuse (e.g., Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996, 2005). To counter some of these 
tendencies, institutionalists have recently refocused their attention on issues of agency, 
particularly on the part of individuals and organizations that are subject to institutional 
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pressures (e.g., DiMaggio, 1988; Perrow, 1986). Some scholars investigate the field-level 
conditions that enable actor’s agency. Examples include emphasis on jolts or crises that 
precipitate action that diverges from a field’s existing institutions (e.g., Greenwood et al., 
2002). Such jolts can take the form of social upheaval, competitive discontinuities, 
technological disruption and regulatory changes and thus contribute to agency in the form 
of the introduction of new ideas (Oliver, 1992; Greenwood et al., 2002). Others 
emphasize the importance of the field-level heterogeneity as a condition that enables an 
actor’s exercise of agency (e.g., Sewell, 1992; Seo & Creed, 2002; Tolbert & Zucker, 
1996; for a review see Dorado, 2005). At the organizational level, the marginalization of 
organizations and social movements (e.g., Leblelici, Salancik, Copay, King, 1991; 
Haveman & Rao, 1997) and organizations’ location at the interstices of fields (e.g., Levy 
& Egan, 2003) are also likely to influence the likelihood they will act as an institutional 
entrepreneurs, and introduce new, and possibly contested practices in their institutional 
environments. Institutionalists have also developed new language to discuss the diffusion 
phenomenon. As mentioned earlier, Czarniawska and Sevón (1996, 2005) propose the 
concept of translation, with actors redesigning and adjusting global discourses rather than 
passively adopting them. Sahlin-Andersson (1996), Djelic (1998), and Sahlin-Andersson 
and Engwall (2002) develop the related constructs of editing, hybridization and 
creolization. 
2.3 Firm embeddedness  
Karl Polanyi first introduced the concept of embeddedness, most famously in The 
Great Transformation in 1944. However, it was only after Mark Granovetter’s 1985 
essay titled “Economic Action and Social Structure: The problem of Embeddedness” that 
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the concept took firm root. Since then, the concept has not only emerged as the 
organizing principle of economic sociology (Krippner & Alvarez, 2007), but it has also 
spread to a variety of sociological subfields and other disciplines, including management, 
economics, political science, economic geography, anthropology, and sustainability 
(Krippner & Alvarez, 2007; Laville, 2007). In the following paragraphs, I review a subset 
of contributions from the economic sociology and management areas that are particularly 
relevant to understand firm embeddedness as it relates to firm’s practice adoption.  
Granovetter (1985) proposes embeddedness as an antidote against the “extremes 
of under- and oversocialized conceptions” of economic action, to indicate that the latter is 
located within networks of social relations that make up the social structure. In 
neoclassical economics, these tendencies are reflected in accounts of human behavior 
where actors “behave or decide as atoms outside a social context,” and action is 
explained based on individual preferences and resource endowments (Granovetter, 1985). 
Once these elements are known, it is possible, in principle, to explain actor’s behavior 
because “s/he will always try to maximize utility or profit in an economic setting” (Baum 
& Dutton, 1996: 3). From this perspective, economic action is not influenced by social 
structure, but governed by the competitive markets. These idealized markets that involve 
“large numbers of price-taking anonymous buyers and sellers supplied with perfect 
information… function without any prolonged human or social contact between the 
parties. Under perfect competition there is no room for bargaining, negotiation, 
remonstration or mutual adjustment and the various operators that contract together need 
not enter into recurrent or continuing relationships as a result of which they would get to 
know each other well” (Hirschman, 1982: 1473). In sum, the atomized conceptualization 
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of economic action implies that “meaningful social relations are unimportant to 
competitive outcomes and lead only to anticompetitive results” (Baum & Dutton, 1996: 
3). Researchers have examined a number of situations in which, rather than operating as a 
drag on markets, social relationships can actually enhance economic performance (Uzzi, 
1996, 1997), and some of the related social network analysis ideas have already been 
reviewed above. As previously discussed, some researchers concentrate on the strength of 
interorganizational ties to explain actors’ behaviors (e.g., Granovetter, 1973; Friedkin, 
1982). Others concentrate on the patterns of these ties. For example, Baker (1984) shows 
that price volatility is reduced in smaller as opposed to larger cliques on the trading floor. 
This is because the smaller group enables information to diffuse more effectively, along 
with the enforcement of traders’ obligations. Burt (1983) identifies conditions in which 
sparse social networks are associated with increased corporate profitability.  
Subsequent research has paid more attention to the content of ties rather than 
merely the structure of ties (Powell & Smith-Doerr, 1996). For example, Uzzi (1996, 
1997) distinguishes between arm’s length and embedded interfirm ties—the former 
characterized by impersonal, diffuse and shifting in membership relationships, while the 
latter characterized by ongoing exclusive relationships among firms. He shows that 
embedded ties create value through three mechanisms, namely trust, fine-grained 
information transfer, and joint problem solving. Although analytically distinct, these 
mechanisms are not fully separable in practice. He also shows that “these positive effects 
rise up to a threshold, however, after which embeddedness can derail economic 
performance by making firms vulnerable to exogenous shocks or insulating them from 
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information that exists beyond their network” (Uzzi, 1997: 35). Podolny (1993) focuses 
on firms’ status within a network to explain tie formation and firm’s performance.  
The structural tradition has mostly dominated the embeddedness research agenda 
(Dacin et al., 1999). Structural approaches have downplayed the importance of the 
content of network ties (DiMaggio, 1992; Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Powell, Koput & 
Smith-Doerr, 1996). However, increasingly researchers point to the need to focus on the 
content of networks, because a social analysis that does not take into consideration “the 
distinctive categories, beliefs, and motives” of a network, will be unable “to explain what 
kinds of social relations have what kind of effect on the behavior of organizations and 
individuals” (Friedland & Alford, 1991: 252). While progress has been made to address 
this gap (e.g., Podolny & Baron, 1997; Lin, 2001; McEvily & Marcus, 2005), many agree 
that there is still room to advance our understanding of these issues (e.g., Adler & Kwon, 
2002; Dacin et al., 199; Kilduff & Brass, 2010).  
Criticism has also been raised about structural approaches’ lack of attention for 
actors’ cognition and the emergence of structured patterns of beliefs within networks. For 
example, DiMaggio (1992) and Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994) posit that networks are 
not mere systems of information and resources, as many structural accounts of 
organizational embeddedness seem to imply, but also areas of social life where 
institutional arrangements emerge with which actors are engaged in a co-constitutive 
manner (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2008). Thus, researchers continue to emphasize the 
importance of an increased focus on collective cognition (e.g., Peteraf & Shanley, 1997) 
and on the emergence of patterned systems of beliefs within networks (e.g., Simsek, 
Lubatkin & Floyd, 2003). These are particularly important considerations when one 
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considers the role of networks as channels of institutional forces that might contribute to 
shaping firm’s decision, including decisions about the adoption of new practices. 
Another commonly raised criticism of social network research concerns its failure 
to take into account human agency (e.g., Salancik, 1995). On this topic, Emirbayer and 
Goodwin (1994: 1413) argue that network research fails to show how “intentional, 
creative human action serves in part to constitute those very social networks that so 
powerfully constrain actors in turn.” Instead, the assumption in much network research is 
that individual and organizational actors have the abilities, skills, and motivation to take 
advantage of beneficial network positions (Kilduff & Brass, 2010: 334). Actors that are 
in a disadvantageous position are similarly assumed to lack the skills, abilities, and 
motivation to overcome the constraints upon them. These issues have brought critics to 
accuse social network analysis of failing to “offer a plausible model of individual action” 
(Friedman & McAdam, 1992: 160). 
Furthermore, Dacin et al. (1999) argue that more attention is needed to capture 
“the complexity, strength, and intensity of embeddedness” (337). They emphasize the 
importance of gathering a better understanding of multiplexity in networks of 
relationships, i.e., the multipurpose nature of interorganizational cooperation (Powell & 
Smith-Doerr, 1994). For example single ties might be multidimensional and embody 
many forms of embeddedness, such as “economic transaction, information exchange and 
social relationships” (Dacin, 1999: 337). Additionally, organizations’ might participate in 
multiple networks with multiple objectives, which creates the “need to consider the 
impact of network overlap on member behavior and outcomes” (Dacin et al., 1999: 337). 
They also point to the importance of developing a better understanding of the issue of 
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embeddedness strength. In particular, they call for more attention to whether intensity of 
relationship and extensiveness of ties might actually represent non-equivalent measures 
of embeddedness, which could lead to different managerial challenges for the firm.   
In an effort to advance the discussion about embeddedness and to explicitly 
describe its conceptual connections with other organizational theory approaches, in 
particular institutionalist approaches, Zukin and DiMaggio (1990) identify four different 
types of embeddedness, namely cognitive (i.e., “structured regularities of mental 
processes [that] limit the exercise of economic reasoning”:  15-16); cultural (i.e., “shared 
collective understandings […] shaping economic strategies and goals”: 17); structural 
(i.e., “patterns of ongoing interpersonal relations”: 18); and political (i.e.,  how social, 
political and other nonmarket institutions shape economic institutions and decisions, 
Baum & Oliver, 1996). In so doing, they identify the different mechanisms through 
which embeddedness influences economic activity by attenuating the possibility and 
practice of (economically) rational activity (Dacin et al., 1999).  
This approach is all the more appropriate if one considers the scenario faced by 
organizations that operate across multiple and varying institutional environments, which 
is the focus of this dissertation. When faced with the decision about whether to adopt 
CSR practices, not only do these organizations face differing and maybe even 
contradicting norms, beliefs and regulations in this area, which add complexity to the 
decision making process, and make it more likely to be influenced by non-rational 
factors. Patterns of ongoing interorganizational relationships are also likely to add 
varying pressures to this decision making process. Therefore, it is useful to concentrate 
on the economic and institutional aspects of firm’s embeddedness through which social 
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structure interacts to influence actor’s behavior. Specifically, economic embeddedness 
provides an effective framework for discussing interactor tie, i.e., the linkages between 
social actors, which include a wide variety of social network arrangements (Dacin et al. 
1999) and could act as carriers of institutional influences vis-à-vis a firm’s decision to 
engage in CSR. In addition, institutional embeddedness provides a framework to discuss 
the normative, cognitive and regulatory forces that are likely to influence managerial 
decision making, including decisions about the adoption of CSR practices. 
2.4 The study of practice diffusion in International Business (IB)  
The investigation of the challenges associated with diffusion processes that span 
over heterogeneous institutional environments is central to much IB research about 
practice diffusion. Some scholars focus on the effects of national institutions and forces 
on the diffusion of certain practices within countries (e.g., Kieser, 1989; Barley & Kunda, 
1992; Abrahamson & Fairchild, 1999; Jepperson & Meyer, 1991; Orrù, Biggart & 
Hamilton, 1991; Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991; Kostova & Roth, 2002). Others more 
specifically consider the institutional factors that shape the cross-national diffusion of 
practices, focusing on state structures, professionalization, and culture as possible drivers 
(e.g., Guillén, 1994; Meyer, Boli, Thomas & Ramirez, 1997; Westney, 1987). In addition, 
researchers have examined the global diffusion of quality standards. These studies tend to 
rely on neo-institutional explanations (e.g., Guler et al. 2002), arguing that country-level 
characteristics that stimulate coercive, normative, and mimetic adaptations drive the 
diffusion of standards across borders (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). For example, Guler et 
al. (2002) find that the diffusion of international standards is favored by the coercive 
effects of powerful organizations, such as the state and multinational firms; that coercive 
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or normative processes result from cohesive trade ties between countries; and that 
competition-based mimicry is generated by role-equivalence in trade. Similarly, 
Christmann and Taylor (2001) find that the diffusion of standards within developing 
countries is positively correlated with increasing trade ties and foreign investment 
because of the coercive pressures exercised by foreign investors onto the local firms.   
More recently, Czarniawska and Sevón (1996, 2005) develop the notion of 
translation to explain the global spread of an idea or practice. Translation describes 
diffusion as a combination of adaptation and construction as the practice spreads in space 
and time, and argues that local actors transform practices to fit their specific setting. 
Relatedly, Boxembaum and Battilana (2005) identify the enabling factors for the cross-
country spread of diversity management, from the United States into Denmark, at the 
individual, organizational and field levels. One of these conditions is a socially 
constructed field problem, which is perceived to be important in the local setting, but 
cannot be easily resolved with existing practices. Another condition is individuals who 
were enabled and motivated to import a foreign managerial practice as an alternative 
solution to the field problem.  
A great deal of research has focused on how innovations, both in terms of 
practices and technology, travel through  multinational firms’ subsidiaries (e.g., Kostova, 
1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Birkinshaw, 2000) and across firms in the context of 
cooperative ventures, such as strategic alliances (e.g., Simonin, 2009; Inkpen & Tsang, 
2005; Lam, 1997). Research in this area considers the effective deployment of products, 
technology, and knowledge in multiple locations as critical success factors for the MNC 
(e.g., Buckley & Casson, 1976; Hymer, 1976, Dunning, 1977; Kogut & Zander, 1993, 
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Zaheer, 1995). Sociological explanations of these phenomena tend to consider at least 
three sets of factors that are likely to influence the pattern of cross-country practice 
diffusion, namely the structure and strategy of sending and recipient units; the specific 
characteristics of practices and policies; and the degree of “fit” between the nature of the 
national system and of the practice being transferred (Ferner, Almond & Colling, 2005).  
First, in terms of structures and strategies of the sending and receiving units, some 
scholars study how the quality of the relationships might influence the transfer of 
practices (e.g., Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990; Ghoshal & Nohria, 1993; Hill, Hitt, & 
Hoskisson, 1992; Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Tsai, 2001, 2002; Tsai & 
Ghoshal, 1998). Others examine the role of intra-corporate and external networks in 
which subsidiaries are embedded (e.g., Hamel, 1991; Inkpen & Beamish, 1997; Inkpen & 
Dinur, 1998; Yan, 1998). All these studies build on a conceptualization of the MNC as a 
differentiated network of relatively autonomous subsidiaries facing heterogeneous 
national contexts (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990). They emphasize that the structural 
characteristics of the MNC intra-firm network can be important drivers for the diffusion 
of practices. For example, some consider the degree to which subsidiaries are dependent, 
and vertically controlled (Hedlund, 1986) as an important explanatory factor of the 
transfer of practices from headquarters to subsidiaries. Others consider additional 
relational factors, such as the degree of trust, dependence and identification between 
subsidiaries and headquarters as key explanatory factors of the success of knowledge 
transfers with the MNC (e.g., Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002). In some cases, 
these studies have broadened the analytical focus beyond the firm boundaries to consider 
the characteristics of the various institutional environments where the organization 
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operates, and how these might contribute to shaping diffusion processes within the 
organization through their interaction with important firm- and network-level 
characteristics (Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002).  
Second, in terms of specific characteristics of practices and policies that might 
affect the diffusion of practices, researchers have considered the degree to which the 
relevant knowledge is tacit or codified, and the extent to which decisions makers clearly 
understand the reasons for success or failure in reproducing a practice in a new context as 
important drivers of knowledge diffusion within the organization (Polanyi, 1962, 1966; 
Szulanski, 1996: 31). They also consider the degree to which the practice can be adapted 
to local needs, with higher levels of adaptability being likely to significantly improve the 
chances of transfer success (e.g., Jensen & Szulanski, 2004). Scholars of the area also 
explain the importance of interpreting the transfer of knowledge within the MNC as a 
multi-stage process, where each stage presents different challenges to the overall success 
of the transfer process (Szulanski, 1996, 2000). 
A third group of studies investigates cross-country diffusion processes as being 
influenced by institutional differences between the multinational’s country of origin and 
subsidiaries’ host countries. In this area, culturalist perspectives played a dominant role 
for a good portion of the two decades that followed the publication of Hofstede’s Culture 
Consequences in 1980. This approach has been criticized for its reductionist 
conceptualization of culture as a bounded, homogeneous, coherent, and stable entity 
(Brumann, 1999). More recent investigations of the macro levels influencing intra-firm 
diffusion processes focus on differences between national business systems and the way 
product, labor, and financial markets are governed, and the way market actors relate to 
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each other (e.g., Lane, 1989; Whitley, 1999; Hall & Soskice, 2001). These cross-national 
differences influence the spread of practices based on the degree to which the practice 
embodies an institutional logic that fits with the host countries’ institutional environment. 
For example, Kostova (1999) and Kostova and Roth (200) find support for the notion that 
dissimilarities in the country institutional profiles (CIP) of the country of origin and the 
country of operation influence intra-firm transfer success. The CIP provides a measure of 
the regulatory, normative and cognitive institutions of a country (Busenitz, Gomez & 
Spencer, 2000). When transferred practices are inconsistent with the recipient country’s 
CIP, transfer success is less likely.  
A more recent development in the international business research area focuses on 
the agency opportunities associated with the complex institutional environment where 
MNC operates with regards to firm’s decision to adopt novel practices (Kostova, Roth & 
Dacin, 2008). Emergent work in this area has identified intra-firm network characteristics 
that foster firm’s ability to engage in an active evaluation of the costs and benefits 
associated with the adoption of certain practices. For example, Saka-Helmhout and 
Geppert (2011) find that the degree to which decision making in the MNC is 
decentralized fosters subsidiaries’ ability to develop innovative strategies that draw on 
their accumulated local learning. They also find that institutional incompatibilities 
between home and host countries are unlikely to trigger the firm’s reflective capacity to 
engage in a process of change, unless local subsidiaries can also draw on supportive 
intra-firm coordination structures.  
Scholars of the area have also begun to unpack some of the political processes 
that guide MNCs decision making when these organizations are exposed to contradictory 
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institutional messages across the various contexts where they operate. Under these 
circumstances, skillful local actors can take advantage of conflicting rationalities about 
the importance of certain practices to introduce new practices that might not totally be 
consistent with local understandings, but might help the organization to strengthen its 
competitive advantage. From this point of view, subsidiaries’ practice adoption is seen as 
being affected by local resource-building strategies, and the role of locally competent 
actors in micro-political games played within the company (Geppert & Dörrenbächer, 
2011: 22-24).  
Researchers have also investigated some of the conditions that make certain 
MNCs more likely to adopt ‘contested practices’. Sanders & Tuschke (2007) define 
institutionally contested practices as those practices that conflict with local 
understandings of what represent appropriate corporate behavior. These practices are 
usually supported by some key constituents within the potential adopters’ institutional 
environment, but also face stiff opposition from other key actors within the same context. 
As they explore the emergence of stock-based options executive pay in Germany, they 
find that MNC adoption of contested practices is favored by the company’s connection 
with business partners that are located in institutional contexts with overall stronger 
institutional requirements and that consider the practice under consideration to be 
legitimate. In addition, their ability to engage in this kind of contested practice adoption 
is further inspired by their pre-existing stock of knowledge on the specific set of practices 
under consideration. They also find that privileged access to information further improve 
the chances of adoption by early mover organizations.  
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An interesting trait of these early works exploring some of the agency 
opportunities that stem from MNCs’ complex institutional environments is that, unlike 
most diffusion research, they frame practice adoption as a manifestation of non-
convergent change. They also point to the importance of an organization’s dexterity in 
dealing with the complexity of the multiple institutional environments where the firm 
operates as a key driver of successful adoption processes. In the model of firm’s adoption 
of CSR practices that I present in the next chapter, I build on some of these insights as 




MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 
Drawing on the theoretical perspectives reviewed in Chapter 2, the conceptual 
model presented in this chapter explores the role of firm’s embeddedness in the global 
business network with regards to its decision to adopt CSR practices. In summary, the 
model suggests that global business networks affect a focal organization’s adoption 
decisions as they provide access to resources and information and channel CSR related 
institutional influences from the countries where the focal firm’s multiple partners are 
located. The nature of the economic relationships in which the focal actor is engaged 
contributes to shaping their effectiveness as conduits of institutional pressures. In 
addition, the presented model suggests that the strength of the institutional requirements 
concerning CSR within the global business network, their heterogeneity, and whether the 
firm operates in institutional contexts with more stringent requirements for CSR than 





I focus on the role of a firm’s embeddedness in its global business network with 
regards to the decision to adopt CSR practices. I describe firm’s adoption of CSR 
practices as the degree to which it implements organizational practices that are aimed at 
furthering some social good, whether by reducing the negative impacts that the firm 
might have on its stakeholders, or by creating positive impacts (Sethi, 1990). CSR-related 
practices can be viewed as organizational routines that are directed at preventing negative 
externalities or compensating affected stakeholders for their impact, or that are directed at 
creating positive externalities (Husted & Allen, 2006; Kostova & Roth, 2002). Some 
main firm’s stakeholder groups include customers, employees, shareholders, suppliers, 
the government and members of the communities where the firm operates (Clarkson, 
1995). For example, a firm would create a negative externality if it released toxins that 
affect the health of its neighboring community. On the other hand, a firm would create a 
positive externality if its operations in a poor inner city neighborhood contributed to 
economic development that reduced crime in the area (Keim, 1978). CSR-related 
practices can help firms establish legitimacy and create some social capital or goodwill 
for itself in the environments in which they operate (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999)  
Figure 1.1 provides a visual representation of a firm’s global business network. In 
this hypothetical example, the U.S. based manufacturer named “Company A” owns 
operations and has employees in the United States. In addition, Company A has 
import/export ties with Germany-based suppliers/buyers, import ties with Vietnam- and 
China-based suppliers, and export ties with France-based buyers. Company A also owns 


















business partners  
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Figure 3.1: Example of a company global business network 
 
Given the global geographic dispersion of Company A’s global business network, 
the firm is likely to be exposed to a variety of institutional arrangements concerning CSR. 
This is because as the firm interacts with the alter organizations (both through trade- and 
FDI-based relationships) that make up its global business network, it is also exposed to 
these organizations’ CSR-related expectations and actual practices, which reflect, to some 
degree, their respective institutional environments. Flows of information between the 
focal firm and its business partners may take place because of repeated exchanges among 
their employees, general exposure to the partner’s technologies, organizational practices, 
and strategies to imitate these techniques in the focal firm’s operations, interactions with 
common third parties (e.g., other suppliers, distributors), informal inter-firm interactions, 
and employee turnover (Gereffi, 1999; Gereffi, Humphrey & Sturgeon, 2005; Gibbon & 
Ponte, 2005; Hess & Coe, 2006; Palpacuer & Tozanli, 2008; Spencer, 2008). 
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To explain the role of the complex embeddedness faced by firms in their global 
business networks as they consider the adoption of CSR practices, I focus on two aspects 
of the environment in which the firm operates: institutional and economic embeddedness 
in the global business network. In the context of this study, institutional embeddedness 
refers to the institutional content of the network, in particular its CSR-related norms, 
rules, beliefs (Kostova, 1997; Scott, 2008) and the uniformity (or lack thereof) of such 
forces within the global business network. For example, a firm might be engaged with 
business partners located in countries where certain CSR-related practices are mandated 
by law, and/or where organizations are expected to engage in certain philanthropic 
initiatives, and/or where individuals have strong beliefs about the importance of 
environmental conservation. Through its exchanges with these business partners, the 
focal firm is also exposed to these rules, norms and beliefs concerning CSR. The 
anchoring of the institutional content of a global business network to a specific issue (i.e., 
CSR) is consistent with previous work showing that institutional dimensions are domain 
specific (e.g., Kostova & Roth, 2002). In some cases, the firm might experience a high 
level of consistency in the degree of CSR-related institutional favorability it faces within 
its global business network. In other instances, firms might experience varying 
expectations, beliefs and/or requirements concerning CSR. For example, a firm with 
business partners located in Germany, Somalia and Vietnam is likely to experience more 
variance in the types of norms, beliefs and rules concerning CSR emanating from these 




Economic embeddedness is defined as the type and quantity of economic 
resources that flow through a network and determine the degree of dependence of the 
focal firm on a specific partner.  I focus on two different types of dependence of the focal 
firm on the alter organizations that make up its global business network, which reflects 
the perceived importance of the relationship, namely trade- and FDI-based dependence. 
In the case of buyer-supplier relationships, dependence could reflect the proportion of the 
focal firm’s outputs that are purchased by a buyer organization (Provan, 1993). For FDI-
based ties, dependence arises in the relationships among parent firms and their 
subsidiaries (i.e., among multinational corporation headquarters and subsidiaries; e.g., 
Kostova & Roth, 2002; Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990). On the one hand, a multinational’s 
subunits can be dependent on headquarters for “providing major resources, including 
technology, capital, and expertise” (Kostova & Roth, 2002: 218). On the other hand, 
headquarters’ dependence on a subsidiary arises when a “subsidiary represents a pool of 
rich resources in an overall resource distribution that cannot be altered at will, and indeed 
tends to persist over time” (Ghoshal & Nohria, 1989: 325). FDI-based dependence 
involves the shared fate of the MNC with its subunits, and a greater likelihood that 
subunits will cooperate and exchange knowledge for the good of the entire organization. 
A focal firm’s dependence can be associated with perceived threat of jeopardizing the 
relationship with an important business partner, and as such, influences firm response. 
Despite the variety of possible CSR behaviors suggested by the diverse institutional 
templates coming from various partners, the firm is likely to model its response after the 
more influential ones. In other words, the more a focal firm perceives a particular alter 
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organization to be critical for its success, the more likely it is to model its behavior after 
that firm (Peteraf & Shanley, 1997).  
3.2 Global business networks  
The proposed conceptualization of a global business network is related to the 
constructs of “global production networks” and “global supply chain” put forward by 
scholars of international production, including Henderson, Dicken, Hess, Coe and eung 
(2002), Dicken and Henderson (2003) and Coe, Hess, Yeung, Dicken and Henderson 
(2004). Consistently with the definition of a global business network presented above, 
these researchers characterize global business networks as structures that blur traditional 
organizational boundaries through the development of diverse forms of equity and non-
equity relationships, which span across multiple regional and national economies (Coe et 
al., 2004: 471).  These researchers concentrate on understanding how these networks 
might influence sub-national regional development and clustering dynamics. I argue that 
research on global business networks can also emphasize their role as social communities 
where specific institutional arrangements concerning CSR emerge over time. 
Specifically, I suggest that global business networks are focal firm-specific, span multiple 
countries, and entail different types of economic ties between the focal firm and its 
business partners, namely inter-firm trade-based relationships and intra-firm, FDI-based 
relationships. These economic ties are both channels through which resources and 
information can be accessed and “networks of meanings” (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994), 
or sensemaking communities, in which focal firms are socialized into certain institutional 
arrangements, including CSR-related matters. As focal firms become increasingly 
involved in these networks, they develop understandings and views about what they 
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consider to be appropriate courses of action (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994: 1441). Thus, 
participation in these networks can influence the degree to which a firm positively or 
negatively evaluates CSR issues, and its propensity to adopt CSR practices.  
There are different types of global business networks. As I further elaborate in the 
construct development section of this chapter, I consider a number of economic and 
institutional characteristics that can be used to classify these networks. Specifically, they 
can vary because of focal actor’s degree of economic embeddedness across the various 
countries where the focal firm’s business partners are located. At one extreme, there are 
firms with very small business networks, which are predominantly embedded in their 
home countries or have small exchange relationships with business partners located 
outside of their home countries. At the other extreme, there are firms with large business 
networks, where the focal actor engages in sizable economic exchanges with actors that 
are located outside of their home countries. These economic relationships can be of 
different types, including FDI-based relationships and trade-based relationships. Global 
business networks also vary based on the different types of institutional forces that they 
harbor. Because I rely on an issue-based approach to evaluating the role of institutions 
with regards to firm’s behavior (Kostova & Roth, 2002), I consider how the composite 
forces of the various institutional contexts in a global business network support the 
diffusion of CSR practices, as well as the heterogeneity of these forces within the 
network.  
These properties of a firm’s global business network are discussed in greater 
detail in subsequent sections of this chapter. For now, I illustrate four examples of global 
business networks. Based on the analytical dimensions discussed above, I investigate the 
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global business networks of two firms (i.e., General Mills and FMC) with very large and 
geographically spread sets of economic relationships. In addition, while General Mills 
operates across a large number of CSR-friendly countries, FMC is more tied to business 
partners located in countries with weaker CSR-related institutional settings. The other 
two firms (i.e., Applied Materials and Acuity Brands) have much smaller global business 
networks compared to those of General Mills and FMC. Like General Mills, Applied 
Materials operates in an overall CSR-friendly global business network. Like FMC, 
Acuity Brands’ global business network includes a majority of countries with weaker 
support for CSR initiatives. These examples can be organized along the two by two 
matrix depicted in Table 3.1 below. In this table, size of the global business network 
refers to the number of countries across which the firm operates, both through 
import/export ties and FDI. For illustrative purposes, I arbitrarily set a threshold of 15 
countries to separate “small” global business networks (which would include up to 15 
countries) from “large” ones (which would include more than 15 countries). I choose this 
value because it represents the average number of countries in which firms in the sample 
operate, as I further discuss in the methods section of the dissertation. As for the degree 
of CSR-related institutional favorability, this refers to the degree to which a country 
where the focal firm’s business partners are located adopts policies and initiatives that 
support the diffusion of CSR initiatives (Kostova & Roth, 2002). To capture this CSR-
related institutional favorability, which I also further discuss in subsequent sections of 
this chapter, I rely on the Responsible Competitiveness Index (RCI), an index that 
researchers have used in the past to measure the quality of the national institutional 
context for CSR (e.g., Peng & Beamish, 2008). This index ranges from 0-100, with 
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higher values indicating a more favorable institutional environment for the diffusion of 
CSR practices (Zadek & McGillivray, 2007, 2008). I further describe this index in the 
methods section of the dissertation. Again, I set an arbitrary analytical threshold to 
separate countries with “low” CSR-related institutional favorability from those with 
“high” CSR-related institutional favorability. I set this threshold at 60, because this value 
separates the top half from the bottom half of the actual distribution of the index values.  
 
Table 3.1:  Typology of global business networks, based on the cases of General 






of the global 
business 
network 
 Size of the global business network 
Small  Large 









The graphical representations of these firms’ global business networks are created 
with UCINET 6.0, a popular social network analysis software. In these network charts, 
the grey circle at the center of the network represents the company of interest. The size of 
this circle is not commensurate with the company’s size. Black and white circles 
connected to the grey circle at the center of the network represent the countries where the 
firm’s business partners are located. Their size varies with the intensity of the firm’s 
business relationship with local business partners – larger circles indicate that the focal 
firm has a deeper economic embeddedness in that context, because of more intense 
import/export ties and/or FDI. In addition, white circles represent countries with high 
levels of CSR-related institutional favorability, while black circles represent countries 
with low levels of CSR-related institutional favorability. The charts below represent the 
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above-mentioned companies’ networks in 2010. Appendix A illustrates the evolution of 
these networks between 2007 and 2010. 
Figure 3.2 depicts General Mills’ global business network in 2010. General Mills 
is headquartered in Minnesota and is one the largest food companies in the world. Its 
brand portfolio includes more than 100 leading U.S. brands, including Betty Crocker, 
Yoplait, Häagen-Dazs, Cheerios and Trix, and numerous category leaders around the 
world. In 2012, the company had sales for $14.7 billion worldwide, the majority of which 
were in the United States (Hoover, 2013a). In 2010 General Mills’ business network 
stretched over 60 countries. In this network, about one third of the countries where the 
focal firm business partners are located are characterized by high levels of CSR-related 
institutional favorability. As one can see from the chart, there is a certain degree of 
variability in the CSR-related institutional quality of the countries where the firm 
operates, ranging from Pakistan’s low levels of CSR-related institutional favorability 
(RCI score = 41.4) to Sweden’s very high levels of institutional favorability (RCI score = 
81.4). However, the firm tends to have more intense and durable economic relationships 
with business partners that operate in countries with stronger CSR-related institutional 
frameworks (e.g., United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, France and Ireland; see also 
Appendix A). Furthermore, the less CSR-oriented countries with which the firm has the 
most sizable economic relationships are not at the bottom of the RCI rankings and 





Figure 3.2: General Mills’ global business network, 2010 
 
FMC’s 2010 global business network is depicted in Figure 3.3. FMC Corporation 
is headquartered in Pennsylvania and is a large chemical manufacturing company. In 
2012, 35% of the company’s sales were in North America, 31% in Latin America, 17% in 
Asia/Pacific, and 17% Europe/Middle East/North Africa (Hoover, 2013b). As the chart 
suggests, the company is also embedded in a large global business network, stretching 
over 40 countries. In addition, it suggests that FMC tends to predominantly operate in 
countries with low CSR-related institutional quality. Further, some of FMC’s most 
intense and durable economic relationships involve business partners located in countries 
with generally low levels of CSR-related institutional favorability (see also Appendix A). 
In sum, while both General Mills and FMC experience a considerable amount of 
heterogeneity of CSR-related institutional quality across the various countries that make 
up their global business networks, FMC’s network is less CSR-friendly that General 
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Mills’. These observations are also confirmed by a quick inspection of the RCI scores for 
all the countries where these firms operate between 2007 and 2010: while the average 
RCI score for FMC is 57, that for General Mills is 61. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: FMC’s global business network, 2010 
 
Applied Materials’ global business network is one of the world’s largest 
producers of semiconductor production equipment. Headquartered in Santa Clara, 
California, the company had $10.5 billion sales in 2011, the majority of which were in 
Asia (Hoover, 2013c). Figure 3.4 indicates that the firm has a smaller global business 
network with regards to those of General Mills and FMC. Between 2007-2010, the 
company operated in about 10 countries (see also Appendix A). The company has 
durable and intense economic relationships with business partners located in countries 
characterized by high levels of CSR-related institutional favorability, including 
Singapore, the Netherlands, and Japan. The only exception is its relationships with 
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business partners located in China. Based on the RCI ratings, the average CSR-related 
institutional quality of Applied Materials’ global business network between 2007 and 
2010 is about 66.  
 
Figure 3.4: Applied Materials’ global business network, 2010 
 
Acuity Brands is a leading producer of indoor/outdoor lighting fixtures based in 
Georgia. In 2012 the company had sales for $1.9 billion, the majority of which were in 
the United States (Hoover, 2013d). Figure 3.5 depicts Acuity Brands’ 2010 global 
business network. Acuity Brands’ global business network consists of 8 countries on the 
average between 2007 and 2010. Between 2007 and 2010, some of the company’s more 
sizable and durable economic relationships involved business partners located in 
countries with lower CSR-related institutional quality, e.g., China (47.2) and Mexico 
(54.2). In addition, the firm does not have strong and enduring economic ties with 
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business partners located in countries with high levels of CSR-related institutional 
settings.  
Appendix A includes additional examples of the global business networks of 
General Mills, FMC, Applied Materials and Acuity Brands. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Acuity Brands’ global business network, 2010 
3.3 Hypotheses development 
Consistent with the proposed embeddedness approach, I suggest that CSR 
adoption by a focal firm will be influenced by factors reflecting both institutional and 
economic aspects of the firm’s participation in the global business network. Institutional 
and economic aspects of embeddedness should be considered jointly because the nature 
of the economic relationship between partners (economic embeddedness) affects how 
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social pressures (institutional embeddedness) are channeled through the network (Owen-
Smith & Powell, 2008). To capture the joint relationship of institutional and economic 
influences with regards to a firm’s decision to adopt CSR practices, I introduce the novel 
constructs of global business network commitment to CSR and within global business 
network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR, and then explore the interaction effect 
between these two factors on the firm’s adoption of CSR-related practices. I also examine 
the role of ties to business partners located in countries with more stringent CSR 
institutional requirements with regards to the firm’s decision to adopt CSR practices. I 
also investigate the differing effects of different types of economic ties on firm’s 
adoption decisions, looking at both FDI- and trade-based ties.  
My explanation of the decision to adopt CSR practices has three components. 
First, firms embedded in global business networks are exposed to mounting levels of 
institutional diversity across the various institutional contexts where they directly operate 
or through their ties to business partners. This creates a condition of heightened 
complexity and ambiguity—in other words, the firm is exposed to multiple, overlapping 
and sometimes conflicting institutional pressures concerning CSR; as a result, the firm 
must interpret this complexity and/or ambiguity before responding to institutional forces, 
and may have to prioritize among competing pressures (Oliver, 1991). Second, this 
condition of heightened ambiguity and institutional complexity as to what might 
represent appropriate behavior in terms of adopting CSR practices is also associated with 
learning opportunities about novel organizational arrangements and practices (Zahra, 
Ireland & Hitt, 2000). This is because competing institutional messages about the 
importance of CSR force the firm to reflect on the appropriate course of action and 
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develop innovative routines to deal with this complexity in a manner that does not hinder 
its ability to operate effectively and legitimately across the various institutional contexts 
that make up the global business network. Third, these networks of domestic and foreign 
business partners represent important channels through which institutional pressures can 
reach the focal actor (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994). As these firms’ economic 
dependence on domestic and foreign business partners grows, the home country-based 
institutional constraints might become less relevant in shaping their behavior (Greenwood 
et al., 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2008).  






Figure 3.6: Summary of hypotheses 
 
3.3.1 Global business network’s commitment to CSR 
CSR-related institutional influences flow to the focal actor through the channels 
of its exchange relationships with the business partners that make up its global business 
network. The first conceptualization of the joint effect of institutional and economic 
embeddedness is through the construct of the global business network commitment to 
CSR, as the joint effect of the favorability to CSR of the various institutional 
environments where a focal firm’s business partners are located and the firm’s degree of 
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favorable institutional environments as “those that contribute in a positive way to the 
adoption of a practice through regulations, laws, and rules supporting and/or requiring the 
practice; cognitive structures that help people understand and interpret the practice 
correctly; and social norms enforcing the practice” (218). The proposed definition 
accounts for the CSR-related institutional favorability of each of the environments where 
the firm operates, but weights each of them based on the level of economic 
embeddedness the firm has on business partners operating in those environments both in 
the context of FDI-based and trade-based relationships. 
 Global business network’s commitment to CSR is focal firm-specific, because 
each firm depends on a specific set of alter firms from a unique set of countries to unique 
degrees. It is also a network-level construct, because it captures the cumulative effect of 
all the CSR-related institutional favorability that is found within the focal firm’s global 
business network. Business partners operating in countries characterized by higher levels 
of commitment to CSR are enabled by favorable local institutions (e.g., laws, norms and 
shared beliefs) concerning CSR. Pressed into higher degrees of compliance by national 
laws, norms and/or shared beliefs, these alter organizations are also more likely to 
channel CSR-related pressures to the focal firm, as they engage in economic exchanges 
with it. However, the importance of these influences will also be contingent upon the 
degree to which the focal firm depends on these alter firms. 
Higher levels of network commitment to CSR should help focus organizational 
leaders’ attention on CSR issues and stimulate the emergence of an organizational 
climate that favors implementation and appreciation of CSR-related initiatives 
(Andersson & Batemen, 1998). Furthermore, if such higher levels of commitment also 
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come from partners on whom the focal firm is highly dependent, focal firms’ managers 
will be more likely to view CSR initiatives as critical to their organization and act on 
these pressures (Bansal & Roth, 2000). Higher global business network’s commitment 
will also provide the focal firm with a better understanding of the possible benefits and 
challenges associated with CSR. This is because higher network commitment reflects 
more intense economic relationships with actors that hail from institutional contexts that 
are more favorable to CSR. More intense economic relationships have been found to 
perform as better conduits of information (Zahra, Ireland & Hitt, 2000). Such conditions 
will also alleviate some of the uncertainty associated with the adoption of CSR initiatives 
(George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin & Barden, 2006). Therefore, I propose: 
Hypothesis 1: A focal firm’s adoption of CSR practices will be positively related 
to the overall CSR commitment of its global business network. 
 
3.3.2 Within global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR  
As global business networks include partners in multiple countries, they are also 
likely to channel institutional environments that have substantial variance in terms of 
their favorability for CSR. For example, a focal firm whose global business network 
spans Germany, the United States, and China is likely to experience a certain degree of 
variance in terms of its business partners’ commitment to CSR. In Germany and the 
United States, support for CSR issues is widespread. In both countries companies are 
held to high standards of compliance with regard to labor issues, consumer rights, and 
environmental concerns (Tolhurst & Embaye, 2010). However, the relevance of 
particular CSR issues, such as the use of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs), or 
the importance of health care insurance appears to be greater for American than German 
firms (Matten & Moon, 2005). Far from being the expression of German firms’ lesser 
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concern for these issues, this situation instead reflects the stricter German regulations in 
these areas. Scholars agree that the different institutional requirements in the two 
countries have fostered a more “implicit” CSR approach among German firms, and a 
more “explicit” CSR approach among U.S. firms (Matten & Moon, 2005). Finally, in 
China, support for CSR practices is not widespread or uniform, although attitudes 
towards these practices have improved since the 1990s and early 2000s, when 
government officials still expressed skepticism and hostility towards international CSR 
standards (Lee & Wickerham, 2010). For example, environmental damage brought about 
by industrial activity still costs China between 3% and 10% of its GDP according to some 
estimates (Lee & Wickerham, 2010). In addition, there are widespread concerns about 
product safety, with several scandals in this area, including the melamine scare in dairy 
and egg products in late 2008 (Moore, 2008) or the Mattel toy safety incident in 2007 
(Story, 2007). Corruption is also endemic, as indicated by the 6227 commercial bribery 
cases that were documented by China’s General Industrial and Commercial 
Administration in 2008 (Lee & Wickerham, 2010).       
 While the overall global business network’s commitment to CSR provides an 
adequate indicator of the general strength of existing CSR-related pressures within the 
network, it does not capture the varying level of support for these practices across the 
multiple institutional contexts that make up the global business network. Indeed, a high 
level of a global business network’s commitment to CSR could reflect both a 
homogenous distribution of high commitment levels among the various institutional 
environments that make up the global business network, as well as a combination of very 
high commitment and low commitment levels. A firm that is embedded in the latter 
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scenario might experience contradicting CSR-related demands. I refer to the variance in 
the commitment to CSR as within global business network heterogeneity of commitment 
to CSR. Greater within global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR 
implies less convergence about the importance of CSR across the various institutional 
contexts that make up the global business network. This lack of convergence is likely to 
make it more difficult for the firm to develop a clear understanding about the importance 
of CSR practices. This is because the firm is exposed to varying messages about these 
practices, so that what would make its conduct legitimate in one context might not work 
in others. Heterogeneity of institutional messages concerning CSR therefore contributes 
to shaping the relationship between global business network commitment to CSR and 
firm’s adoption of CSR practices, by weakening the isomorphic pressures associated with 
commitment. Conversely, when a firm’s global business network is consistently 
supportive (or non-supportive) of the diffusion of CSR practices and there is little 
variation in the institutional messages concerning the importance of CSR that reach the 
focal actor, the firm becomes more likely to adopt (or not adopt) these practices because 
of the strong legitimacy incentives associated with the institutional pressures in this area. 
In other words, when the global business network commitment to CSR grows and within 
global business network heterogeneity decreases, firms are more likely to adopt CSR 
practices because of the consistently uniform cues to do so that they receive from within 
their network. More formally, I argue that:  
Hypothesis 2a: As within global business network heterogeneity of commitment 
to CSR decreases, focal firm’s adoption of CSR practices becomes more 





While growing levels of within global business network commitment to CSR 
make it harder for the firm to develop a clear understanding about the importance of CSR 
practices by exposing the organization to varying assessments of these practices, they can 
also strengthen firm’s learning in this area. This is because as the firm is exposed to a 
broader spectrum of business partners from different countries (Zhara, Ireland & Hitt, 
2000) with varying understandings of the importance of CSR practices, it also becomes 
less likely to take any specific set of institutional influences for granted (Battilana, Leca 
& Boxembaum, 2002; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998; Seo & Creed, 2002; Sewell, 1992). In 
addition, the firm is faced with the related challenge of not being able to just conform to 
one set of expectations (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Kostova, Roth & Dacin, 2008). This 
means that in order to be legitimate across the various institutional contexts where it 
operates, the firm is forced to search for innovative solutions that are better suited to 
satisfying diverse and potentially conflicting expectations (Simon, 1955). Therefore, as 
firms attempt to develop inferences from the multiplicity of CSR-related institutional 
messages that they experience within their global business network, they can also 
develop richer understandings, skills and routines in this area (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 
1990; Levitt & March, 1988).  
As within global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR grows, 
firm’s decision to adopt of CSR practices might not always be a simple response to 
pressures and legitimacy threats. Firms might instead learn from the multiplicity of 
experiences of their business partners, and make decisions based on the anticipated 
efficiency benefits (Haunschild & Chandler, 2008). This is even more likely to be the 
case when global business network commitment to CSR is low, because weaker 
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isomorphic pressures imply that firm’s decision making in this area is more likely to be 
inspired by the firm’s active evaluation of the potential benefits associated with a certain 
course of action. Therefore, I more formally argue that: 
Hypothesis 2b: As global business network commitment to CSR decreases, focal 
firm’s adoption of CSR practices becomes more positively related to within 
global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR. 
 
3.3.3 Ties with business partners located in countries with more stringent CSR 
institutional requirements 
Global business network commitment to CSR and within global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR reflect network-level institutional and economic 
forces that contribute to shaping a firm’s decision to adopt CSR practices. However, it is 
also possible that some particular relationships might exert unique effects on focal firms’ 
adoption of CSR-related practices, because they connect the firm to institutional contexts 
that have more stringent CSR institutional requirements. Such exchange relationships 
expose the firm to the rationale and local legitimacy of practices that might not be as 
strongly supported in the firm’s home country. This could then result in a reevaluation of 
the firm’s assumptions about these novel practices (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). 
Research has shown that when organizations operate in a country of similar or greater 
standing than its home base, they become more likely to be influenced by the rationale 
and local legitimacy of practices stemming from that institutional context (Sanders & 
Tuschke, 2007). Exchange relationships with business partners located in countries with 
more stringent institutional requirements in the CSR area operate as conduits for these 
influences to reach the focal firm. These relationships offer the focal firm an opportunity 
to understand that while these practices might not be widely accepted in its home 
59 
 
country, they are embraced in a prestigious institutional environment, and are adopted by 
firms of similar or higher status (Sanders & Tuschke, 2007). In these circumstances, the 
focal firm is more likely to upgrade its own CSR practices in order to achieve legitimacy 
in these host countries. Thus, I predict that: 
Hypothesis 3: A firm is more likely to adopt CSR practices to the extent that it has 
ties with business partners in countries with more stringent CSR institutional 
requirements.  
 
3.3.4 FDI- versus trade-based relationships in the global business network 
Distinguishing between the effects of focal firm’s trade based and FDI-based ties 
within the global business network is also important, because they imply varying degrees 
of tie strength among the focal firm and its business partners, and, by extension, differing 
capacities to channel pressures from the local institutional environment into the global 
business network and onto the focal firm (e.g., Kogut & Zander, 1992).  Trade 
relationships based on a firm’s exports and imports ties reflect the proportion of the focal 
firm’s inputs and outputs that are exchanged with alter organizations (e.g., Provan, 1993). 
FDI-based relationships are those that exist between parent firms and their subsidiaries 
(i.e., among multinational corporation headquarters and subsidiaries; e.g., Kostova & 
Roth, 2002).  
While both trade- and FDI-based relationships help defining the degree to which 
the focal actor is exposed to social forces stemming from its global business network, the 
former should be a less effective conduit for CSR-related institutional pressures than the 
latter since trade-based ties tend be weaker than FDI-based ties. Unlike trade ties, FDI-
based relationships involve transfers of capital, managerial expertise, shared 
organizational values, and a lasting interest in the assets owned by the company in the 
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host country, and, therefore, in the host country itself (Bandelj, 2002). This lasting 
interest implies the focal organization’s capability to work within the social expectations 
of its various local institutional environments, including those concerning CSR. This is 
not necessarily the case with trade-based ties between focal firm and alter organizations, 
which tend to be more impersonal, shifting in membership (Uzzi, 1996), and perform as a 
less effective knowledge transfer channel than FDI-based relationships (Kogut & Zander, 
1992). The varying strength of these relationships is likely to impact all forces stemming 
from within the global business network. Therefore I put forward the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4a: The type of tie between the focal firm and its partners in the global 
business network moderates the effect of global business network commitment to 
CSR on firm’s adoption of CSR practices, such that the positive effect of global 
business network commitment to CSR is stronger for FDI-based relationships 
than trade-based relationships. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: The type of tie between the focal firm and its partners in the 
global business network moderates the effect of within global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR on the relationship between global business 
network commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of CSR practices, such that this 
effect is stronger for FDI-based relationships than trade-based relationships. 
 
Hypothesis 4c: The type of tie between the focal firm and its partners in the global 
business network moderates the effect of global business network commitment to 
CSR on the relationship between within global business network heterogeneity of 
commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of CSR practices, such that this effect is 
stronger for FDI-based relationships than trade-based relationships. 
 
Hypothesis 4d: The type of tie between the focal firm and its partners in the 
global business network moderates the effect of the firm’s ties to business 
partners in countries with more stringent CSR requirements on adoption of CSR 





RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This chapter describes the research design and methodology to test the theoretical 
model presented in chapter 3. It illustrates data sources and population sample; variable 
operationalizations; a description of the statistical method, model specification, and 




The sample in this study consists of publicly traded U.S. firms listed on the 
Russell 3000 index with matching information from the Kinder, Lydenberg and Domani 
(KLD), Port Import Export Report Service (PIERS), Corporate Affiliations and 
Compustat databases. The Russell 3000 index lists the largest U.S. multinationals in 
terms of market capitalization. This is an appropriate sample because these firms have 
                                                          
1
 At an early stage of this project, I conducted ten interviews with managers from several large corporations 
such as Wal-Mart, BMW, Michelin, and Whole Foods. These interviews illustrated some of challenges 
associated with the implementation of ambitious CSR programs within MNCs and their global business 
networks both from the point of view of large multinational buyers, their suppliers and civil society 
stakeholders. They also helped refine my thinking about the construct of global business network as an 
actor-centered nexus of equity and non-equity relationships that span multiple countries. Also, the 
conversations and the research I carried out to support the related outreach activities helped me refine my 
understanding about the importance of these global networks for the study of the diffusion of CSR 
practices.     
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extensive global trade-based and FDI-based ties, and their social and environmental 
performance has been tracked for a number of years. The sampling history covers the 
years 2007-2011 since this is the coverage of the PIERS and KLD databases. After 
matching these databases, the sample consisted of 710 firms. The average firm size in 
2007 was US$182.6 billion in total assets. The largest firm was Citigroup Inc. (US$218.7 
billion) and the smallest was Jones Soda Co. (US$41.6 million). The sampled firms 
operated in up to 114 countries and 15 on average. Table 4.1 describes the industries 
represented in the sample, and provides a sample breakdown by industrial sector. The 
largest group of firms in the sample belongs to the manufacturing sector (340 firms), 
followed by the consumer goods sector (100 firms), professional and information services 
sector (95 firms), pharmaceutical and biotechnology sector (79 firms), energy and 























Consumer Goods  
 
This sector includes companies that relate to items 
purchased by individuals rather than by manufacturers and 








This sector includes companies involved in the production 
and sale of energy, including extraction (e.g., mining, oil 





This sector includes companies that manufacture and 
distribute a wide range of food and beverages; crop 
producers, livestock and meat producers, poultry and egg 
companies, dairy farmers, tobacco companies, food 





This sector includes companies operating in the provision 
of professional, scientific and technical services (e.g., legal 
advice and representation; accounting, bookkeeping and 
payroll services; architectural, engineering, and specialized 
design services; computer services; consulting services; 
research services; advertising services). It also includes 
companies offering services in the finance and insurance 
sectors.   
95 13.38% 
Manufacturing This sector includes companies engaged in the mechanical, 
physical, or chemical transformation of materials, 





This sector includes companies that operate in the 
development, production, and marketing of drugs or 
pharmaceuticals licensed for use as medications; as well as 
companies involved the in application of biology and 
technology to develop innovative products and services. 
79 11.13% 
Total   710 100% 
 
4.2 Data sources 
To measure the dependent variable - adoption of CSR practices, I use the KLD 
database. Launched in 1991, KLD’s categorical ratings comprise the largest and most 
comprehensive multidimensional database of firm-specific social performance ratings. As 
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such, KLD ratings are used widely by academics and investors (e.g., Berman, Wicks, 
Kotha, & Jones, 1999; Waddock & Graves, 1997). Starting in 2003, KLD’s coverage was 
extended to the 3,000 largest U.S.-based companies by market capitalization. KLD rates 
firm’s adoption of CSR practices across seven areas: community relations, diversity, 
corporate governance, employee relations, environment, human rights, and product 
quality and safety. Each category is subcategorized into strengths, which rate positive 
environmental and social externalities, and concerns, ratings of firm’s negative 
environmental and social externalities (Tashman & Rivera, 2010). KLD ratings can 
receive a score of 1 or 0. A score of 1 indicates that the firm has been rated positively on 
a specific criterion, while 0 indicates lack of strength. Similarly, KLD concerns ratings 
can also receive a score of 1 or 0. Here a score of 1 would indicate the presence of a 
concern, while a score of 0 would indicate its absence. KLD ratings are based on a 
number of sources, including reports from company data, research partners, articles 
ranking companies on particular issues (e.g., Working Mother Magazine’s “100 Best 
Companies to Work For”), public documents such as Securities and Exchange 
Commission filings, and information from government and nongovernmental 
organizations. 
To measure focal firm’s economic embeddedness in global business networks, I 
use firm-level exports and imports data from the PIERS database and data on firm-level 
foreign direct investment from the Corporate Affiliations database. The PIERS database 
is one of the most accurate and comprehensive databases available concerning U.S. 
export and import activities (Peng, Zhou & York, 2006). PIERS collects information 
directly from U.S. Customs documents about every export and import shipment to and 
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from the U.S. and then verifies the data with their quality control staff. The Corporate 
Affiliations database contains historical sales and employment levels of corporate family 
trees, including parent companies and domestic and foreign subsidiaries.  
To measure institutional embeddedness, I follow Peng and Beamish (2008) and 
rely on the Responsible Competitiveness Index (RCI), which is a measure of country-
level CSR-related institutional favorability from the Institute of Social and Ethical 
Accountability (AccountAbility) and the Fundação Dom Cabral (Zadek & MacGillivray, 
2007, 2008). The RCI was originally created in 2003 with the intention to create a 
summary measure to rate a country’s degree of support for CSR-related initiatives. It 
relies on 21 indicators, clustered around three primary domains, namely: (1) “policy 
drivers” (measuring the degree to which public policies encourage responsible business 
practices); (2) “business action” (measuring the application of governance, social and 
environmental good practice, codes and management systems at the firm level); and (3) 
“social enablers” (measuring the broader social and political environment as they support 
collaborative efforts among government and civil society organizations).  
Finally, I rely on the Compustat database to develop several firm-level control 
variables and the NAICS industry classifications to control for industry effects.  
4.3 Measures 







Table 4.2: Variables, measures, and sources of data 
Variable Measure Value Source 
Adoption of 
CSR practices  






Indicator of the degree to which the focal actor is economically embedded 
through FDI and import/export ties in institutional contexts that are 
favorable to the diffusion of CSR practices 
Continuous   
Global business network’s commitment to CSRi =                                              




Dependenceij =  degree of FDI- and import/export-based dependence of 
firm i at time t on economic ties within country j;  
0-4 Computed using data from 
Piers and Corporate 
Affiliations 








Indicator of the degree to which the focal actor is embedded through FDI 
ties in institutional contexts that are favorable to the diffusion of CSR 
practices 
Continuous   
FDI-based global business network’s commitment to CSRi =                               
Σ (FDI-based Dependenceij * Favorabilityj)   
FDI-based Dependenceij =  degree of  FDI-based dependence of firm i on 
relationships within country j;  
0-2 Computed using data from 
Corporate Affiliations 








Indicator of the degree to which the focal actor is embedded through 
import/export ties in institutional contexts that are favorable to the 
diffusion of CSR practices 
Continuous   
Trade-based global business network’s commitment to CSRi =                               









Trade-based Dependenceij =  degree of import/export-based dependence 
of firm i on economic ties within country j;  
0-2 Computed using data from 
Piers 









Indicator of the variance of commitment to CSR within the focal firm's 
global business network 
Continuous   
Global business network’s commitment to CSRi =                                               
σ (Dependenceij * Favorabilityj)
2
  
    
Dependenceitj =  degree of FDI- and import/export-based dependence of 
firm i on economic ties within country j;  
0-4 Computed using data from 
Piers and Corporate 
Affiliations 








Indicator of the variance of commitment to CSR within the focal firm's 
FDI-based global business network 
Continuous   
FDI-based global business network’s commitment to CSRi =                                              
σ (FDI-based Dependenceij * Favorabilityj)
2
   
Dependenceij =  degree of FDI-based dependence of firm i on economic 
ties within country j;  
0-2 Computed using data from 
Piers and Corporate 
Affiliations 








Indicator of the variance of commitment to CSR within the focal firm's 
trade-based global business network 
Continuous   
Trade-based global business network’s commitment to CSRi =                                              
σ (Trade-based Dependenceij * Favorabilityj)
2
   
    
Trade-based Dependenceij =  degree of import/export-based dependence 
of firm i on economic ties within country j;  
0-2 Computed using data from 
Piers  














Indicator of whether the firm has FDI and/or import/export ties in at least 
a country with more favorable CSR-related institutional context than that 
of its home country 







Indicator of whether the firm has FDI ties in at least a country with more 
favorable CSR-related institutional context than that of its home country 







Indicator of whether the firm has import/export ties in at least a country 
with more favorable CSR-related institutional context than that of its 
home country 
0 or 1 RCI 
ROA Returns on assets, measured as the ratio of net income to net assets Continuous Compustat 
R&D Intensity Ratio of R&D expenditures to total sales Continuous Compustat 
Capital Intensity Ratio of total assets to total sales Continuous Compustat 
Leverage Ratio of long term debt to total sales  Continuous Compustat 
Industry Indicator of the industry of the firm at the 2-digit NAICS level (6 
industries) 






4.3.1 Dependent Variable  
I develop a summary score of CSR practice adoption capturing all of the KLD 
categories (community relations, diversity, corporate governance, employee relations, 
human rights, product quality and safety, and environment) following the convention 
established by Waddock and Graves (1997) and Waldman, Siegel and Javidan (2006). 
Specifically, separate estimates for strengths and concerns are combined into a single 
measure of environmental and social practices for each of the seven KLD categories. 
Concerns ratings in this set were first reverse-coded, so that -1 indicated the presence of a 
concern and 0 indicated the absence of. Then, I add the strength and concern assessments 
to form a single measure for each KLD rating for each year.  
Research on corporate social performance frequently aggregates KLD indicators 
(e.g., Bouquet & Deutsch, 2008; David, Bloom & Hillman, 2007; Deckop, Merriman & 
Gupta, 2006; Graves & Waddock, 1994; Van der Laan, Van Ees & Van Witteloostuijn, 
2008). Some researchers have operationalized adoption of CSR practices as the sum of all 
seven KLD category scores (e.g., Van der Laan et al., 2008), while others have relied on 
only a subset of indicators. Because the presented predictions do not suggest that any 
specific area would be more important than another, I used the method that involves 
summing all seven indicators into one aggregate KLD score.  
Summing KLD scores is an appropriate method for measuring firm’s adoption of 
CSR-related practices because the dependent variable is a theory-based formative 
construct, for which the issues of construct validity and reliability typical of reflective 
constructs are not as relevant. Bagozzi (1994) argues that “reliability in the internal 




meaningful when indexes are formed as a linear sum of measurements” (333). 
Diamantopoulos and Winklhoffer (2001) and Strike, Gao and Bansal (2006) identify four 
critical issues that need to be addressed in order to create a valid formative index, namely 
content specification, indicator specification, indicator collinearity, and external validity. 
I address the first two by explicitly defining adoption of CSR practices and using 
commonly employed component indicators (e.g., Agle, Mitchell & Sonnenfeld, 1999; 
Berman, Wicks, Kotha & Jones, 1999; Deckop et al., 2006; Strike et al., 2006; Waddock 
& Graves, 2008). In addition, the indicator condition is met because there is weak 
correlation among the indicators that make up the measure and small variation inflation 
factors (VIFs) when regressing adoption of CSR practices on its component parts. 
Moreover, other studies have used similar measures of CSR to predict other outcomes, 
which is evidence that the construct is externally valid (Strike et al., 2006).  Similar 
aggregate measures have been used in previous studies and proved to be reliable, and, 
despite their limitations, they have been acknowledged to be the best available 
(Waddock, 2003). One reason is the KLD indicators’ reliance on a broad number of 
sources to measure firm social performance, which sets them apart from other measures 
of corporate social performance that have been criticized for their bias towards specific 
interests (e.g., Entine, 2003). Results of these tests are reported in Appendix B. Appendix 
C lists all the KLD indicators included in the development of this measure.  
It is important to note that the number of KLD indicators within each sub-
category changed from time to time across years over the sampling history. For this 




standardizing the count scores within years to z-scores so that the scores are comparable 
across years.  
Table 4.3 reports the 2011 top 5% adopters of CSR practices in this study’s 
sample. Table 4.4 reports the 2011 bottom 5% adopters of CSR practices in the sample. 
These rankings are based on the previously described measure of CSR practice adoption. 
Top performers include a majority of firms in the consumer goods, manufacturing and 
professional and information sectors. Worst performers include a majority of firms from 
the energy & extractive and manufacturing sectors.   
These results are consistent with recent CSR trends, which indicate the growing 
desire among global consumers for products that incorporate CSR- and sustainability-
related concerns (Forbes, 2012). This would help explaining the presence of firms from 
the consumer products sector at the top of the 2011 CSR adopters list. This trend is for 
example currently reflected in the renewed interest for green labeling among companies 
in the United States and Europe, exemplified Wal-Mart’s great strides in this area with its 
sustainability index
2
. Relatedly, industry experts predict that cause-related marketing will 
keep growing in the near future (Forbes, 2012).  
The presence of a considerable number of firms from the professional service and 
information sector among the 2011 top CSR adopters is also consistent with recent trends 
in this industry, which suggest a considerable growth of interest for environmental 
management issues (e.g., Accenture, 2013; Duff & Guo, 2010). 
The presence of manufacturing firms among both the top and worst adopters of 







CSR practices reflects the fact that firm in more controversial sectors are often at the 
forefront of new CSR and sustainability initiatives in large part to improve their corporate 
image and reduce the threat of investors’ disapproval and government’s sanctions (see 
McGladrey, 2010). Large MNCs like those included in the sample for this study are more 
likely to attract the attention of regulators and governmental sanctions than smaller firms 
or of firms that operate in less controversial sectors. For these firms, preserving their 
“license to operate” in different locations across the various countries that make up the 
focal firm’s global business network is still a very important consideration. In other 
words, regulatory compliance, safety and social concerns, and investments in other 
sustainability areas are all important components of these firms’ strategy to ensure 
financial returns on long-lived investments, such as utility plants and oil refineries (Baier, 
2011).  
The large presence of firms from the energy & extractive sector among the worst 
CSR performers is also not surprising, given these firms’ unique challenges in the CSR 
area (see Ali & O’Faircheallaigh, 2007). These stem, among the other things, from the 
physically irreversible impact of many mining operations on the environment, their 
reliance on processes and inputs that can destroy the environment and often have major 
social impacts on the adjacent communities (see Ali & O’Faircheallaigh, 2007). 
Nonetheless, industry experts observe that many European and U.S. companies in this 
sector have begun to take environmental and social issues very seriously, often because 
of the negative repercussions associated with their previous inability to effectively deal 





Table 4.3: Top 5% adopters of CSR practices in 2011 
Rank within  
sample 
Company name Industrial sector 
1 General Mills Incorporated Manufacturing 
2 Xerox Corporation Manufacturing 
3 Johnson & Johnson Consumer Goods  
4 Procter & Gamble Company Consumer Goods  
5 Dell Inc. Professional and Information Services 
6 Avon Products, Inc. Consumer Goods  
7 
International Business Machines 
Corporation 
Professional and Information Services 
8 Merck & Co., Inc. Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology 
9 Estee Lauder Companies Inc. (The) Consumer Goods  
10 Sara Lee Corporation Consumer Goods  
11 Gap, Inc. (The) Consumer Goods  
12 NIKE, Inc. Consumer Goods  
13 Ecolab Inc. Manufacturing 
14 Seagate Technology Manufacturing 
15 Whirlpool Corporation Manufacturing 
16 Cisco Systems, Inc. Professional and Information Services 
17 Macy's, Inc. Consumer Goods  
18 Lexmark International, Inc. Manufacturing 
19 Applied Materials, Inc. Manufacturing 
20 Eaton Corporation Manufacturing 
21 Hewlett-Packard Company Manufacturing 
22 Microsoft Corporation Professional and Information Services 
23 Wells Fargo & Company Professional and Information Services 
24 Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, Inc. Food & Agriculture 
25 Hormel Foods Corporation Food & Agriculture 
26 Clorox Company (The) Consumer Goods  
27 Office Depot, Inc. Consumer Goods  
28 Colgate-Palmolive Company Consumer Goods  
29 Abbott Laboratories Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology 
30 Kimberly-Clark Corporation Manufacturing 
31 Alcoa, Inc. Manufacturing 
32 NVIDIA Corporation Professional and Information Services 
33 Campbell Soup Company Food & Agriculture 
34 Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc. Food & Agriculture 










Company name Industrial sector 
678 Dril-Quip, Inc. Energy & Extractive 
679 Helix Energy Solutions Group Energy & Extractive 
680 Walter Energy, Inc. Energy & Extractive 
681 Helmerich & Payne, Inc. Energy & Extractive 
682 CONSOL Energy, Inc. Energy & Extractive 
683 American Apparel, Inc. Consumer Goods  
684 Audiovox Corporation Consumer Goods  
685 MarineMax, Inc. Consumer Goods  
686 CROCS, Inc. Consumer Goods  
687 Lorillard, Inc. Consumer Goods  
688 Cynosure, Inc. Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology 
689 General Maritime Corp Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology 
690 USANA Health Sciences, Inc. Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology 
691 USA Truck, Inc. Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology 
692 Old Dominion Freight Lines, Inc. Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology 
693 Solutia, Inc. Manufacturing 
694 Exide Technologies Manufacturing 
695 Cytec Industries, Inc. Manufacturing 
696 Cintas Corporation Manufacturing 
697 Jarden Corporation Manufacturing 
698 AK Steel Holding Corporation Manufacturing 
699 Dana Holding Corporation Manufacturing 
700 Oshkosh Corporation Manufacturing 
701 Rent-A-Center, Inc. Professional and Information Services 
702 Chiquita Brands International, Inc. Food & Agriculture 
703 Rowan Companies, Inc. Energy & Extractive 
704 Arch Coal, Inc. Energy & Extractive 
705 National Oilwell Varco, Inc. Energy & Extractive 
706 Rite Aid Corporation Consumer Goods  
707 URS Corporation Professional and Information Services 
708 Halliburton Company Energy & Extractive 
709 Alliant Techsystems Inc. Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology 






4.3.2 Independent variables 
I measure global business network’s commitment to CSR as the weighted average 
of the institutional favorabilities for CSR of the countries comprising the focal firm’s 
global business network (capturing the firm’s institutional embeddedness), by the focal 
firm’s degree of dependence on economic ties in those countries (capturing the firm’s 
economic embeddedness). The following formula was used to calculate this measure: 
Global Business Network’s Commitment to CSRi = Σ (Dependenceij * Favorabilityj)         
(1) 
where: 
Dependenceij = degree of dependence of firm i on economic ties within country j;  
Favorabilityj = institutional favorability of country j for CSR. 
Below, I further describe how Dependenceij and Favorabilityj are measured. 
Figure 3.7 offers a stylized representation of the measurement approach described above 





















Figure 3.7: Measurement approach to global business network commitment to CSR 
for a hypothetical focal firm  
 
Following other studies, I measure the focal firm’s degree of dependence as the 
intensity of the economic exchange between the focal firm and its business partners 
located in a specific national market (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Elango & Sethi, 2007; 
Sullivan, 1994; Thomas & Eden, 2004). Specifically, the proposed operationalization is 
based on Sullivan’s (1994) measure of internationalization, as the sum of four ratios, 
namely: (1) ratio of country-specific yearly exports to total yearly exports; (2) ratio of 
country-specific yearly imports to total yearly imports; (3) ratio of number of employees 
per country per year to the total number of employees per year; and (4) ratio of the 
number of subsidiaries per country per year to the total number of subsidiaries per year. 
The former two ratios are drawn from the PIERS database, while the latter two from the 












































 Given the formative nature of this index, I followed the same approach to 
ensuring construct validity and reliability that was discussed above for the dependent 
variable. Specifically, Diamantopoulos and Winklhoffer’s (2001) indicator condition was 
satisfied because of the weak correlation among the indicators that make up 
Dependenceitj and the small VIFs when regressing firm’s degree of dependence on its 
component parts. In addition, other studies have used similar measures of firm’s intensity 
of economic exchange with foreign business partners to predict other outcomes, 
providing evidence that the construct is externally valid (Strike et al., 2006). Results of 
these tests are reported in Appendix B at the end of this document. The advantage of this 
measure of firm’s degree of dependence on a set of business partners located in a specific 
foreign market is that it captures its multidimensional nature by considering both its FDI- 
and trade-related components. Thus, the proposed measure is more comprehensive and 
nuanced than other unidimensional operationalizations of this construct. 
Institutional favorability for CSR.  I follow Peng and Beamish (2008) and rely on 
the 2007 Responsible Competitiveness Index (RCI) to measure the degree of country-
level CSR-related institutional favorability. The RCI relies on 21 indicators, which are 
arranged in three sub-indexes, each with seven indicators, all drawn from authoritative 
sources as diverse as Amnesty International, the International Organization for 
Standardization, the ILO, Transparency International, the World Economic Forum, and 
the World Bank (Zadek & McGillivray, 2007, 2008). Data for the RCI are only available 
for 2007. In accordance with Peng and Beamish (2008), I used them for the entire time 
period covered by the independent variables (2007-2010), assuming that they are 




also standardize this measure. Appendix D lists all the 21 indicators making up the RCI, 
as well as the countries included in the RCI and their rankings. 
I measure FDI-based Global Business Network’s Commitment to CSR as the 
weighted average of the institutional favorabilities for CSR of countries comprising the 
focal firm’s FDI-based global business network, by the focal firm’s degree of dependence 
on FDI-based economic ties in those countries. The following formula was used to 
calculate this measure: 
FDI-based Global Business Network’s Commitment to CSRi = 
                                         Σ (FDI-based Dependenceij * Favorabilityj)                           (2) 
where: 
FDI-based Dependenceij = degree of FDI-based dependence of firm i on FDI-based 
economic ties within country j;  
Favorabilityj = institutional favorability of country j for CSR. 
While Favorabilityj is measured as it was explained above, FDI-based 
Dependenceij is measured as the sum of two of the ratios that were listed above, namely: 
(1) ratio of number of employees per country per year to the total number of employees 
per year; and (2) ratio of the number of subsidiaries per country per year to the total 
number of subsidiaries per year. The resulting measure of dependence displays values 
between 0 and 2. 
I measure Trade-based Global Business Network’s Commitment to CSR as the 
weighted average of the institutional favorabilities for CSR of countries comprising the 
focal firm’s trade-based global business network, by the focal firm’s degree of 




trade-based economic embeddedness). The following formula was used to calculate this 
measure: 
Trade-based Global Business Network’s Commitment to CSRi = 
                                         Σ (Trade-based Dependenceij * Favorabilityj)                         (2) 
where: 
Trade-based Dependenceij = degree of trade-based dependence of firm i on 
import/export-based economic ties within country j;  
Favorabilityj = institutional favorability of country j for CSR. 
Favorabilityjt is measured as it was explained above. Trade-based Dependenceij is 
measured as the sum of two of the four ratios that were listed above for Global Business 
Network Commitment to CSR, namely: (1) ratio of country-specific yearly exports to 
total yearly exports; (2) ratio of country-specific yearly imports to total yearly imports. 
The resulting measure displays values between 0 and 2. 
Within Global Business Network Heterogeneity of Commitment to CSR: I measure 
this variable as the variance of commitment to CSR within a focal firm’s global business 
network in a given year. This measure was calculated using the following formula: 
Within Global Business Network Heterogeneity of Commitment to CSRi = 
σ(Dependenceij * Favorabilityj)
2
                                                    (2) 
where: 
Dependenceij = degree of dependence of firm i on economic ties within country j;  




The proposed operationalization uses the same components (i.e., degree of 
dependence and favorability of the institutional environments) of the Global Business 
Network’s Commitment to CSR variable.  
 Within FDI-based Global Business Network Heterogeneity of Commitment to 
CSR: I measure this variable as the variance of commitment to CSR within a focal firm’s 
FDI-based global business network in a given year. This measure was calculated using 
the following formula: 
Within FDI-based Global Business Network Heterogeneity of commitment to CSRi = 
Σ (FDI-based Dependenceij * Favorabilityj)
2
                               (2) 
where: 
FDI-based Dependenceij = degree of dependence of firm i on the FDI-based economic 
ties within country j;  
Favorabilityj = institutional favorability of country j for CSR. 
This variable relies on the same components that were discussed above for the 
FDI-Based Global Business Network’s Commitment to CSR variable.  
Within Trade-based Global Business Network Heterogeneity of Commitment to 
CSR: I measure this variable as the variance of commitment to CSR within a focal firm’s 
trade-based global business network in a given year. This measure was calculated using 
the following formula: 
Within Trade-based Global Business Network Heterogeneity of Commitment to CSRi = 
Σ (Trade-based Dependenceij * Favorabilityj)
2





Trade-based Dependenceitj = degree of dependence of firm i on the imports/exports-based 
economic ties within country j;  
Favorabilityjt = institutional favorability of country j for CSR. 
This variable relies on the same components that were discussed above for Trade-
Based Global Business Network’s Commitment to CSR variable. 
 Ties to Business Partners in Countries with More Stringent CSR Institutional 
Requirements. I operationalize this variable as a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if 
the focal firm has global business network’s partners or operates in at least one country 
with a better RCI score than that of its home country, and 0 otherwise.    
 FDI-Ties to Countries with More Stringent CSR Institutional Requirements. I 
operationalize this variable as a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the focal firm 
has FDI in at least one country with a better RCI score than that of its home country, and 
0 otherwise.   
 Trade-Ties to Countries with More Stringent CSR Institutional Requirements. I 
operationalize this variable as a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the focal firm 
has trade partners in at least one country with a better RCI score than that of its home 
country, and 0 otherwise. 
 Control variables. To account for other factors that could affect the focal firm’s 
CSR-related practices, I include a number of control variables. I control for firm size, 
which has been found to have positive effects on a firm corporate social performance 
(e.g., Christmann & Taylor, 2001). Existing research explains that larger companies are 
more likely to invest in CSR initiatives because of the greater public scrutiny over their 




for firm profitability, which several studies have found to be positively related to a firm’s 
social performance (e.g., Mattingly & Berman, 2006; McWilliams & Siegel, 2000, 2001; 
Russo & Fouts, 1997), as firms with superior financial performance are likely to have 
more resources to invest in CSR. I propose to measure firm profitability as the return on 
firm assets (Hart, 1995). Following McWilliams and Siegel (2000), I also control for a 
focal firm’s research and development (R&D) intensity, which has been found to 
influence a firm’s adoption of CSR practices. R&D intensity was measured as the ratio of 
R&D expenditures to firm sales. Given the high number of missing values for this 
variable, I followed previous studies (e.g., Russo & Fouts, 1997; Strike et al., 2006) that 
have used industry averages as a proxy for missing observations. In addition, I control for 
capital intensity (Russo & Fouts, 1997), measuring it as the ratio of assets to sales, and 
leverage as the ratio of debt to sales (Tashman & Rivera, 2010).  
 Because industry level factors may also affect firm’s adoption of CSR practices 
(e.g., Waddock & Graves, 1997), I control for industry effects by classifying each firm by 
its two-digit North American Industry Classification System code. I coded each firm into 
one of six industry sectors using five dummy variables. These industry sector categories 
include Consumer Goods, Energy and Extractive, Food and Agriculture, Professional and 
Information Services, Manufacturing, and Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology. The 
Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology is the reference industry sector.  
 All controls were standardized so that their coefficients in the model are 
comparable.  




I analyze the data following the approach by Hull and Rothenberg (2008) who 
also rely on KLD data to investigate firm’s adoption of CSR practices as it relates to their 
corporate financial performance. Specifically, I calculate the averages for all independent 
measures and control variables over the four-year period from 2007 through. To assess 
the impact of the independent variables on future adoption of CSR practices, I measured 
the dependent variable in the year 2011. This approach is appropriate not only because it 
helps to reduce noise in the data, but also because it is consistent with the likely longer-
term nature of the effects of institutional and economic embeddedness. Other empirical 
studies of institutional effects have relied on similar statistical approach (e.g., Holburn 
and Zellner, 2010; Kwok & Reeb, 2000). A significant Breusch-Pagen χ
2
 test for the two 
main models (156.98; p < .01 for Model 2 in Table 6.2; and 141.47; p < .01 for Model 2 
in Table 6.4) indicated heteroscedastic error variances. I therefore rely on OLS regression 
with Huber-White estimators, whose robust standard errors deal with the failure to meet 
the homoscedasticity assumption. The analysis was done in Stata version 12.  
This model specification, in tests of Hypotheses 1, 2 a-b and 3, can be expressed 
as follows:  
Yit = β0 + β1X1it-1 + β2X2it-1 + β3X3it-1 + β4X1it-1 * X2it-1 + βnCit-1 + εi                             (1) 
where: 
Yit = predicted adoption of CSR practices for focal firm i, year t, 
β0 = the intercept of Yit,  
β1 = the direct effect of X1it-1 on Yit, 
X1it-1 = global business network’s commitment to CSR, firm i, year t-1, 




X2it-1 = within global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR, 
firm i, year t-1, 
β3 = the direct effect of X3it-1 on Yit, 
X3it-1 = ties to business partners in countries with more stringent CSR institutional 
requirements, firm i, year t-1, 
β4 = the interaction effect of X1it-1 and X2it-1 on Yit, 
βn = the direct effects of the Cit-1 on Yit, 
Ci = vector of control variables for firm i year t-1, 




Hypothesis 1 (H1: A focal firm’s adoption of CSR practices will be 
positively related to the overall CSR commitment of its global business network) 
is supported if the coefficient for global business network commitment to CSR is 
positive and significant (i.e., Ha: β1>0 in equation (1)).  
Support for Hypothesis 2a is present when two conditions are met (H2a: 
As within global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR 
decreases, focal firm’s adoption of CSR practices becomes more positively 
related to global business network commitment to CSR). First, the interaction of 
global business network commitment to CSR and within global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR needs to be negative and significant (i.e., 
Ha: β4 < 0 in equation (1)). In addition, simple slopes analysis (Aiken & West, 
1991) at different levels of these variables (i.e., average; low; and high) should 




(i.e., β1 in equation 1) becomes more positive as within global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR decreases in value.  
Similarly, Hypothesis 2b is supported when two conditions are met (H2b: 
As global business network commitment to CSR decreases, focal firm’s adoption 
of CSR practices becomes more positively related to within global business 
network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR). First, the interaction of global 
business network commitment to CSR and within global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR needs to be negative and significant (i.e., 
Ha: β4 < 0 in equation (1)). In addition, simple slopes analysis (Aiken & West, 
1991) at different levels of these variables (i.e., average; low; and high) needs to 
show that the coefficient of within global business network heterogeneity of 
commitment to CSR (i.e., β2 in equation 1) becomes more positive as global 
business network commitment to CSR decreases in value.  
Hypothesis 3 (H3: A firm is more likely to adopt CSR practices to the extent that it has 
ties with business partners in countries with more stringent CSR institutional 
requirements) is supported if the coefficient of ties to business partners in countries with 
more stringent CSR institutional requirements is positive and significant (i.e., β3 > 0 in 
equation (1)). 
The model specification for testing Hypotheses 4a, b, c and d, can be expressed as 
follows:  
Yit = β0 + β1X1it-1 + β2X2it-1 + β3X3it-1 + β4X1it-1*X2it-1 + β5X4it-1 + β6X5it-1 + β7 X6it-1 + 





Yit = predicted adoption of CSR practices for focal firm i, year t, 
β0 = the intercept of Yit,  
β1 = the direct effect of X1it-1 on Yit, 
X1it-1 = FDI-based global business network’s commitment to CSR, firm i, year t-
1, 
β2 = the direct effect of X2i on Yit, 
X2it-1 = within FDI-based global business network heterogeneity of commitment 
to CSR, firm i, year t-1, 
β3 = the direct effect of X3it-1 on Yit, 
X3it-1 = FDI-ties to countries with more stringent CSR institutional requirements, 
firm i, year t-1, 
β4 = the interaction effect of X1it-1 and X2it-1 on Yit, 
β5 = the direct effect of X4it-1 on Yit, 
X4it-1 = trade-based global business network’s commitment to CSR, firm i, year t-
1, 
β6 = the direct effect of X5it-1 on Yit, 
X5it-1 = within trade-based global business network heterogeneity of commitment 
to CSR, firm i, year t-1, 
β7 = the direct effect of X6it-1 on Yit, 
X6it-1 = trade-ties to countries with more stringent CSR institutional requirements, 
firm i, year t-1, 
β8 = the interaction effect of X4it-1 and X5it-1 on Yit, 




Ci = vector of control variables for firm i year t-1, 




Hypothesis 4a (H4a: The type of tie between the focal firm and its 
partners in the global business network moderates the effect of global business 
network commitment to CSR on firm’s adoption of CSR practices, such that the 
positive effects of global business network commitment to CSR is stronger for 
FDI-based relationships than trade-based relationships), is supported if the 
coefficient for FDI-based global business network commitment to CSR is positive 
and significant (i.e., Ha: β1>0 in equation (2)) and  the coefficient for trade-based 
global business network commitment to CSR is insignificant (β5).  
Hypothesis 4b (H4b: The type of tie between the focal firm and its partners in the 
global business network moderates the effect of within global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR on the relationship between global business network 
commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of CSR practices, such that this effect is stronger 
for FDI-based relationships than trade-based relationships), is supported if three 
conditions are met:  
(a) The coefficient of the interaction of FDI-based global business network 
commitment to CSR and within FDI-based global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR is negative and significant (i.e., Ha: 
β4 > 0 in equation (2));  




these variables (i.e., average; low; and high) should indicate that the 
coefficient of FDI-based global business network’s commitment to CSR 
(i.e., β1 in equation 2) becomes more positive as within FDI-based global 
business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR decreases in value; 
(c) The coefficient of the interaction of trade-based global business network 
commitment to CSR and within trade-based global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR is insignificant (β8).  
Hypothesis 4c (H4c: The type of tie between the focal firm and its partners in the 
global business network moderates the effect of global business network commitment to 
CSR on the relationship between within global business network heterogeneity of 
commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of CSR practices, such that this effect is stronger 
for FDI-based relationships than trade-based relationships), is supported if three 
conditions are met:  
(a) The coefficient of the interaction of FDI-based global business network 
commitment to CSR and within FDI-based global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR is negative and significant (i.e., Ha: 
β4 > 0 in equation (2));  
(b) Simple slopes analysis (Aiken & West, 1991) at different levels of 
these variables (i.e., average; low; and high) should indicate that the 
coefficient of within FDI-based global business network heterogeneity of 
commitment to CSR (i.e., β2 in equation 2) becomes more positive as FDI-




(c) The coefficient of the interaction of trade-based global business network 
commitment to CSR and within trade-based global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR is insignificant (β8).  
Hypothesis 4d (H4d: The type of tie between the focal firm and its partners in the 
global business network moderates the effect of the firm’s ties to business partners in 
countries with more stringent CSR requirements on adoption of CSR practices, such that 
the positive effect is stronger for FDI-based relationships than trade-based 
relationships), is supported if the coefficient of FDI-ties to countries with more stringent 
CSR institutional requirements is positive and significant (i.e., β3 > 0 in equation (2)) and 
the coefficient of trade-ties to countries with more stringent CSR institutional 
requirements is insignificant (i.e., β7 in equation (2)).  
4.5 Alternative model specification 
I conduct several robustness tests. One set of them relies on an alternative model 
specification. Specifically, since the original dataset contains multi-year observations for 
each firm, it is effectively a pool-time series, or panel data set (Johnson, 1995). To verify 
whether observations are dependent within firm, I conduct a Wooldridge F test 
(Wooldridge, 2002; Drukker, 2003). Significant test statistics (357.67; p < .01 for Models 
in Table 6.2; and 471.958; p < .01 for Models in Table 6.4) indicate the presence of serial 
correlation. In addition I perform a Breusch-Pagen χ
2
 test for heteroskedasticity to 
examine whether error variances differed across firms. Significant test statistics (610.83; 
p < .01 for Models in Table 6.2; and 589.82; p < .01 for Models in Table 6.4) indicate 




Given the presence of these violations, I rely on cross-sectional time series 
regression with generalized least square (GLS) estimators with controls for 
autocorrelation (xtregar in STATA). The Hausman χ
2
 test was significant, which 
indicated that fixed effects are more appropriate than random-effects (Hausman, 1978; χ
2 
= 26.83; p < .01 for Models in Table 6.2 and 30.14; p <.01 for Models in Table 6.4). 
However, I could not use a fixed-effects approach as several of the hypothesized 
variables did not vary. Therefore I implement panel-corrected standard error regression 
(PCSE) with panel-specific corrections for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. PCSE 
regression has been used extensively in the management research by researchers with 
panel data, and has appeared in numerous articles in high ranking management journals 
(e.g. Banker, Field, Schroeder & Sinha, 1996; Berman, Wicks, Kotha & Jones, 1999; 
Gimeno, 1999; He & Heli, 2009). Management scholars have used other analytical 
options for panel data including feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) regression 
(Beck & Katz, 1995). FGLS is however inappropriate because the panel in the current 
study consists of a large number of cross-sections and small number of time-periods. Via 
Monte Carlo simulations, Beck and Katz (1995) showed, in these cases, that this 
procedure often led to significant Type I errors. In comparison, they found that PCSE 
regression produced accurate and efficient estimations in simulations of the same models 
and data. 









5.1 Main results 
Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics – means, standard deviations, and 
correlations for all non-dichotomous variables. Tables 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 report the 
results of the main analyses. Correlations are generally low, with the exception of the 
correlation between the variables within trade-based global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR and trade-based global business network 
commitment to CSR (ρ = .76; p < .01). To address potential multicollinearity concerns, I 
rely on variance inflation factors (VIFs) to test for multicollinearity in the main analyses 
that includes these variables and obtain mean values considerably lower than the 
recommended cutoff value of 10 (Kutner et al., 2004: 409). Specifically, the mean VIFs 
for Models 1 and 2 in Table 5.2 are, respectively, 1.85 and 2.28. This suggests that 







Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
 
Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 Adoption of CSR Practices -0.53 3.07 1
2 Size
a
7.79 1.64 0.56 *** 1
3 ROA 0.03 0.12 0.14 *** 0.28 *** 1
4 R&D Intensity 0.05 0.08 -0.04 -0.18 *** -0.32 *** 1
5 Capital Intensity 1.69 3.00 0.05 -0.09 *** -0.14 *** 0.31 *** 1
6 Leverage 0.32 0.49 0.04 -0.04 -0.25 *** 0.02 0.62 *** 1
7 Global Business Network Commitment to 
CSR
0.61 1.14 0.09 *** 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.08 *** -0.04 1
8 FDI-based Global Business Network 
Commitment to CSR
0.17 0.42 0.15 *** 0.09 *** 0.05 -0.03 -0.10 *** -0.08 *** 0.39 *** 1
9 Trade-based Global Business Network 
Commitment to CSR
0.29 0.89 -0.10 *** -0.13 *** 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 ** -0.05 0.15 *** 0.14 *** 1
10 Within Global Business Network 
Heterogeneity of Commitment to CSR
0.22 0.38 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.11 *** 0.27 *** 0.18 *** 1
11 Within FDI-based Global Business Network 
Heterogeneity of Commitment to CSR
0.01 0.06 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.06 * -0.01 0.94 *** 0.11 *** 0.13 *** 0.02 1
12 Within Trade-based Global Business 
Network Heterogeneity of Commitment to 
CSR
0.13 0.27 -0.09 ** -0.12 *** -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 ** -0.05 0.13 *** -0.06 ** 0.76 *** 0.01 0.18 *** 1
a












St. E. St. E. St. E.
Size 0.33 *** 0.02 0.33 *** 0.02 0.33 *** 0.02
ROA 0.60 * 0.34 0.66 * 0.34 0.66 * 0.34
R&D Intensity 0.58 *** 0.18 0.59 *** 0.18 0.59 *** 0.18
Capital Intensity 0.02 ** 0.01 0.03 *** 0.01 0.03 *** 0.01
Leverage 0.11 * 0.06 0.12 * 0.06 0.12 * 0.06
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods 0.27 * 0.14 0.31 ** 0.14 0.31 ** 0.14
   Energy & Extractive -0.32 ** 0.14 -0.31 ** 0.13 -0.31 ** 0.13
   Food & Agriculture 0.31 * 0.19 0.34 * 0.18 0.34 * 0.18
   Professional and Information Services -0.03 0.13 -0.04 0.13 -0.04 0.13
   Manufacturing -0.06 0.09 -0.05 0.09 -0.05 0.09
GBN Commitment to CSR 0.08 ** 0.04 0.15 *** 0.05 0.26 *** 0.07
Within GBN Heterogeneity of Commitment 
to CSR
0.02 0.09 0.36 *** 0.13 0.36 *** 0.13
GBN Commitment to CSR * Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of Commitment to CSR
-0.30 *** 0.08 -0.30 *** 0.08
Ties to More Stringent CSR Requirements 0.18 ** 0.07 0.19 *** 0.07 0.19 *** 0.07
Intercept -8.59 *** 1.85 -8.81 *** 1.83 -8.94 *** 1.83
Observations 710 710 710
Number of Firms 710 710 710
R
2 35.56% 36.54% 36.54%
F (13, 696) 21.52*** (14, 695) 20.63*** (14, 695) 20.63***
Root MSE 0.83 0.83 0.83
Model 1                                                                                                          Model 2
GBN  
Commitment to 
CSR                                    




CSR                                                                    
Model 3                                       
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                   
*                                        
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 









St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E.
Size 0.33 *** 0.02 0.33 *** 0.02 0.33 *** 0.02 0.33 *** 0.02 0.33 *** 0.02 0.33 *** 0.02 0.33 *** 0.02
ROA 0.66 * 0.34 0.66 * 0.34 0.66 * 0.34 0.66 * 0.34 0.66 ** 0.34 0.66 * 0.34 0.66 * 0.34
R&D Intensity 0.59 *** 0.18 0.59 *** 0.18 0.59 *** 0.18 0.59 *** 0.18 0.59 *** 0.18 0.59 *** 0.18 0.59 *** 0.18
Capital Intensity 0.03 *** 0.01 0.03 *** 0.01 0.03 *** 0.01 0.03 *** 0.01 0.03 *** 0.01 0.03 *** 0.01 0.03 *** 0.01
Leverage 0.12 * 0.06 0.12 * 0.06 0.12 * 0.06 0.12 * 0.06 0.12 * 0.06 0.12 * 0.06 0.12 * 0.06
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods 0.31 ** 0.14 0.31 ** 0.14 0.31 ** 0.14 0.31 ** 0.14 0.31 ** 0.14 0.31 ** 0.14 0.31 ** 0.14
   Energy & Extractive -0.31 ** 0.13 -0.31 ** 0.13 -0.31 ** 0.13 -0.31 ** 0.13 -0.31 ** 0.13 -0.31 ** 0.13 -0.31 ** 0.13
   Food & Agriculture 0.34 * 0.18 0.34 * 0.18 0.34 * 0.18 0.34 * 0.18 0.34 * 0.18 0.34 * 0.18 0.34 * 0.18
   Professional and Information Services -0.04 0.13 -0.04 0.13 -0.04 0.13 -0.04 0.13 -0.04 0.13 -0.04 0.13 -0.04 0.13
   Manufacturing -0.05 0.09 -0.05 0.09 -0.05 0.09 -0.05 0.09 -0.05 0.09 -0.05 0.09 -0.05 0.09
GBN Commitment to CSR 0.05 0.04 0.15 *** 0.05 0.26 *** 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.15 *** 0.05 0.26 *** 0.07 0.05 0.04
Within GBN Heterogeneity of Commitment 
to CSR
0.36 *** 0.13 0.65 *** 0.20 0.65 *** 0.20 0.65 *** 0.20 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
GBN Commitment to CSR * Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of Commitment to CSR
-0.30 *** 0.08 -0.30 *** 0.08 -0.30 *** 0.08 -0.30 *** 0.08 -0.30 *** 0.08 -0.30 *** 0.08 -0.30 *** 0.08
Ties to More Stringent CSR Requirements 0.19 *** 0.07 0.19 *** 0.07 0.19 *** 0.07 0.19 *** 0.07 0.19 *** 0.07 0.19 *** 0.07 0.19 *** 0.07
Intercept -8.68 *** 1.82 -8.96 *** 1.83 -9.20 *** 1.84 -8.73 *** 1.82 -8.66 *** 1.83 -8.68 *** 1.83 -8.64 *** 1.83
Observations 710 710 710 710 710 710 710
Number of Firms 710 710 710 710 710 710 710
R
2 36.54% 36.54% 36.54% 36.54% 36.54% 36.54% 36.54%
F (14, 695) 20.63*** (14, 695) 20.63*** (14, 695) 20.63*** (14, 695) 20.63*** (14, 695) 20.63*** (14, 695) 20.63*** (14, 695) 20.63***
Root MSE 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83
Coeff.
Model 4                                           
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                   




CSR                          
(+1 δ)
Model 9                                          
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                
(+1 δ)                                                     
*                                                    
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                           
(-1 δ)
Model 10                                        
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                              
(+1 δ)                                      




CSR                          
(+1 δ)
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Model 8                                         
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                              
(+1 δ)                                      
*                                      
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                                                                 
Model 5                                    
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                  
(-1 δ)                                                     




CSR                                                                    
Model 6                                           
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                  
(-1 δ)                                                     




CSR                           
(-1 δ)
Model 7                                   
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                 
(-1 δ)                    











Hypothesis 1 predicts that global business network’s commitment to CSR is positively 
related to the focal firm’s adoption of CSR-related practices. Results in Table 5.2 for Model 1, 
which only includes the predicted direct effects, indicate a positive significant relationship 
between global business network’s commitment to CSR and focal firm’s adoption of CSR 
practices (β = 0.08; p < .05), supporting H1. This result is also confirmed in Model 2 (β = 0.15; p 
< .01), which also includes the interaction, at average levels, of global business network 
commitment to CSR and within global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR.  
I explore the interactive relationship between global business network commitment to 
CSR and within global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR, as predicted in 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b, following the steps recommended by Aiken and West (1991). Therefore 
Models 2 through 9 include this interaction term at different levels of global business network 
commitment to CSR and within global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR 
(i.e., average; low; and high). The first necessary step involves confirming that the interaction of 
global business network commitment to CSR and within global business network heterogeneity 
of commitment to CSR is negative and significant. This is supported in Model 2 (β = -0.3; p < 
.01). I then look at how within global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR 
moderates the relationship between global business network’s commitment to CSR and firm’s 
adoption of CSR practices. Hypothesis 2a is confirmed if the coefficient of global business 
network commitment to CSR becomes more positive as within global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR decreases in value. This is supported by Models 3, 2 and 4. 
Specifically, at low levels of within global business network heterogeneity of commitment to 
CSR (Model 3), the coefficient of global business network’s commitment to CSR is positive and 





of commitment to CSR (Model 2), the coefficient of global business network’s commitment to 
CSR is also positive and significant (β = 0.15; p < .01), but of a lower magnitude than that in 
Model 3. Then, at high levels of within global business network heterogeneity of commitment to 
CSR (Model 4), the coefficient of global business network commitment to CSR is insignificant 
(β = 0.05; n.s.). Figure 5.1 illustrates how within global business network heterogeneity of 
commitment to CSR moderates the relationship between global business network’s commitment 
to CSR and firm’s adoption of CSR practices. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Interaction plot for the moderating effect of within global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR on the relationship between global business network 
commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of CSR-related practices, using OLS regression 
with Huber-White estimators (Hypothesis 2a) 
 
I follow the same steps to also examine how global business network’s commitment to 





commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of CSR practices, as predicted in Hypothesis 2b. This 
hypothesis is supported if the coefficient of within global business network commitment to CSR 
becomes more positive as global business network commitment to CSR decreases in value. This 
is indeed the case in Models 5, 2 and 8. These models show that at low levels of global business 
network’s commitment to CSR (Model 5), the coefficient of within global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR is positive and significant (β = 0.65; p < .01). In addition, 
at average levels of global business network commitment to CSR (Model 2), the coefficient of 
within global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR is also positive and 
significant (β = 0.36; p < .01), but of a lower magnitude than that in Model 5. Finally, at high 
levels of global business network commitment to CSR (Model 8), the coefficient of within global 
business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR is insignificant (β = 0.07; n.s.). Figure 
5.2 illustrates how global business network commitment to CSR moderates the relationship 








Figure 5.2: Interaction plot for the moderating effect of global business network 
commitment to CSR on the relation between within global business network heterogeneity 
of commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of CSR-related practices, using OLS regression 
with Huber-White estimators (Hypothesis 2b) 
 





















Table 5.3: Summary of results from Models 2-9 using OLS regression with Huber-White 





Results also support Hypothesis 3, as shown by the positive and significant coefficient of 
the dummy variable for ties to business partners in countries with more stringent CSR 
institutional requirements in Models 1 (β = 0.18; p < .05) and 2 (β = 0.19; p < .01).  
Results in Table 5.2 above indicate that the control variables size, ROA, R&D intensity, 
capital intensity, leverage, and industry, these variables are all significantly related to firm 
adoption of CSR practices. The only exceptions are the effects of the controls for professional 
and information services and manufacturing sectors. 






Commit.  -1δ 0.26 Commit.  -1δ 0.15 Commit.  -1δ 0.05
Heter. -1δ 0.65 Heter. 0.65 Heter. +1δ 0.65
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Commit. 0.26 Commit. 0.15 Commit. 0.05
Heter. -1δ 0.36 Heter. 0.36 Heter. +1δ 0.36
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Commit.  +1δ 0.26 Commit.  +1δ 0.15 Commit.  +1δ 0.05
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Table 5.4: OLS regression with Huber-White estimators (Hypotheses 4a, b, c and d) 
 
St. E. St. E. St. E.
Size 0.32 *** 0.02 0.32 *** 0.02 0.32 *** 0.02
ROA 0.55 * 0.34 0.61 * 0.34 0.61 * 0.34
R&D Intensity 0.58 *** 0.18 0.58 *** 0.18 0.58 *** 0.18
Capital Intensity 0.03 *** 0.01 0.03 *** 0.01 0.03 *** 0.01
Leverage 0.11 * 0.06 0.12 ** 0.06 0.12 ** 0.06
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods 0.28 ** 0.14 0.28 ** 0.14 0.28 ** 0.14
   Energy & Extractive -0.32 ** 0.14 -0.33 ** 0.14 -0.33 ** 0.14
   Food & Agriculture 0.34 * 0.19 0.33 * 0.19 0.33 * 0.19
   Professional and Information Services -0.07 0.13 -0.07 0.13 -0.07 0.13
   Manufacturing -0.09 0.09 -0.10 0.09 -0.10 0.09
FDI-based GBN Commitment to CSR 0.17 ** 0.08 0.24 *** 0.09 1.25 *** 0.34
Within FDI-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
-0.19 0.18 1.06 *** 0.33 1.06 *** 0.33
FDI-based GBN Commitment to CSR * 
Within FDI-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
-1.01 *** 0.28 -1.01 *** 0.28
FDI Ties to More Stringent CSR 
Requirements 
0.25 *** 0.09 0.21 ** 0.09 0.21 ** 0.09
Trade-based GBN Commitment to CSR 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06
Within Trade-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
0.25 ** 0.11 0.26 ** 0.12 0.26 ** 0.12
Trade-based GBN Commitment to CSR * 
Within Trade-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
-0.04 0.12 -0.04 0.12
Trade Ties to More Stringent CSR 
Requirements 
0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08
Intercept -8.58 *** 1.88 -8.66 *** 1.83 -9.72 *** 1.89
Observations 710 710 710
Number of Firms 710 710 710
R
2 37.30% 37.89% 37.89%
F ( 16, 693) 20.07*** ( 18, 691) 18.14*** ( 18, 691) 18.14***
Root MSE 0.82 0.82 0.82
Model 1                                                                                                          Model 2
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                    
*                                          
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                                                                    
Model 3                   
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                   












St. E. St. E. St. E.
Size 0.32 *** 0.02 0.32 *** 0.02 0.32 *** 0.02
ROA 0.61 * 0.34 0.61 * 0.34 0.61 * 0.34
R&D Intensity 0.58 *** 0.18 0.58 *** 0.18 0.58 *** 0.18
Capital Intensity 0.03 *** 0.01 0.03 *** 0.01 0.03 *** 0.01
Leverage 0.12 ** 0.06 0.12 ** 0.06 0.12 ** 0.06
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods 0.28 ** 0.14 0.28 ** 0.14 0.28 ** 0.14
   Energy & Extractive -0.33 ** 0.14 -0.33 ** 0.14 -0.33 ** 0.14
   Food & Agriculture 0.33 * 0.19 0.33 * 0.19 0.33 * 0.19
   Professional and Information Services -0.07 0.13 -0.07 0.13 -0.07 0.13
   Manufacturing -0.10 0.09 -0.10 0.09 -0.10 0.09
FDI-based GBN Commitment to CSR -0.76 *** 0.23 0.24 *** 0.09 1.25 *** 0.34
Within FDI-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
1.06 *** 0.33 2.07 *** 0.59 2.07 *** 0.59
FDI-based GBN Commitment to CSR * 
Within FDI-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
-1.01 *** 0.28 -1.01 *** 0.28 -1.01 *** 0.28
FDI Ties to More Stringent CSR 
Requirements 
0.21 ** 0.09 0.21 ** 0.09 0.21 ** 0.09
Trade-based GBN Commitment to CSR 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06
Within Trade-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
0.26 ** 0.12 0.26 ** 0.12 0.26 ** 0.12
Trade-based GBN Commitment to CSR * 
Within Trade-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
-0.04 0.12 -0.04 0.12 -0.04 0.12
Trade Ties to More Stringent CSR 
Requirements 
0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08
Intercept -7.60 *** 1.83 -8.90 *** 1.84 -10.97 *** 2.00
Observations 710 710 710
Number of Firms 710 710 710
R
2 37.89% 37.89% 37.89%
F ( 18, 691) 18.14*** ( 18, 691) 18.14*** ( 18, 691) 18.14***
Root MSE 0.82 0.82 0.82
Coeff.
Model 4                                           
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                   
*                                                  
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                          
(+1 δ)
Model 5                                          
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                  
(-1 δ)                                                   
*                                                   
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                                                                    
Model 6                                           
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                  
(-1 δ)                                            
*                                             
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 










St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E.
Size 0.32 *** 0.02 0.32 *** 0.02 0.32 *** 0.02 0.32 *** 0.02
ROA 0.61 * 0.34 0.61 * 0.34 0.61 * 0.34 0.61 * 0.34
R&D Intensity 0.58 *** 0.18 0.58 *** 0.18 0.58 *** 0.18 0.58 *** 0.18
Capital Intensity 0.03 *** 0.01 0.03 *** 0.01 0.03 *** 0.01 0.03 *** 0.01
Leverage 0.12 ** 0.06 0.12 ** 0.06 0.12 ** 0.06 0.12 ** 0.06
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods 0.28 ** 0.14 0.28 ** 0.14 0.28 ** 0.14 0.28 ** 0.14
   Energy & Extractive -0.33 ** 0.14 -0.33 ** 0.14 -0.33 ** 0.14 -0.33 ** 0.14
   Food & Agriculture 0.33 * 0.19 0.33 * 0.19 0.33 * 0.19 0.33 * 0.19
   Professional and Information Services -0.07 0.13 -0.07 0.13 -0.07 0.13 -0.07 0.13
   Manufacturing -0.10 0.09 -0.10 0.09 -0.10 0.09 -0.10 0.09
FDI-based GBN Commitment to CSR -0.76 *** 0.23 0.24 *** 0.09 1.25 *** 0.34 -0.76 *** 0.23
Within FDI-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
2.07 *** 0.59 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.16
FDI-based GBN Commitment to CSR * 
Within FDI-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
-1.01 *** 0.28 -1.01 *** 0.28 -1.01 *** 0.28 -1.01 *** 0.28
FDI Ties to More Stringent CSR 
Requirements 
0.21 ** 0.09 0.21 ** 0.09 0.21 ** 0.09 0.21 ** 0.09
Trade-based GBN Commitment to CSR 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06
Within Trade-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
0.26 ** 0.12 0.26 ** 0.12 0.26 ** 0.12 0.26 ** 0.12
Trade-based GBN Commitment to CSR * 
Within Trade-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
-0.04 0.12 -0.04 0.12 -0.04 0.12 -0.04 0.12
Trade Ties to More Stringent CSR 
Requirements 
0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08
Intercept -6.83 *** 1.86 -8.42 *** 1.82 -8.47 *** 1.84 -8.36 *** 1.82
Observations 710 710 710 710
Number of Firms 710 710 710 710
R
2 37.89% 37.89% 37.89% 37.89%
F ( 18, 691) 18.14*** ( 18, 691) 18.14*** ( 18, 691) 18.14*** ( 18, 691) 18.14***
Root MSE 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Model 7                                          
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                  
(-1 δ)                                                     
*                                                  
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                          
(+1 δ)
Model 8                                         
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                              
(+1 δ)                                           
*                                           
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                                                                    
Model 9                                          
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                
(+1 δ)                                           
*                                            
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR  
(-1 δ)
Model 10                                           
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                              
(+1 δ)                                          
*                                        
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 






Model 1 includes all the independent and control variables without the interaction terms. 
Model 2 includes all independent and control variables and the two interaction terms of interest. 
Results in Models 1 and 2 in Table 5.4 above provide support for Hypothesis 4a and show that 
the positive effects of global business network commitment to CSR is stronger for FDI-based 
relationships than trade-based relationships, because the coefficient for FDI-based global 
business network commitment to CSR is positive and significant in both models (β = 0.17; p < 
.05; β = 0.24; p < .01), while the coefficient for trade-based global business network commitment 
to CSR is always insignificant.  
To investigate Hypothesis 4b, I follow the steps suggested by Aiken and West 
(1991). Results support H4b and show that the moderating effect of within FDI-based 
global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR on the relationship 
between FDI-based commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of CSR practices is stronger 
than that of within trade-based global business network heterogeneity of commitment to 
CSR on the relationship between trade-based global business network commitment to 
CSR and firm’s adoption of CSR practices. Models 2 through 9 in Table 5.4 include the 
interaction of FDI-based global business network commitment to CSR and within FDI-
based global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR at different levels of 
these two variables (i.e., average; low; and high). In support of H4b, results show that: 
(a) the coefficient of the interaction of FDI-based global business network 
commitment to CSR and within FDI-based global business network heterogeneity 
of commitment to CSR in Model 2 is negative and significant (β = -1.01; p < .01); 





business network commitment to CSR and within trade-based global business 
network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR is insignificant; 
(b) In addition, Models 3, 2 and 4 show that the coefficient of FDI-based global 
business network’s commitment to CSR becomes more positive as within FDI-
based global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR decreases 
in value. Specifically, at low levels of within FDI-based global business 
network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR (Model 3), the coefficient of 
FDI-based global business network’s commitment to CSR is positive and 
significant (β = 1.25; p < .01). At average levels of within FDI-based global 
business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR (Model 2), the 
coefficient of FDI-based global business network’s commitment to CSR is also 
positive and significant (β = 0.24; p < .01), but of a lower magnitude than that 
in Model 3. Then, at high levels of within FDI-based global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR (Model 4), the coefficient of FDI-based 
global business network’s commitment to CSR is negative and significant (β = 
-0.76; p < .01).  
Figure 5.3 illustrates how within FDI-based global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR moderates the relationship between FDI-based 








Figure 5.3: Interaction plot for the moderating effect of within FDI-based global business 
network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR on the relationship between FDI-based 
global business network commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of CSR-related practices, 
using OLS regression with Huber-White estimators (Hypothesis 4b) 
 
I follow the same steps for H4c, and examine whether the moderating effect of 
FDI-based global business network’s commitment to CSR on the relationship between 
within intra global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR and firm’s 
adoption of CSR practices is stronger than that of trade-based global business network 
commitment to CSR on the relationship between within trade-based global business 
network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of CSR practices. This 
hypothesis is supported because:  
(a) First, the coefficient of the interaction of FDI-based global business network 
commitment to CSR and within FDI-based global business network 





β = -1.01; p < .01); Model 2 also shows that the coefficient of the interaction 
of trade-based global business network commitment to CSR and within trade-
based global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR is 
insignificant;   
(b) The coefficient of within FDI-based global business network heterogeneity of 
commitment to CSR becomes more positive as FDI-based global business 
network commitment to CSR decreases in value. This is indeed the case in 
Models 5, 2 and 8. These models show that at low levels of FDI-based global 
business network’s commitment to CSR (Model 5), the coefficient of within 
FDI-based global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR is 
positive and significant (β = 2.07; p < .01). In addition, at average levels of 
FDI-based global business network commitment to CSR (Model 2), the 
coefficient of within FDI-based global business network heterogeneity of 
commitment to CSR is also positive and significant (β = 1.06; p < .01), but of 
a lower magnitude than that in Model 5. Finally, at high levels of FDI-based 
global business network commitment to CSR (Model 8), the coefficient of 
within FDI-based global business network heterogeneity of commitment to 
CSR is insignificant (β = 0.06; n.s.).  
Figure 5.4 illustrates how FDI-based global business network commitment to CSR 
moderates the relationship between FDI-based global business network heterogeneity of 
commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of CSR practices. Table 5.5 summarizes the results for 






Figure 5.4: Interaction plot for the moderating effect of FDI-based global business network 
commitment to CSR on the relation between within FDI-based global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of CSR-related practices, using 
OLS regression with Huber-White estimators (Hypothesis 4c) 
 
Results in Table 5.4 also support Hypothesis 4d, and show that the type of tie 
between the focal firm and its partners in the global business network moderates the 
effect of ties to business partners in countries with more stringent CSR institutional 
requirements on firm’s adoption of CSR practices, such that the positive effect is stronger 
for FDI ties than trade ties. This is because (a) the coefficient of FDI ties to countries 
with more stringent CSR institutional requirements is positive and significant in Models 1 
and 2 (β = 0.25; p <.01; β = 0.21; p <.05). In addition, the coefficient of trade ties to 







Table 5.5: Summary of results from Models 2-9 using OLS regression with Huber-White 
estimators (Hypotheses 4b and c) 
 
Commitment  -1δ; 
Heterogeneity -1δ 
  Commitment  -1δ; 
Heterogeneity 
  Commitment  -1δ; 
Heterogeneity +1δ 
  Coef. Sig.     Coef. Sig.     Coef. Sig. 
Commit.  -1δ 1.25 ***   Commit.  -1δ 0.24 ***   Commit.  -1δ 
-
0.76 *** 
Heter. -1δ 2.07 ***   Heter. 2.07 ***   Heter. +1δ 2.07 *** 
                      
Commitment; 
Heterogeneity -1δ 
  Commitment; 
Heterogeneity 
  Commitment; 
Heterogeneity +1δ 
  Coef. Sig.     Coef. Sig.     Coef. Sig. 
Commit.  1.25 ***   Commit.  0.24 ***   Commit.  
-
0.76 *** 
Heter. -1δ 1.06 ***   Heter. 1.06 ***   Heter. +1δ 1.06 *** 
                      
Commitment +1δ; 
Heterogeneity -1δ 
  Commitment +1δ; 
Heterogeneity 
  Commitment +1δ; 
Heterogeneity +1δ 
  Coef. Sig.     Coef. Sig.     Coef. Sig. 
Commit.  +1δ 1.25 ***   Commit.  +1δ 0.24 ***   Commit.  +1δ 
-
0.76 *** 
Heter. -1δ 0.06     Heter. 0.06     Heter. +1δ 0.06   
 
Similarly to Table 5.2, results in Table 5.4 above indicate that size, ROA, R&D intensity, 
capital intensity, leverage, and industry are all significantly related to firm adoption of CSR 
practices. Like in the other set of results, the only insignificant control variables are professional 
and information services and manufacturing sectors. 
5.2 Robustness tests using alternative model specification 
To test the robustness of the results, I run several robustness tests. First, I rely on the 
alternative model specification that was discussed in the methods section of the dissertation. 
Specifically, I implement panel-corrected standard error regression (PCSE) with panel-specific 
corrections for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. PCSE regression has been used 





in high ranking management journals (e.g. Banker, Field, Schroeder & Sinha, 1996; Berman, 
Wicks, Kotha & Jones, 1999; Gimeno, 1999; He & Heli, 2009). 
All independent variables and controls in these analyses are standardized so that the 
coefficients of all continuous variables in the model are comparable. In addition, to mitigate the 
potential for reverse-causality, I lag all independent and control variables by one year. 
Table 5.6 confirms previous findings. As in Table 6.2, Models 1 and 2 in Table 5.6 
provide support for Hypothesis 1, because the coefficient of global business network 
commitment to CSR is positive and significant (β = 0.05; p < .05; β = 0.05; p < .05). They also 
provide support for Hypothesis 3, as the coefficient of ties to business partners located in 
countries with more stringent CSR requirements is positive and significant (β = 0.19; p < .05; β = 
0.21; p < .01). In addition, Models 4 (β = n.s.), 2 (β = 0.05; p < .05) and 3 (β = 0.11; p < .01) 
provide support for Hypothesis 2a and confirm that as within global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR decreases, the relationship between global business 
network commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of CSR practices becomes more positive. 
Furthermore, Models 8 (β = n.s.), 2 (β = 0.06; p < .01), and 5 (β = 0.13; p < .01), provide support 
for Hypothesis 2b and show that as global business network commitment to CSR decreases, the 
relationships between within global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR and 
firm’s adoption of CSR practices becomes more positive. Table 5.7 further summarizes the 













Table 5.6: Panel-corrected standard error regression with panel-specific corrections for 








St. E. St. E. St. E.
Size 0.22 *** 0.03 0.22 *** 0.03 0.22 *** 0.03
ROA 0.07 *** 0.02 0.07 *** 0.02 0.07 *** 0.02
R&D Intensity 0.18 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.12
Capital Intensity 0.12 *** 0.03 0.13 *** 0.03 0.13 *** 0.03
Leverage -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods 0.32 *** 0.09 0.35 *** 0.09 0.35 *** 0.09
   Energy & Extractive -0.33 *** 0.09 -0.32 *** 0.09 -0.32 *** 0.09
   Food & Agriculture 0.26 ** 0.13 0.29 ** 0.13 0.29 ** 0.13
   Professional and Information Services 0.18 ** 0.08 0.18 ** 0.08 0.18 ** 0.08
   Manufacturing 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06
GBN Commitment to CSR 0.05 ** 0.02 0.05 ** 0.02 0.11 *** 0.03
Within GBN Heterogeneity of Commitment 
to CSR
0.01 0.02 0.06 *** 0.03 0.06 *** 0.03
GBN Commitment to CSR * Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of Commitment to CSR
-0.06 *** 0.02 -0.06 *** 0.02
Ties to More Stringent CSR Requirements 0.19 *** 0.04 0.21 *** 0.04 0.21 *** 0.04
Intercept -0.27 *** 0.06 -0.28 *** 0.06 -0.34 *** 0.07
Observations 2386 2386 2386
Number of Firms 764 764 764
Wald χ
2 158.24 *** 164.54*** 164.54***
R
2 8.68% 9.10% 9.10%





CSR                                    




CSR                                                                    
Model 3                                       
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                   
*                                        
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 












St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E.
Size 0.22 *** 0.03 0.22 *** 0.03 0.22 *** 0.03 0.22 *** 0.03 0.22 *** 0.03 0.22 *** 0.03 0.22 *** 0.03
ROA 0.07 *** 0.02 0.07 *** 0.02 0.07 *** 0.02 0.07 *** 0.02 0.07 *** 0.02 0.07 *** 0.02 0.07 *** 0.02
R&D Intensity 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.12
Capital Intensity 0.13 *** 0.03 0.13 *** 0.03 0.13 *** 0.03 0.13 *** 0.03 0.13 *** 0.03 0.13 *** 0.03 0.13 *** 0.03
Leverage -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods 0.35 *** 0.09 0.35 *** 0.09 0.35 *** 0.09 0.35 *** 0.09 0.35 *** 0.09 0.35 *** 0.09 0.35 *** 0.09
   Energy & Extractive -0.32 *** 0.09 -0.32 *** 0.09 -0.32 *** 0.09 -0.32 *** 0.09 -0.32 *** 0.09 -0.32 *** 0.09 -0.32 *** 0.09
   Food & Agriculture 0.29 ** 0.13 0.29 ** 0.13 0.29 ** 0.13 0.29 ** 0.13 0.29 ** 0.13 0.29 ** 0.13 0.29 ** 0.13
   Professional and Information Services 0.18 ** 0.08 0.18 ** 0.08 0.18 ** 0.08 0.18 ** 0.08 0.18 ** 0.08 0.18 ** 0.08 0.18 ** 0.08
   Manufacturing 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06
GBN Commitment to CSR -0.01 0.03 0.05 ** 0.02 0.11 *** 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.05 ** 0.02 0.11 *** 0.03 -0.01 0.03
Within GBN Heterogeneity of Commitment 
to CSR
0.06 *** 0.03 0.13 *** 0.04 0.13 *** 0.04 0.13 *** 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02
GBN Commitment to CSR * Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of Commitment to CSR
-0.06 *** 0.02 -0.06 *** 0.02 -0.06 *** 0.02 -0.06 *** 0.02 -0.06 *** 0.02 -0.06 *** 0.02 -0.06 *** 0.02
Ties to More Stringent CSR Requirements 0.21 *** 0.04 0.21 *** 0.04 0.21 *** 0.04 0.21 *** 0.04 0.21 *** 0.04 0.21 *** 0.04 0.21 *** 0.04
Intercept -0.21 *** 0.07 -0.33 *** 0.06 -0.46 *** 0.08 -0.20 *** 0.07 -0.23 *** 0.07 -0.23 *** 0.07 -0.23 *** 0.07
Observations 2386 2386 2386 2386 2386 2386 2386
Number of Firms 764 764 764 764 764 764 764
Wald χ
2 164.54*** 164.54*** 164.54*** 164.54*** 164.54*** 164.54*** 164.54***
R
2 9.10% 9.10% 9.10% 9.10% 9.10% 9.10% 9.10%
Model 9                                          
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                
(+1 δ)                                                     
*                                                    
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                           
(-1 δ)
Model 5                                          
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                  
(-1 δ)                                                     




CSR                                                                    
Coeff.
Model 4                                   
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                  




CSR                          
(+1 δ)
Coeff. Coeff.
Model 10                                        
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                              
(+1 δ)                                      




CSR                          
(+1 δ)
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Model 6                                           
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                  
(-1 δ)                                                     




CSR                           
(-1 δ)
Model 7                                   
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                  
(-1 δ)                                    




CSR                          
(+1 δ)
Model 8                                         
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                              
(+1 δ)                       
*                          
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 





Table 5.7: Summary of results from Models 2-9 using panel-corrected standard 
error regression with panel-specific corrections for autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity (Hypotheses 2a and b) 
 
 
Figure 5.5 illustrates how within global business network heterogeneity of 
commitment to CSR moderates the relationship between global business network’s 
commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of CSR practices. Figure 5.6 illustrates how 
global business network commitment to CSR moderates the relationship between within 
global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of 
CSR practices.  
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Commit.  -1δ 0.11 Commit.  -1δ 0.05 Commit.  -1δ -0.01
Heter. -1δ 0.13 Heter. 0.13 Heter. +1δ 0.13
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Commit. 0.11 Commit. 0.05 Commit. -0.01
Heter. -1δ 0.06 Heter. 0.06 Heter. +1δ 0.06
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Commit.  +1δ 0.03 Commit.  +1δ 0.05 Commit.  +1δ -0.01
Heter. -1δ 0.02 Heter. 0.00 Heter. +1δ 0.00
Sig. Sig.
Commitment  -1δ;            
Heterogeneity -1δ
Commitment  -1δ; 
Heterogeneity



































Figure 5.5: Interaction plot for the moderating effect of within global business 
network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR on the relationship between global 
business network commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of CSR-related practices 




Figure 5.6: Interaction plot for the moderating effect of global business network 
commitment to CSR on the relation between within global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of CSR-related practices 
using panel-corrected standard error regression (Hypothesis 2b)  
 





Table 5.8: Panel-corrected standard error regression with panel-specific corrections 





St. E. St. E. St. E.
Size 0.18 *** 0.0274 0.18 *** 0.03 0.18 *** 0.03
ROA 0.06 *** 0.0221 0.06 *** 0.02 0.06 *** 0.02
R&D Intensity 0.18 0.1226 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.12
Capital Intensity 0.12 *** 0.0252 0.13 *** 0.03 0.13 *** 0.03
Leverage -0.03 0.037 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods 0.35 *** 0.0877 0.36 *** 0.09 0.36 *** 0.09
   Energy & Extractive -0.30 *** 0.0937 -0.31 *** 0.09 -0.31 *** 0.09
   Food & Agriculture 0.28 ** 0.1242 0.28 ** 0.12 0.28 ** 0.12
   Professional and Information Services 0.16 ** 0.0817 0.16 ** 0.08 0.16 ** 0.08
   Manufacturing 0.05 0.0622 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06
FDI-based GBN Commitment to CSR 0.10 *** 0.0301 0.10 *** 0.03 0.11 *** 0.03
Within FDI-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
-0.06 *** 0.0192 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02
FDI-based GBN Commitment to CSR * 
Within FDI-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
0.051 -0.01 * 0.01 -0.01 * 0.01
FDI Ties to More Stringent CSR 
Requirements 
0.21 *** 0.0211 0.19 *** 0.05 0.19 *** 0.05
Trade-based GBN Commitment to CSR -0.01 0.0147 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02
Within Trade-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
0.02 0.0506 0.04 * 0.02 0.04 * 0.02
Trade-based GBN Commitment to CSR * 
Within Trade-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
0.0699 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01
Trade Ties to More Stringent CSR 
Requirements 
0.10 * 0.10 * 0.05 0.10 ** 0.05
Intercept -0.27 *** -0.26 *** 0.07 -0.25 *** 0.07
Observations 2386 2386 2386
Number of Firms 764 764 764
Wald χ
2 179.17*** 181.43*** 181.43***
R
2 10.12% 10.28% 10.28%
Model 1                                                                                                          Model 2                                      
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                    
*                                          
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                                                                    
Model 3                   
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                   















St. E. St. E. St. E.
Size 0.18 *** 0.03 0.18 *** 0.03 0.18 *** 0.03
ROA 0.06 *** 0.02 0.06 *** 0.02 0.06 *** 0.02
R&D Intensity 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.12
Capital Intensity 0.13 *** 0.03 0.13 *** 0.03 0.13 *** 0.03
Leverage -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods 0.36 *** 0.09 0.36 *** 0.09 0.36 *** 0.09
   Energy & Extractive -0.31 *** 0.09 -0.31 *** 0.09 -0.31 *** 0.09
   Food & Agriculture 0.28 ** 0.12 0.28 ** 0.12 0.28 ** 0.12
   Professional and Information Services 0.16 ** 0.08 0.16 ** 0.08 0.16 ** 0.08
   Manufacturing 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06
FDI-based GBN Commitment to CSR 0.09 *** 0.03 0.10 *** 0.03 0.11 *** 0.03
Within FDI-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
-0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03
FDI-based GBN Commitment to CSR * 
Within FDI-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
-0.01 * 0.01 -0.01 * 0.01 -0.01 * 0.01
FDI Ties to More Stringent CSR 
Requirements 
0.19 *** 0.05 0.19 *** 0.05 0.19 *** 0.05
Trade-based GBN Commitment to CSR -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02
Within Trade-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
0.04 * 0.02 0.04 * 0.02 0.04 * 0.02
Trade-based GBN Commitment to CSR * 
Within Trade-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
-0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01
Trade Ties to More Stringent CSR 
Requirements 
0.10 ** 0.05 0.10 ** 0.05 0.10 ** 0.05
Intercept -0.28 *** 0.08 -0.36 *** 0.07 -0.36 *** 0.07
Observations 2386 2386 2386
Number of Firms 764 764 764
Wald χ
2 181.43*** 181.43*** 181.43***
R
2 10.28% 10.28% 10.28%
Model 4                                           
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                   
*                                                  
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                          
(+1 δ)
Model 5                                          
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                  
(-1 δ)                                                   
*                                                   
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                                                                    
Model 6                                           
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                  
(-1 δ)                                            
*                                             
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 







Table 5.8—Cont’d  
 
 
Model 1 includes all the independent and control variables without the interaction 
terms. Model 2 includes all independent and control variables and the two interaction 
terms of interest. Results in Models 1 and 2 provide support for Hypothesis 4a and show 
that the positive effects of global business network commitment to CSR is stronger for 
St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E.
Size 0.18 *** 0.03 0.18 *** 0.03 0.18 *** 0.03 0.18 *** 0.03
ROA 0.06 *** 0.02 0.06 *** 0.02 0.06 *** 0.02 0.06 *** 0.02
R&D Intensity 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.12
Capital Intensity 0.13 *** 0.03 0.13 *** 0.03 0.13 *** 0.03 0.13 *** 0.03
Leverage -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods 0.36 *** 0.09 0.36 *** 0.09 0.36 *** 0.09 0.36 *** 0.09
   Energy & Extractive -0.31 *** 0.09 -0.31 *** 0.09 -0.31 *** 0.09 -0.31 *** 0.09
   Food & Agriculture 0.28 ** 0.12 0.28 ** 0.12 0.28 ** 0.12 0.28 ** 0.12
   Professional and Information Services 0.16 ** 0.08 0.16 ** 0.08 0.16 ** 0.08 0.16 ** 0.08
   Manufacturing 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06
FDI-based GBN Commitment to CSR 0.09 *** 0.03 0.10 *** 0.03 0.11 *** 0.03 0.09 *** 0.03
Within FDI-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02
FDI-based GBN Commitment to CSR * 
Within FDI-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
-0.01 * 0.01 -0.01 * 0.01 -0.01 * 0.01 -0.01 * 0.01
FDI Ties to More Stringent CSR 
Requirements 
0.19 *** 0.05 0.19 *** 0.05 0.19 *** 0.05 0.19 *** 0.05
Trade-based GBN Commitment to CSR -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02
Within Trade-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
0.04 * 0.02 0.04 * 0.02 0.04 * 0.02 0.04 * 0.02
Trade-based GBN Commitment to CSR * 
Within Trade-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
-0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01
Trade Ties to More Stringent CSR 
Requirements 
0.10 ** 0.05 0.10 ** 0.05 0.10 ** 0.05 0.10 ** 0.05
Intercept -0.37 *** 0.08 -0.16 ** 0.08 -0.14 * 0.08 -0.19 ** 0.08
Observations 2386 2386 2386 2386
Number of Firms 764 764 764 764
Wald χ
2 181.43*** 181.43*** 181.43*** 181.43***
R
2 10.28% 10.28% 10.28% 10.28%
Model 7                                          
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                  
(-1 δ)                                                     
*                                                  
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                          
(+1 δ)
Model 8                                         
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                              
(+1 δ)                                           
*                                                   
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                                                                    
Model 9                                          
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                
(+1 δ)                                           
*                                            
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR  
(-1 δ)
Model 10                                           
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                              
(+1 δ)                                          
*                                        
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                          
(+1 δ)





FDI-based relationships than trade-based relationships, because the coefficient for FDI-
based global business network commitment to CSR is positive and significant in both 
Models (β = 0.10; p < .01; β = 0.10; p < .01), while the coefficient for trade-based global 
business network commitment to CSR is always insignificant.  
To investigate Hypothesis 4b I follow the steps suggested by Aiken and 
West (1991). Results show that as within global business network heterogeneity 
of commitment to CSR decreases, focal firm’s adoption of CSR practices 
becomes more positively related to global business network commitment to CSR 
and that this effect is stronger for FDI-based relationships than trade-based 
relationships. Models 2 through 9 include the interaction of FDI-based global 
business network commitment to CSR and within FDI-based global business 
network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR at different levels of these two 
variables (i.e., average; low; and high). Hypothesis 4a is supported because: 
(a) the coefficient of the interaction of FDI-based global business network 
commitment to CSR and within FDI-based global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR in Model 2 is negative and 
significant (β = -.01; p < .10); Model 2 also shows that the coefficient of 
the interaction of trade-based global business network commitment to 
CSR and within trade-based global business network heterogeneity of 
commitment to CSR is insignificant;  
(b) In addition, Models 3, 2 and 4 show that the coefficient of FDI-based 
global business network’s commitment to CSR becomes more positive as 





to CSR decreases in value. Specifically, at low levels of within global 
business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR (Model 3), the 
coefficient of global business network’s commitment to CSR is positive 
and significant (β =0.11; p < .01). At average levels of within global 
business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR (Model 2), the 
coefficient of global business network’s commitment to CSR is also 
positive and significant (β = 0.10; p < .01), but of a lower magnitude than 
that in Model 3. Then, at high levels of within global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR (Model 4), the coefficient of global 
business network’s commitment to CSR is positive and significant (β = 
0.09; p < .01) but of a lower magnitude than that in Model 2.  
Figure 5.7 illustrates how within FDI-based global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR moderates the relationship between FDI-













Figure 5.7: Interaction plot for the moderating effect of within FDI-based global 
business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR on the relationship between 
FDI-based global business network commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of 
CSR-related practices, using panel-corrected standard error regression (Hypothesis 
4b) 
 
Hypothesis 4c is not supported, indicating that the moderating effect of 
FDI-based global business network’s commitment to CSR on the relationship 
between within global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR and 
firm’s adoption of CSR practices is not stronger for FDI-based ties than trade-
based ties. This is because one of the three relevant conditions is not met. 
Specifically, the coefficient of the interaction of FDI-based global business 
network commitment to CSR and within FDI-based global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR in Model 2 is negative and significant (β = -





interaction of trade-based global business network commitment to CSR and 
within trade-based global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR 
is insignificant. However, the coefficient of within FDI-based global business 
network commitment to CSR does not become more positive as FDI-based global 
business network commitment to CSR decreases in value. This is indeed the case 
in Models 5, 2 and 8, where the coefficients of within FDI-based global business 
network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR are insignificant.  
Table 6.9 summarizes the results for Hypotheses 4b and 4c discussed 
above.  
Results do not support Hypothesis 4d, which means that the positive 
effects of ties to business partners in countries with more stringent CSR 
institutional requirements is not stronger for FDI ties than trade ties. Results show 
that the coefficient of within FDI ties to countries with more stringent CSR 
requirements is positive and significant in Models 1 and 2 (β = 0.21; p <.01; β = 
0.19; p <.01), and that the coefficient of trade ties to countries with more stringent 
CSR requirements is also positive and significant (β = 0.10; p <.10; β = 0.10; p 
<.10) and of a lower magnitude than that of FDI ties. However, a Wald test of the 












Table 5.9: Summary of results from Models 2-9 using panel-corrected standard 
error regression with panel-specific corrections for autocorrelation and 




5.3 Robustness tests using alternative specification of the dependent variable 
To ensure accurate inference, I present additional sensitivity checks, by 
introducing an alternative specification of the dependent variable. I rely on the main 
analytical approach discussed above, i.e., OLS regression with Huber-White estimators, 
and averaged independent and control variables over the four-year 2007-2010 period 
(Hull & Rothenberg, 2008). The dependent variable is measured in the year 2011 to allow 
for lagged effects. (In Appendix F, I present the results of another set of robustness tests 
using a second alternative specification of the dependent variable.) As I further discuss in 
the discussion section (as well as in Appendix F for the second set of robustness tests 
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Commit.  -1δ 0.11 Commit.  -1δ 0.10 Commit.  -1δ 0.09
Heter. -1δ 0.00 Heter. 0.00 Heter. +1δ 0.00
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Commit. 0.11 Commit. 0.10 Commit. 0.09
Heter. -1δ -0.01 Heter. -0.01 Heter. +1δ -0.01
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Commit.  +1δ 0.11 Commit.  +1δ 0.10 Commit.  +1δ 0.09







Commitment  -1δ; 
Heterogeneity
Sig.



























using an alternative dependent variable specification), all these analyses corroborate the 
findings of the main analyses that were presented above.  
Here I follow Strike et al. (2006) and separate the strengths and weaknesses 
components of each KLD category. This allows me to create two variables—one based 
on the sum of all the strength components of each category, which reflects firm’s 
adoption of CSR practices; the other based on the sum of all the weakness components of 
each category, which measures firm’s adoption of what researchers have referred to as 
corporate social “irresponsibility” (CSiR) practices (see Strike et al., 2006; McGuire, 
Dow & Argheyd, 2003). Following the established literature in this area, I define CSiR 
practices as those organizational routines that create negative externalities on a firm’s 
stakeholders. Prior research has found inconsistent results between CSR and CSiR, 
suggesting that they are subject to different dynamics (McGuire et al., 2003). Therefore, 
while I would expect my models to hold with the above discussed alternative 
specification of the dependent variable, I do not expect this to be the case for firm’s 
adoption of CSiR practices. However, for the purpose of completeness, I report the 
results concerning CSiR in Appendix G. 
Tables 5.10, 5.11, 5.12 and 5.13 confirm previous findings. As in Tables 5.2 and 
5.6, Models 1 and 2 in Table 5.10 provide support for Hypothesis 1, because the 
coefficient of global business network commitment to CSR is positive and significant (β 
= 0.11; p < .01; β = 0.17; p < .01). They also provide support for Hypothesis 3, as the 
coefficient of ties to business partners in countries with more stringent CSR requirements 
is positive and significant (β = 0.16; p < .01; β = 0.17; p < .01). In addition, Models 4 (β 





Hypothesis 2a and confirm that as within global business network heterogeneity of 
commitment to CSR decreases, the relationship between global business network 
commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of CSR practices becomes more positive. 
Furthermore, Models 8 (β = -.16; p < .1), 2 (β = 0.17,  n.s.), and 5 (β = 0.5; p < .01) 
provide support for Hypothesis 2b and show that as global business network commitment 
to CSR decreases, the relationships between within global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of CSR practices becomes 



































Table 5.10: OLS regression with Huber-White estimators and alternative 
specification of the dependent variable (Adoption of CSR practices = Sum of all the 








St. E. St. E. St. E.
Size 0.43 *** 0.02 0.42 *** 0.02 0.42 *** 0.02
ROA 0.29 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.33
R&D Intensity 0.65 *** 0.18 0.66 *** 0.17 0.66 *** 0.17
Capital Intensity 0.02 * 0.01 0.02 *** 0.01 0.02 *** 0.01
Leverage 0.09 0.06 0.10 * 0.06 0.10 * 0.06
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.13
   Energy & Extractive -0.13 0.12 -0.13 0.12 -0.13 0.12
   Food & Agriculture 0.39 *** 0.17 0.41 *** 0.17 0.41 *** 0.17
   Professional and Information Services -0.05 0.12 -0.06 0.12 -0.06 0.12
   Manufacturing -0.05 0.09 -0.04 0.09 -0.04 0.09
GBN Commitment to CSR 0.11 *** 0.03 0.17 *** 0.04 0.26 *** 0.06
Within GBN Heterogeneity of Commitment 
to CSR
0.01 0.08 0.30 *** 0.1 0.30 *** 0.10
GBN Commitment to CSR * Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of Commitment to CSR
-0.25 *** 0.06 -0.25 *** 0.06
Ties to More Stringent CSR Requirements 0.16 *** 0.06 0.17 *** 0.06 0.17 *** 0.06
Intercept -10.00 *** 1.81 -10.19 *** 1.79 -10.30 *** 1.80
Observations 710 710 710
Number of Firms 710 710 710
R
2 52.43% 53.14% 53.14%
F (13, 696) 37.85*** (14, 695) 20.63*** (14, 695) 20.63***
Root MSE 0.72 0.71 0.71
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Model 1                                                                                                          Model 2
GBN  
Commitment to 
CSR                                    




CSR                                                                    
Model 3                                       
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                   
*                                        
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 











St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E.
Size 0.42 *** 0.02 0.42 *** 0.02 0.42 *** 0.02 0.42 *** 0.02 0.42 *** 0.02 0.42 *** 0.02 0.42 *** 0.02
ROA 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.33
R&D Intensity 0.66 *** 0.17 0.66 *** 0.17 0.66 *** 0.17 0.66 *** 0.17 0.66 *** 0.17 0.66 *** 0.17 0.66 *** 0.17
Capital Intensity 0.02 *** 0.01 0.02 *** 0.01 0.02 *** 0.01 0.02 *** 0.01 0.02 *** 0.01 0.02 *** 0.01 0.02 *** 0.01
Leverage 0.10 * 0.06 0.10 * 0.06 0.10 * 0.06 0.10 * 0.06 0.10 * 0.06 0.10 * 0.06 0.10 * 0.06
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.13
   Energy & Extractive -0.13 0.12 -0.13 0.12 -0.13 0.12 -0.13 0.12 -0.13 0.12 -0.13 0.12 -0.13 0.12
   Food & Agriculture 0.41 *** 0.17 0.41 *** 0.17 0.41 *** 0.17 0.41 *** 0.17 0.41 *** 0.17 0.41 *** 0.17 0.41 *** 0.17
   Professional and Information Services -0.06 0.12 -0.06 0.12 -0.06 0.12 -0.06 0.12 -0.06 0.12 -0.06 0.12 -0.06 0.12
   Manufacturing -0.04 0.09 -0.04 0.09 -0.04 0.09 -0.04 0.09 -0.04 0.09 -0.04 0.09 -0.04 0.09
GBN Commitment to CSR 0.08 *** 0.03 0.17 *** 0.04 0.26 *** 0.06 0.08 *** 0.03 0.17 *** 0.04 0.26 *** 0.06 0.08 *** 0.03
Within GBN Heterogeneity of Commitment 
to CSR
0.30 *** 0.1 0.55 *** 0.15 0.55 *** 0.15 0.55 *** 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06
GBN Commitment to CSR * Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of Commitment to CSR
-0.25 *** 0.06 -0.25 *** 0.06 -0.25 *** 0.06 -0.25 *** 0.06 -0.25 *** 0.06 -0.25 *** 0.06 -0.25 *** 0.06
Ties to More Stringent CSR Requirements 0.17 *** 0.06 0.17 *** 0.06 0.17 *** 0.06 0.17 *** 0.06 0.17 *** 0.06 0.17 *** 0.06 0.17 *** 0.06
Intercept -10.08 *** 1.79 -10.36 *** 1.79 -10.55 *** 1.8 -10.16 *** 1.79 -10.02 *** 1.79 -10.04 *** 1.79 -10.00 *** 1.79
Observations 710 710 710 710 710 710 710
Number of Firms 710 710 710 710 710 710 710
R
2 53.14% 53.14% 53.14% 53.14% 53.14% 53.14% 53.14%
F (14, 695) 20.63*** (14, 695) 20.63*** (14, 695) 20.63*** (14, 695) 20.63*** (14, 695) 20.63*** (14, 695) 20.63*** (14, 695) 20.63***
Root MSE 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71
Model 8                                         
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                              
(+1 δ)                                                     
*                                                   
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                                                                    
Model 9                                          
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                
(+1 δ)                                       
*                                        
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                           
(-1 δ)
Model 10                                        
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                              
(+1 δ)                                      




CSR                          
(+1 δ)
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Model 4                                           
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                   




CSR                          
(+1 δ)
Model 5                                    
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                  
(-1 δ)                                                     




CSR                                                                    
Model 6                                           
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                  
(-1 δ)                                                     




CSR                           
(-1 δ)
Model 7                                   
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                 
(-1 δ)                    










Table 5.11: Summary of results from Models 2-9 using OLS regression with Huber-




Figures 5.8 and 5.9 provide a visual illustration of the results for Hypotheses 2a 
and b.  
 
Figure 5.8: Interaction plot for the moderating effect of within global business 
network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR on the relationship between global 
business network commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of CSR-related 
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Commit.  -1δ 0.26 Commit.  -1δ 0.17 Commit.  -1δ 0.08
Heter. -1δ 0.55 Heter. 0.55 Heter. +1δ 0.55
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Commit. 0.26 Commit. 0.17 Commit. 0.08
Heter. -1δ 0.30 Heter. 0.30 Heter. +1δ 0.30
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Commit.  +1δ 0.26 Commit.  +1δ 0.17 Commit.  +1δ 0.08







Commitment  -1δ; 
Heterogeneity
Sig.



































practices, using OLS regression with Huber-White estimators and alternative 




Figure 5.9: Interaction plot for the moderating effect of global business network 
commitment to CSR on the relation between within global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of CSR-related practices, 
using OLS regression with Huber-White estimators and alternative specification of 
the dependent variable (Hypothesis 2b) 
 






















Table 5.12: OLS regression with Huber-White estimators and alternative 
specification of the dependent variable (Adoption of CSR practices = Sum of all the 
strength components of each KLD category; Hypotheses 4a, b, c and d) 
 
 
St. E. St. E. St. E.
Size 0.42 *** 0.02 0.42 *** 0.02 0.42 *** 0.02
ROA 0.26 0.33 0.28 0.33 0.28 0.33
R&D Intensity 0.65 *** 0.18 0.66 *** 0.18 0.66 *** 0.18
Capital Intensity 0.02 ** 0.01 0.02 ** 0.01 0.02 ** 0.01
Leverage 0.09 0.06 0.09 * 0.06 0.09 * 0.06
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
   Energy & Extractive -0.16 0.12 -0.16 0.12 -0.16 0.12
   Food & Agriculture 0.39 ** 0.17 0.39 ** 0.17 0.39 ** 0.17
   Professional and Information Services -0.09 0.12 -0.09 0.12 -0.09 0.12
   Manufacturing -0.09 0.09 -0.09 0.09 -0.09 0.09
FDI-based GBN Commitment to CSR 0.10 0.06 0.13 * 0.07 0.60 ** 0.25
Within FDI-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
-0.07 0.12 0.51 ** 0.25 0.51 ** 0.25
FDI-based GBN Commitment to CSR * 
Within FDI-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
-0.47 ** 0.19 -0.47 ** 0.19
FDI Ties to More Stringent CSR 
Requirements 
0.23 *** 0.07 0.22 *** 0.07 0.22 *** 0.07
Trade-based GBN Commitment to CSR 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05
Within Trade-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
0.16 * 0.10 0.22 ** 0.10 0.22 ** 0.10
Trade-based GBN Commitment to CSR * 
Within Trade-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
-0.08 0.11 -0.08 0.11
Trade Ties to More Stringent CSR 
Requirements 
0.13 * 0.07 0.13 * 0.07 0.13 * 0.07
Intercept -10.06 *** 1.85 -10.12 *** 1.83 -10.63 *** 1.87
Observations 710 710 710
Number of Firms 710 710 710
R
2 53.34% 53.50% 53.50%
F (16, 693) 32.47*** (18, 691) 29.47*** (18, 691) 29.47***
Root MSE 0.71 0.71 0.71
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Model 1                                                                                                          Model 2
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                    
*                                          
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                                                                    
Model 3                   
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                   











St. E. St. E. St. E.
Size 0.42 *** 0.02 0.42 *** 0.02 0.42 *** 0.02
ROA 0.28 0.33 0.28 0.33 0.28 0.33
R&D Intensity 0.66 *** 0.18 0.66 *** 0.18 0.66 *** 0.18
Capital Intensity 0.02 ** 0.01 0.02 ** 0.01 0.02 ** 0.01
Leverage 0.09 * 0.06 0.09 * 0.06 0.09 * 0.06
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
   Energy & Extractive -0.16 0.12 -0.16 0.12 -0.16 0.12
   Food & Agriculture 0.39 ** 0.17 0.39 ** 0.17 0.39 ** 0.17
   Professional and Information Services -0.09 0.12 -0.09 0.12 -0.09 0.12
   Manufacturing -0.09 0.09 -0.09 0.09 -0.09 0.09
FDI-based GBN Commitment to CSR -0.34 ** 0.16 0.13 * 0.07 0.60 ** 0.25
Within FDI-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
0.51 ** 0.25 0.98 ** 0.43 0.98 ** 0.43
FDI-based GBN Commitment to CSR * 
Within FDI-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
-0.47 ** 0.19 -0.47 ** 0.19 -0.47 ** 0.19
FDI Ties to More Stringent CSR 
Requirements 
0.22 *** 0.07 0.22 *** 0.07 0.22 *** 0.07
Trade-based GBN Commitment to CSR 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05
Within Trade-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
0.22 ** 0.10 0.22 ** 0.10 0.22 ** 0.10
Trade-based GBN Commitment to CSR * 
Within Trade-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
-0.08 0.11 -0.08 0.11 -0.08 0.11
Trade Ties to More Stringent CSR 
Requirements 
0.13 * 0.07 0.13 * 0.07 0.13 * 0.07
Intercept -9.60 *** 1.82 -10.25 *** 1.83 -11.22 *** 1.93
Observations 710 710 710
Number of Firms 710 710 710
R
2 53.50% 53.50% 53.50%
F (18, 691) 29.47*** (18, 691) 29.47*** (18, 691) 29.47***
Root MSE 0.71 0.71 0.71
Coeff.Coeff. Coeff.
Model 6                                           
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                  
(-1 δ)                                                     
*                                                    
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                           
(-1 δ)
Model 4                                           
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                   
*                                                  
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                          
(+1 δ)
Model 5                                         
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                  
(-1 δ)                                        
*                                           
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 








St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E.
Size 0.42 *** 0.02 0.42 *** 0.02 0.42 *** 0.02 0.42 *** 0.02
ROA 0.28 0.33 0.28 0.33 0.28 0.33 0.28 0.33
R&D Intensity 0.66 *** 0.18 0.66 *** 0.18 0.66 *** 0.18 0.66 *** 0.18
Capital Intensity 0.02 ** 0.01 0.02 ** 0.01 0.02 ** 0.01 0.02 ** 0.01
Leverage 0.09 * 0.06 0.09 * 0.06 0.09 * 0.06 0.09 * 0.06
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
   Energy & Extractive -0.16 0.12 -0.16 0.12 -0.16 0.12 -0.16 0.12
   Food & Agriculture 0.39 ** 0.17 0.39 ** 0.17 0.39 ** 0.17 0.39 ** 0.17
   Professional and Information Services -0.09 0.12 -0.09 0.12 -0.09 0.12 -0.09 0.12
   Manufacturing -0.09 0.09 -0.09 0.09 -0.09 0.09 -0.09 0.09
FDI-based GBN Commitment to CSR -0.34 ** 0.16 0.13 * 0.07 0.60 ** 0.25 -0.34 ** 0.16
Within FDI-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
0.98 ** 0.43 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.14
FDI-based GBN Commitment to CSR * 
Within FDI-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
-0.47 ** 0.19 -0.47 ** 0.19 -0.47 ** 0.19 -0.47 ** 0.19
FDI Ties to More Stringent CSR 
Requirements 
0.22 *** 0.07 0.22 *** 0.07 0.22 *** 0.07 0.22 *** 0.07
Trade-based GBN Commitment to CSR 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05
Within Trade-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
0.22 ** 0.10 0.22 ** 0.10 0.22 ** 0.10 0.22 ** 0.10
Trade-based GBN Commitment to CSR * 
Within Trade-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR
-0.08 0.11 -0.08 0.11 -0.08 0.11 -0.08 0.11
Trade Ties to More Stringent CSR 
Requirements 
0.13 * 0.07 0.13 * 0.07 0.13 * 0.07 0.13 * 0.07
Intercept -9.27 *** 1.83 -9.99 *** 1.82 -10.03 *** 1.84 -9.94 *** 1.82
Observations 710 710 710 710
Number of Firms 710 710 710 710
R
2 53.50% 53.50% 53.50% 53.50%
F (18, 691) 29.47*** (18, 691) 29.47*** (18, 691) 29.47*** (18, 691) 29.47***
Root MSE 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Model 7                                          
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                  
(-1 δ)                                                     
*                                                  
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                          
(+1 δ)
Model 8                                         
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                              
(+1 δ)                                           
*                                           
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                                                                    
Model 9                                          
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                
(+1 δ)                                           
*                                            
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR  
(-1 δ)
Model 10                                           
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                              
(+1 δ)                                          
*                                        
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 






Model 1 in Table 5.12 above includes all the independent and control variables 
without the interaction terms. Model 2 includes all independent and control variables as 
well as the two interaction terms of interest. Results in Models 1 and 2 provide partial 
support for Hypothesis 4a. This is because the coefficients for FDI-based global business 
network commitment to CSR and trade-based global business network commitment to 
CSR are insignificant in Model 1. However, FDI-based global business network 
commitment to CSR is positive and significant in Model 2 (β = 0.13; p < .10), while the 
coefficient for trade-based global business network commitment to CSR is insignificant. 
To investigate Hypothesis 4b I follow the steps suggested by Aiken and 
West (1991). These results are consistent with previous findings and indicate that 
as within global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR 
decreases, focal firm’s adoption of CSR practices becomes more positively 
related to global business network commitment to CSR and that this effect is 
stronger for FDI-based relationships than trade-based relationships. Models 2 
through 9 include the interaction of FDI-based global business network 
commitment to CSR and within FDI-based global business network heterogeneity 
of commitment to CSR at different levels of these two variables (i.e., average; 
low; and high). Hypothesis 4a is supported because: 
(a) The coefficient of the interaction of FDI-based global business 
network commitment to CSR and within FDI-based global business 
network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR in Model 2 is negative 
and significant (β = -.47; p < .05); Model 2 also shows that the 





commitment to CSR and within trade-based global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR is insignificant;  
(b) In addition, the coefficient of FDI-based global business network’s 
commitment to CSR becomes more positive as within FDI-based 
global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR 
decreases in value. This is supported by Models 3, 2 and 4. 
Specifically, at low levels of within FDI-based global business 
network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR (Model 3), the 
coefficient of FDI-based global business network’s commitment to 
CSR is positive and significant (β = 0.6; p < .05). At average levels of 
within FDI-based global business network heterogeneity of 
commitment to CSR (Model 2), the coefficient of FDI-based global 
business network’s commitment to CSR is also positive and significant 
(β = 0.13; p < .10), but of a lower magnitude than that in Model 3. 
Then, at high levels of within FDI-based global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR (Model 4), the coefficient of 
FDI-based global business network’s commitment to CSR is 
insignificant (β = -0.34; p < .05).  
Figure 5.10 illustrates how within FDI-based global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR moderates the relationship between FDI-







Figure 5.10: Interaction plot for the moderating effect of within FDI-based global 
business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR on the relationship between 
FDI-based global business network commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of 
CSR-related practices, using OLS regression with Huber-White estimators and 
alternative specification of the dependent variable (Adoption of CSR practices = 
Sum of all the strength components of each KLD category; Hypothesis 4b) 
 
I follow the same steps to also examine whether the moderating effect of 
global business network’s commitment to CSR on the relationship between within 
global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR and firm’s 
adoption of CSR practices is stronger for FDI-based relationships than trade-
based relationships, as predicted in Hypothesis 4c. H4c is supported because:  
(a) The coefficient of the interaction of FDI-based global business 
network commitment to CSR and within FDI-based global business 
network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR in Model 2 is negative 





coefficient of the interaction of trade-based global business network 
commitment to CSR and within trade-based global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR is insignificant;  
(b) Finally, the coefficient of within FDI-based global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR becomes more positive as FDI-
based global business network commitment to CSR decreases in value. 
This is indeed the case in Models 5, 2 and 8. These models show that 
at low levels of FDI-based global business network’s commitment to 
CSR (Model 5), the coefficient of within FDI-based global business 
network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR is positive and 
significant (β = .98; p < .05). In addition, at average levels of FDI-
based global business network commitment to CSR (Model 2), the 
coefficient of within FDI-based global business network heterogeneity 
of commitment to CSR is also positive and significant (β = 0.51; p < 
.05), but of a lower magnitude than that in Model 5. Finally, at high 
levels of FDI-based global business network commitment to CSR 
(Model 8), the coefficient of within FDI-based global business 
network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR is insignificant. 
Figure 5.11 illustrates how FDI-based global business network 
commitment to CSR moderates the relationship between within FDI-based global 
business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of 
CSR practices.  







Figure 5.11: Interaction plot for the moderating effect of FDI-based global business 
network commitment to CSR on the relation between within FDI-based global 
business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of CSR-
related practices, using OLS regression with Huber-White estimators and 
alternative specification of the dependent variable (Adoption of CSR practices = 
Sum of all the strength components of each KLD category; Hypothesis 4c) 
 
Results do not support Hypothesis 4d, which means that the positive effect 
of ties to business partners in countries with more stringent CSR requirements is 
not stronger for FDI ties than trade ties. Results show that the coefficient of 
within FDI ties to business partners in countries with more stringent CSR 
requirements is positive and significant in Models 1 and 2 (β = 0.23; p <.01; β = 
0.22; p <.01), and that the coefficient of trade ties to business partners in countries 
with more stringent CSR requirements is also positive and significant (β = 0.13; p 





Wald test of the differences between these two coefficients was not statistically 
significant at the .05 level. 
 
Table 5.13: Summary of results from Models 2-9 using OLS regression with Huber-
White estimators and alternative specification of the dependent variable (Adoption 
of CSR practices = Sum of all the strength components of each KLD category; 
Hypotheses 4b and c) 
 
 
Table 5.14 below summarizes hypotheses testing results based on main analytical 
method, as well as alternative model- and alternative dependent variable- specifications.  
Appendix F reports the results of additional robustness test using a second set of 
alternative dependent variable specifications, which consider each individual components 
of the main dependent variable, i.e., community relations, diversity, corporate 
governance, employee relations, environment, human rights, and product quality and 




Commit.  -1δ 0.60 Commit.  -1δ 0.13 Commit.  -1δ -0.34
Heter. -1δ 0.98 Heter. 0.98 Heter. +1δ 0.98
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Commit. 0.60 Commit. 0.13 Commit. -0.34
Heter. -1δ 0.51 Heter. 0.51 Heter. +1δ 0.51
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Table 5.14: Summary of main and robustness tests results 
 













H1: A focal firm’s adoption of CSR 
practices will be positively related to the 












H2a: As within global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR 
decreases, focal firm’s adoption of CSR 
practices becomes more positively related 












H2b: As global business network 
commitment to CSR decreases, focal 
firm’s adoption of CSR practices becomes 
more positively related to within global 
business network heterogeneity of 











H3: A firm is more likely to adopt CSR 
practices to the extent that it has ties with 
business partners in countries with more 











H4a: The type of tie between the focal 
firm and its partners in the global 
business network moderates the effect of 
global business network commitment to 
CSR on firm’s adoption of CSR practices, 
such that the positive effects of global 
business network commitment to CSR is 















H4b: The type of tie between the focal 
firm and its partners in the global 
business network moderates the effect of 
within global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR on 
the relationship between global business 
network commitment to CSR and firm’s 
adoption of CSR practices, such that the 
effect is stronger for FDI-based 
















H4c: The type of tie between the focal 
firm and its partners in the global 
business network moderates the effect of 
global business network commitment to 
CSR on the relationship between within 
global business network heterogeneity of 
commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption 
of CSR practices, such that the effect is 












H4d: The type of tie between the focal 
firm and its partners in the global 
business network moderates the effect of 
the firm’s ties to business partners in 
countries with more stringent CSR 
requirements on adoption of CSR 
practices, such that the positive effect of 
ties to business partners in countries with 
more stringent CSR requirements is 






















This dissertation examined how the complexity of the firm’s trade- and FDI-based 
business partner networks contributes to shaping its adoption of CSR practices. The 
empirical study found support for the notion that embeddedness, or the joint effect of 
CSR-related institutional influences and the intensity of the economic relationships 
within a focal firm’s global business network, shapes the extent to which the firm 
engages in CSR. Results also showed that higher levels of overall global business 
network’s commitment to CSR increase the likelihood that firms adopt related practices. 
This implies that, as firms deepen their economic ties to business partners located in 
countries with more stringent institutional requirements for CSR, they become more 
influenced by pro-CSR institutional forces and are more likely to adopt related practices. 
I argued that this occurs because economic ties perform as channels for institutional 
influences related to CSR, and the nature of these relationships contributes to shaping the 





Results also indicate that   within global business network heterogeneity of 
commitment to CSR and global business network commitment to CSR jointly contribute 
to shaping firm’s decision to adopt CSR practices. Specifically, results indicate that, in 
support of Hypothesis 2a, as within global business network heterogeneity of commitment 
to CSR decreases, the relationship between global business network commitment to CSR 
and firm’s adoption of CSR practices becomes stronger. In addition, results indicate that, 
in support of Hypothesis 2b, as global business network commitment to CSR decreases, 
the influence of within global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR with 
regards to a firm’s decision to adopt CSR practices becomes stronger.  
 Support for H2a indicates that a firm’s decision to adopt CSR practices is more 
positively affected by global business network commitment to CSR when that 
commitment is fairly consistent across the various institutional contexts in which the firm 
operates. It also indicates that the overall intensity of global business network 
commitment to CSR is not very important to firm’s adoption of CSR practices when this 
consistency is lacking. One possible explanation for this is that higher levels of within 
global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR imply multiple logics 
around the importance of CSR, meaning the institutional pressures to adopt CSR 
practices are less cohesive. This weakens a firm’s incentives to acquiesce to any 
particular set of institutional influences (Oliver, 1991). This could be especially relevant 
to the firms in my sample.  These are all large MNCs, which, according to Kostova, Roth 
& Dacin (2008: 999) tend to view institutional heterogeneity as a means to achieve 
“institutional freedom” to “choose the patterns of behavior that they think fit them best.” 





become more important to the firm’s adoption decision as global business network 
commitment to CSR becomes weaker. Under these circumstances, I argue that firms seem 
to adopt CSR practices less because of the isomorphic pressures regarding the importance 
of CSR (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), and more because of the learning opportunities 
associated with the multiplicity of institutional influences concerning the importance of 
CSR to which they are exposed within their global business network. While 
heterogeneity may make it more difficult to operate legitimately across a variety of 
institutional environments that vary with regards to their CSR-related institutional 
requirements (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), it also forces firms to develop innovative 
solutions and routines to achieve this goal., This ultimately strengthen their knowledge 
base in this area and make it more likely that they would adopt CSR practices. More 
intense global business network commitment to CSR would instead constrain firms into 
specific patterns of behaviors (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  
Hypothesis 3, which predicted that some of the institutional contexts that make up 
the global business network can exercise distinct effects on firm’s decision to adopt CSR-
related practices, was also supported. Results show that relationships that tie the focal 
firm to institutional contexts characterized by more stringent requirements for CSR than 
those of the firm’s home country are more likely to adopt related practices.  
Furthermore, results indicate that the type of economic relationships in which the 
focal actor is engaged is also important with regards to its decision to adopt CSR 
practices, as predicted in Hypotheses 4a, b, c and d. Specifically, results show that a 
firm’s FDI ties perform as more effective channels of the institutional forces that stem 





general hypothesis is consistent with an interpretation of the firm as a social community 
that specializes in the creation and transfer of knowledge across borders (Kogut and 
Zander, 1993). FDI-based relationships imply more intense relationships between focal 
actors and alter organizations than trade-based relationships. This is because FDI-based 
relationships usually involve transfers of capital, managerial expertise, shared 
organizational values, a lasting interest in the local assets that are owned by the focal 
actor and, therefore, in the host country (Bandelj, 2002). Given that the firm has more to 
gain from being perceived as a legitimate local player and more to lose if it is not 
perceived as such, this lasting interest for the host country implies that the focal firm is 
more exposed to demands that might emerge from the local institutional context as to the 
firm’s adoption decisions. It also implies that the firm might be more likely to have 
already done the necessary due diligence to understand its ability to perform effectively 
within the local institutional context and to work within the local social expectations, 
including those concerning CSR. This is not necessarily the case with trade-based 
economic relationships because, while still very important to the economic success of the 
firm, they are not as durable, and do not imply equally strong incentives to adapt to and 
learn from the local context as FDI-based relationships (Kogut & Zander, 1992). 
However, it is also important to note that FDI and much trade are linked: a significant 
portion of world’s trade is FDI-based and another portion involves trade between MNCs 
and independent parties. This would suggest that to the extent that trade and FDI are 
complements, trade measures might reflect institutional effects on firm’s adoption 





More specifically, support of Hypothesis 4a indicates that FDI ties perform as 
better conduits of the isomorphic pressures stemming from the global business network 
when compared with trade-based ties. In addition, support for Hypothesis 4b indicates 
that as heterogeneity in the FDI-based global business network commitment to CSR 
grows, the importance of this network’s commitment to CSR with regards to the firm’s 
decision to engage in CSR becomes weaker. Furthermore, it shows that the moderating 
effect of within FDI-based global business network heterogeneity is stronger than the 
moderating effect of within trade-based global business network heterogeneity. This 
means that, as expected, heterogeneity can more effectively impede the effect of 
isomorphic pressures in the context of FDI-based relationships than in the context of 
trade-based relationships. Also, support for Hypothesis 4c indicates that commitment to 
CSR is more disruptive of the learning opportunities associated with heterogeneity in the 
case of FDI-based relationships than are trade-based relationships. Both scenarios are 
likely to take place because the institutional pressures and learning opportunities that 
flow through trade-based ties are not as intense as those that flow through a firm’s FDI 
ties.   
It is important to note that while main analyses and robustness tests relying on the 
alternative specification of the dependent variable all provide support for H4c, this is not 
the case for those analyses that rely on the alternative model specification. These results 
suggest that when one considers only FDI-based relationships, heterogeneity-induced 
learning is not always an important driver of the firm’s decision to adopt CSR practices, 
even when network’s commitment to CSR is low. This could be, in some instances, 





relationships is more consequential to a firm’s decision to engage in CSR, rather than just 
that experienced within the firm’s FDI-based network.    
Finally, results from the main analyses support Hypothesis 4d indicating that a 
firm’s FDI ties to countries with more stringent CSR requirements are more important 
with regards to its decision to adopt CSR practices than are trade ties to countries with 
more stringent CSR requirements. However, robustness tests relying on alternative model 
and dependent variable specifications do not support H4d, because Wald tests of 
significance did not show that these coefficients are significantly different at the .95 
level. These results suggest that while ties to business partners in countries with more 
stringent CSR requirements matter with regards to firm’s decisions to adopt CSR 
practices, they may not always be as important whether the firm is exposed to more 
stringent institutional environments in the context of trade or FDI-based relationships. 
This could depend on the fact that ties to business partners in countries with more 
stringent CSR requirements create incentives for firms to learn that do not depend on the 
type of economic relationship that channels them.   
6.2 Implications for research 
The results of this study inform three areas of research—international business, 
organizational institutionalism, and CSR.  
6.2.1 Implications for international business research 
This study contributes to the international business research area by providing a 
novel conceptualization of the global space where internationalized firms, and in 
particular MNCs, operate. Traditional approaches to the study of this global space tend to 





make up the organization and on the challenges to effective knowledge transfer that 
might emerge within it (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990). In this study, I demonstrate the 
importance of expanding this analytical focus in order to consider inter-firm 
relationships, because they also contribute to channeling important issue-specific 
institutional forces.  
This work also contributes to the international business research area because it 
provides an investigation of the organizational- and field-level factors that contribute to 
the emergence of both the “constraining” and “enabling” effects of institutional forces 
(Saka-Helmhout & Geppert, 2011). Indeed, while institutional theory has provided a rich 
theoretical foundation to analyze MNCs, much of international business research only 
considers their constraining effects (Saka-Helmhout & Geppert, 2011), based on an 
understanding of institutions as “rules of the game” that impose transaction costs that 
shape actors’ behavior (North, 1990). However, I suggest that the institutional forces that 
emerge from the global business network where the firm operates expose the firm to 
isomorphic pressures, as well as learning opportunities about CSR practices (Kostova et 
al., 2008). I do so by considering not only the intensity of the institutional pressures 
emerging from the global business network, but also their heterogeneity. While stronger 
institutional pressures about CSR stimulate conformity, their heterogeneity makes it more 
difficult for the firm to take any specific course of action for granted (Oliver, 1991). 
Therefore, one of the novel findings in this work is that strength and heterogeneity of 
institutional forces within the firm’s global business network can coexist, and exercise 
separate, as well as joint influences on the focal actor’s CSR adoption decisions. 





In the organizational institutionalism area, the first proposed contribution is the 
narrowing of the existing gap between institutional and network perspectives about 
organizational behavior, by making explicit the role that networks play as conduits for the 
diffusion of institutional practices, as well as the co-constitutive relationship between 
networks and institutions (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2008). This idea is consistent with 
many institutional studies that presume that professional or inter-organizational networks 
serve as conduits for the diffusion of appropriate practices and ideas (Owen-Smith & 
Powell, 2008). For example, Meyer and Rowan (1977) pointed to the ‘explosive 
organizational potential’ of organizations’ relational networks, and how this greatly 
increased both the spread and number of rationalized myths. Networks were also 
essential components of DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) conception of organizational 
field, which emphasized ‘connectedness and structural equivalence’ (Owen-Smith & 
Powell, 2008). However, existing work concerning how organizational fields shape 
firms’ behaviors tends to fall short on providing an explicit discussion of the mechanisms 
through which networks might contribute to the diffusion of practices.  
This dissertation makes those network mechanisms more explicit by investigating 
the diffusion of CSR-related practices through the organizational network ties within 
global business networks in which firms operate. It suggests a more encompassing effect 
of these networks, that includes not only structural links, but also relational 
characteristics, the quality of the type of economic ties in which the firm is engaged, and 
their relative importance towards explaining the firm’s adoption of CSR-related practices. 
As such, this work also contributes to the emerging literature at the intersection of 





McDermott & Corredoira, 2010), which has offered initial explanations of how firms’ 
embeddedness, in certain inter-organizational networks, promotes knowledge diffusion. 
This work advances the field by focusing, not only on ties structure but also on their 
quality and composition.  
The second contribution to organizational theory focuses on the embeddedness 
research area. Indeed, whereas much existing research in this tradition has downplayed 
the importance of the content of network ties in favor of their structure (DiMaggio, 1992; 
Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Powell & Smith-Doerr, 1994), several scholars agree that 
network ties requires further attention  (e.g., Adler & Kwon, 2002; Dacin et al., 1997; 
Kilduff & Brass, 2010). In this study, I answer this call by considering both the economic 
and institutional content of networks. Specifically, I conceptualize global business 
networks as systems of economic resources, and also rules, norms, and beliefs concerning 
CSR. I also respond to calls for greater attention to “the complexity, strength, and 
intensity of embeddedness” (Dacin et al., 1999: 337). The study does so by measuring 
and modeling the intensity and types of economic exchanges between the focal firm and 
its business partners as constitutive elements of the intensity with which the focal actor 
perceives these influences.  
6.2.3 Implications for CSR research 
The main contribution to CSR research is the development of an embeddedness 
explanation of CSR adoption. This approach extends existing explanations of firm social 
and environmental behaviors, which have been focused on the identification of firm-level 
drivers, including top leadership’s values (e.g., Branzei, Ursacki-Bryant, Vertinsky & 





groups) (e.g., Doh & Guay, 2006); certain firm’s characteristics and resources, including 
the level of R&D spending; competitive pressures; industry type (e.g., McWilliams & 
Siegel, 2000); and employees turnover (e.g., Turban & Greening, 1996). However, as 
suggested by the emerging comparative research in this area, firms’ understandings about 
their role in society vary across institutional settings (Aguilera & Jackson, 2008). 
Additionally, there are important inter-organizational aspects to corporate decisions to 
engage in CSR that have not been investigated until now. In particular, the quality of the 
relationship between buyer and supplier firms across countries has influenced the latter’s 
propensity to engage in CSR initiatives. For example, Nike is well-known for mandating 
fair labor standards for its production outsourcing partners, because of stakeholder 
expectations in developed countries, even though the factories are independently owned 
and located in developing countries (Locke & Romis, 2007). In this case, a buyer firm 
channels pressures from its composite institutional environment to suppliers in other 
countries. These forces reflect normative and cognitive understandings about the role of 
business in society in the firm’s home and host countries. They also reflect normative, 
cognitive and coercive pressures stemming from inter-organizational linkages within 
global business network, either directly or indirectly, through its value-added chain 
and/or outsourcing service providers. As a result, studies of the drivers of adoption of 
CSR practices narrowly focused on the firm-level of analysis and/or a single country 
might not have the power to address the complex set of forces that govern firm’s decision 
making in this area. 





This study has also several managerial implications. At a general level, it 
demonstrates the importance of a firm’s network of business partners in shaping its CSR 
practices. Findings from this study show that firms need to be concerned not only with 
what happens inside its own “walls”, but also with the general CSR trends in its global 
business network. This finding is corroborated by the mounting anecdotal evidence that 
even firms with the glossiest CSR reports have found themselves cast as public enemy, 
often because of accidents or wrongdoings in their global business networks. This was, 
for example, the case with BP, following the April 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. 
The spill was caused by an explosion on the Deepwater Horizon, an offshore oil drilling 
rig owned by Transocean, one of the BP’s main contractors in the United States. In the 
aftermath of the oil spill, BP experienced one of the most severe reputational crises.- 
These created negative financial consequences when investors began to question the 
company’s ability to salvage its reputation. Before then, however, BP had been often 
labeled as one of the most progressive and socially responsible firms in the oil industry 
(e.g., Levy & Kolk, 2002). These events further highlight the need for corporations to 
carefully monitor their global business networks to ensure that CSR issues are as much of 
a priority for their business partners as much as they are for them. 
Societal CSR expectations have never been higher; therefore these create a large 
component of the challenge that is currently faced by large corporation (McKinsey, 
2013). Experts agree that companies are increasingly expected to not only obey the law 
or meet certain standards within their business, but also to ensure high standards within 
their global business networks, among their subsidiaries and suppliers.  Larger companies 





problems (McKinsey, 2009, 2013). Furthermore, as expectations have increased, so have 
the means available to monitor corporate behavior. Digital communications ensure that 
individuals and NGOs can monitor business impacts on society and quickly rally support 
against firms that they perceive as inadequate at almost zero cost (Chouinard & Stanley, 
2012). 
The dissertation also has implications for developing successful CSR strategies. 
More specifically, it offers managers a theoretically-grounded framework to develop a 
better understanding of their CSR-related decision- making and to assess whether their 
company’s CSR-related behaviors are aligned with the overall organizational strategy and 
business partners’ expectations. For example, embeddededness in a global business 
network, with strong overall commitment to CSR, would indicate that there are strong 
incentives for the firm to adopt CSR-related practices, as well as potentially sizable costs 
associated with non-conformity in this area. Furthermore, divergence between the firm’s 
CSR practice adoption, with related trends in its global business network, is another 
useful source of information for the firm. Specifically, if the firm is embedded in a 
network that is considerably better at CSR than the focal firm, then, such discrepancies 
could suggest the need for the firm to improve its CSR record. Alternatively, if the firm 
operates in a global business network that tends to care less about CSR than it does, then 
it might need to be prepared to deal with the possibility that something could go wrong in 
this area among its FDI- and/or trade-based partners. In sum, mapping of global business 
network CSR-related expectations can help managers reduce the likelihood that the firm 





 In addition, awareness of the degree of within global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR can help managers refine their understanding of 
conflicting messages concerning its importance. Firms embedded in more heterogeneous 
environments should consider whether they have the internal resources and capabilities to 
deal effectively with the more challenging nature of the global business network where 
they operate. Examples of such resources and capabilities include: managerial focus on 
CSR issues, and expertise in this area; ties with relevant local civil society groups across 
the various institutional contexts where the firm operates, helping the firm tailor its CSR 
offerings to the local needs and providing more refined understandings of what these 
needs are; and the ability of the firm to tap those relationships to acquire information 
about local CSR needs and how they fit into the organization’s overall strategy, in order 
to avoid tensions that might expose it  to damaging legitimacy crisis (Kostova & Zaheer, 
1999). In sum, awareness of the challenges and opportunities associated with the global 
business network would improve managers’ ability to recognize when and where to 
expect potential crises in this area, and what kind of resources and capabilities they might 
need to deploy in order to tackle them. 
6.4 Limitations and future research 
There are several limitations to this study that must be noted. First, this is an early 
effort at unpacking the characteristics and impacts of a firm’s institutional and economic 
embeddedness within its global business network with regards to its decision to adopt 
CSR practices. One of the main challenges is the lack of partner-specific CSR 
performance data, which I capture, instead, with a measure of the CSR-related 





located. While this measure only proxies business partners’ CSR track record, it is 
consistent with existing research that measures  the effects of country level institutional 
arrangements on firm practice adoption (e.g., Busenitz, Gomez & Spencer, 2000; Ferner 
& Quintanilla, 1998; Quack, Morgan & Whitley, 2000;  Orrù, Biggart & Hamilton, 1991; 
Rosenzweig & Nohria, 1994). In addition I conducted this study with reference to a 
single set of practices and a population of only U.S. firms. For the purpose of 
generalizability, it would be important to replicate this study with other practices, as well 
as with non-U.S. firms, although I would expect my model to be generalizable to all types 
of practices and firms. Nonetheless, the current lack of variation in the firms’ home 
countries does allow one to conduct a conservative test of the presented model, given that 
fewer countries possess CSR-related institutional arrangements that are more 
sophisticated than those found in the United States. For example, it would be interesting 
to also include firms based in Europe and several emerging markets. This would increase 
the variance in the variables describing the strength and heterogeneity of the practice-
related institutional quality found within the networks where firms operate. As I further 
discuss in the next section of this chapter, this inclusion would allow for a more nuanced 
investigation of the role of a firm’s home country as it relates to the forces that stem from 
the global business network. I would also expect that firms that are located in countries 
with less developed institutional frameworks for the practice under consideration would 
be more exposed to the influences emerging from their global business network.  
Finally, while this study covers five years of corporate decision making in the 
CSR area, future research would certainly benefit from a more in-depth evaluation of the 





their ties to specific institutional contexts through their economic exchange relationships 
with local business partners. 
6.5 Next steps 
 Currently, there are two manuscripts planned. The first manuscript is an empirical 
paper based on the quantitative study in the dissertation. The main goal of this paper will 
be to explore the role of a firm’s institutional and economic embeddedness in its global 
business network with regards to the decision to adopt CSR practices. The second 
manuscript is a survey-based study of the adoption of innovative managerial practices by 
emerging market firms. Innovative managerial practices are defined as practices that are 
new to the firm. This study would also draw on interviews with and surveys of firm 
managers. It would be based on the main theoretical insights developed in the 
dissertation. One benefit of this approach is that it allows collecting focal firm’s partners-
specific performance data, thus addressing one of this dissertation’s main limitations. 
This manuscript would also focus on managerial cognitive processes that contribute to 
shaping firm’s interpretation of the social and economic forces to which it is exposed in 
the global business network. Thus, another benefit of this approach is that it would offer a 
more nuanced investigation at the level of the individual firm whose characteristics 
contribute to the phenomenon under investigation. In addition, this study would 
investigate the role of a firm’s embeddedness in its global business network for a sample 
of non-U.S. firms, thus addressing the sample-related concern associated with the 
dissertation that was discussed above. I believe that a population sample with greater 
variation in terms of the countries of origin of the organizations would help to better 





institutional requirements with regards to a firm’s decision to adopt innovative 
managerial practices. While the related variables included in my study already provide an 
indication of the importance of this construct, I believe that the effects would be even 
stronger when one considers firms headquartered in emerging markets.  
There are other areas for future research on related topics. While I focus on the 
adoption of broadly defined CSR practices, future studies could investigate the global 
business network-related drivers of the adoption of specific sets of CSR practices as 
captured by the KLD database (e.g., community relations, diversity, corporate 
governance, employee relations, environment, human rights, and product quality and 
safety). This would be interesting as there are important differences in the way these 
practices tend to be regulated within each country, a condition that could affect the 
relative importance of global business network-related forces vis-à-vis firm’s adoption 
decisions. Finally, it would also be interesting to investigate the unique effects associated 
with the firm’s economic relationships with business partners located in countries with 
less stringent CSR-related institutional requirements than those of the firm’s home 
country on its adoption decisions. While a small number of studies has begun unpacking 
the varying effects of firm’s embeddedness in more and less stringent institutional 
contexts relative to the firm’s home country, scholars agree that more research is needed 
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APPENDIX A: GLOBAL BUSINESS NETWORKS OF GENERAL MILLS, FMC, APPLIED 
MATERIALS AND ACUITY BRANDS, 2007-2010 
 
 


















Figure A.4: General Mills’ global business network, 2010 
 
 









Figure A.6: FMC’s global business network, 2008 
 
 









Figure A.8: FMC’s global business network, 2010 
 

















Figure A.10: Applied Materials’ global business network, 2008 
 








Figure A.12: Applied Materials’ global business network, 2010 
 
 







Figure A.14: Acuity Brands’ global business network, 2008 
 
 












APPENDIX B: VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY TESTS BASED ON DIAMANTOPOULOS & 
WINKLHOFER (2001) 
 
The tables below report the results of the tests carried out to evaluate construct validity 
and reliability based on Diamantopoulos & Winklhofer (2001) for the main dependent 
variable of interest and the presented measure of firm’s dependence on the business 
partners that make up the global business network. 
 
Adoption of CSR Practices 
Year 2008 
The following tables show low correlations among the index components, and low 
average VIF. 
                      |   1         2        3        4        5        6       7         
----------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
1 Corporate Governance|   1.0000 
2 Community           |   0.0584   1.0000 
3 Diversity           |  -0.1490   0.2537   1.0000 
4 Employee Relations  |   0.0657   0.1396   0.1850   1.0000 
5 Environment         |   0.0965   0.3476   0.1576   0.1515   1.0000 
6 Human Rights        |   0.1238   0.0318  -0.2002   0.0170   0.1758   1.0000 




Variable            |       VIF       1/VIF   
--------------------+---------------------- 
Diversity           |      1.22    0.820250 
Environment         |      1.21    0.824025 
Community           |      1.20    0.831950 
Human Rights        |      1.10    0.909861 
Employee Relations  |      1.07    0.934319 
Corporate Governance|      1.06    0.944009 
Product             |      1.06    0.945291 
--------------------+---------------------- 







The following tables show low correlations among the index components, and low 
average VIF. 
                      |     1         2        3        4        5        6       7         
----------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
1 Corporate Governance|   1.0000 
2 Community           |   0.0369   1.0000 
3 Diversity           |  -0.1499   0.2455   1.0000 
4 Employee Relations  |   0.0513   0.1521   0.2025   1.0000 
5 Environment         |   0.0924   0.3356   0.1650   0.1670   1.0000 
6 Human Rights        |   0.1447  -0.0125  -0.2195   0.0212   0.1472   1.0000 
7 Product             |  -0.0943   0.1129   0.2339   0.1233   0.1138  -0.0624   1.0000 
 
 
Variable            |       VIF       1/VIF   
--------------------+---------------------- 
Diversity           |      1.24    0.807936 
Environment         |      1.20    0.832374 
Community           |      1.19    0.843536 
Human Rights        |      1.10    0.906674 
Employee Relations  |      1.08    0.925617 
Product             |      1.08    0.927770 
Corporate Governance|      1.06    0.943667 
-------------+---------------------- 




The following tables show low correlations among the index components, and low 
average VIF. 
                      |      1       2        3        4        5        6        7    
----------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
1 Corporate Governance|   1.0000 
2 Community           |   0.1752   1.0000 
3 Diversity           |   0.1189   0.5028   1.0000 
4 Employee Relations  |   0.1167   0.1131   0.0482   1.0000 
5 Environment         |   0.2191   0.3884   0.4186   0.0710   1.0000 
6 Human Rights        |   0.1621   0.0822  -0.0150   0.2466   0.0454   1.0000 




Variable            |       VIF       1/VIF   
--------------------+---------------------- 
Diversity           |      1.55    0.645737 
Community           |      1.51    0.662698 
Environment         |      1.33    0.751192 
Product             |      1.31    0.764469 
Human Rights        |      1.10    0.910677 
Corporate Governance|      1.10    0.912525 
Employee Relations  |      1.08    0.925198 
--------------------+---------------------- 







The following tables show low correlations among the index components, and low 
average VIF. 
                      |     1       2        3        4        5        
6        7    
----------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
1 Corporate Governance|   1.0000 
2 Community           |   0.4735   1.0000 
3 Diversity           |   0.5709   0.5551   1.0000 
4 Employee Relations  |   0.1254   0.2567   0.2003   1.0000 
5 Environment         |   0.5893   0.4662   0.5285   0.2351   1.0000 
6 Human Rights        |   0.1288   0.1612   0.1085   0.1670   0.0766   1.0000 
7 Product             |   0.3693   0.3838   0.4393   0.0497   0.3492   0.1373   1.0000 
 
 
Variable          |       VIF       1/VIF   
------------------+---------------------- 
Diversity         |      1.93    0.519087 
Community         |      1.86    0.538059 
Environment       |      1.77    0.563835 
Community         |      1.66    0.602818 
Product           |      1.33    0.751037 
Employee Relations|      1.13    0.884636 
Human Rights      |      1.06    0.943573 
------------------+---------------------- 




Index of firm’s dependence 
Year 2007 
The following tables show very low correlations among the index components, and low 
average VIF. 
                   1      2        3       4 
   -------------+------------------------------------ 
1 Imports Ratio |   1.0000 
2 Exports Ratio |   0.1031   1.0000 
3 Subs. Ratio   |   0.1730   0.0702   1.0000 




       Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
   -------------+---------------------- 
1 Imports Ratio |      1.14    0.880588 
2 Exports Ratio |      1.13    0.884809 
3 Subs. Ratio   |      1.05    0.950403 
4 Empl. Ratio   |      1.02    0.978201 
   -------------+---------------------- 








The following tables show very low correlations among the index components, and low 
average VIF. 
                         1        2       3       4 
   -------------+------------------------------------ 
1 Imports Ratio |   1.0000 
2 Exports Ratio |   0.0966   1.0000 
3 Subs. Ratio   |   0.2728   0.0051   1.0000 
4 Empl. Ratio   |   0.2349   0.0911   0.3338   1.0000 
 
 
       Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
   -------------+---------------------- 
1 Imports Ratio |      1.18    0.846890 
2 Exports Ratio |      1.16    0.860616 
3 Subs. Ratio   |      1.12    0.895710 
4 Empl. Ratio   |      1.02    0.983743 
   -------------+---------------------- 






The following tables also show very low correlations among the index components, and 
low average VIF. 
                |     1        2        3        4 
   -------------+------------------------------------ 
1 Imports Ratio |   1.0000 
2 Exports Ratio |   0.1083   1.0000 
3 Subs. Ratio   |   0.2425   0.0476   1.0000 
4 Empl. Ratio   |   0.2588   0.1299   0.3042   1.0000 
 
 
       Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
----------------+---------------------- 
1 Imports Ratio |      1.16    0.861706 
2 Exports Ratio |      1.14    0.878686 
3 Subs. Ratio   |      1.11    0.898002 
4 Empl. Ratio   |      1.02    0.977115 
----------------+---------------------- 










The following tables also show very low correlations among the index components, and 
low average VIF. 
 
                |     1        2        3        4  
----------------+------------------------------------ 
1 Imports Ratio |   1.0000 
2 Exports Ratio |   0.1046   1.0000 
3 Subs. Ratio   |   0.1531   0.1738   1.0000 





       Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
----------------+---------------------- 
1 Imports Ratio |      1.20    0.831584 
2 Exports Ratio |      1.19    0.843856 
3 Subs. Ratio   |      1.07    0.935234 
4 Empl. Ratio   |      1.04    0.962211 
----------------+---------------------- 












Beneficial Products and Services (ENV-str-A) 
This indicator measures the positive environmental impact of a firm’s products and/or 
services. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, 
products/services that reduce other firms’ and individuals’ consumption of energy, 
production/consumption of hazardous chemicals, and overall patterns of resource 
consumption. 
 
Pollution Prevention (ENV-str-B) 
This indicator measures a firm’s method of mitigating non-carbon air emissions, water 
discharges, and solid waste from its operations. Factors affecting this evaluation include, 
but are not limited to, initiatives to reduce a firm’s non-carbon air emissions from its 
operations; to reduce the release of raw sewage, industrial chemicals, and other regulated 
substances; to reduce hazardous and non-hazardous waste; and programs to reduce the 
use of packaging materials, to support recycling; and to recycle old products such as 
televisions and other consumer electronics. 
 
Recycling (ENV-str-C) 
This indicator measures a firm’s use of recycled materials in its products/services. 
Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to: assessment of the volume 
and recycled content of products made with recycled input materials, including paper, 
metal, plastic; and any certification of its practices by a third party, such as the Forest 
Stewardship Council for timber product companies. 
 
Clean Energy (ENV-str-D) 
This indicator measures a firm’s policies regarding climate change. Factors affecting this 
evaluation include, but are not limited to, acknowledgement of direct and/or indirect 
impacts on operations due to climate change and formal commitments to: reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions; and initiatives to reduce energy consumption and to increase 
the use of renewable energy. 
 
Management Systems (ENV-str-G) 
This indicator measures a firm’s monitoring and management of its environmental 





establishment and monitoring of environmental performance targets, the presence of 
environmental training and communications programs for employees, and stakeholder 
engagement. 
 
Other Strength (ENV-str-X) 
This indicator measures a firm’s environmental management policies. Factors affecting 
this evaluation include, but are not limited to, a stated commitment to: integrate 
environmental considerations into all operations; reduce environmental impact of 





Regulatory Problems (ENV-con-B) 
This indicator measures a firm’s record of compliance with environmental regulations. 
Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, fines/sanctions for 
causing environmental damage, and/or violations of operating permits. 
 
Substantial Emissions (ENV-con-D) 
This indicator measures a firm’s emission of toxic chemicals according to data from the 
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
database of information on toxic chemical releases and waste management activities. 
Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, how the firm compares to 
its industry peers. 
 
Climate Change (ENV-con-F) 
This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to a firm’s climate change 
related policies and initiatives. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not 
limited to, a history of involvement in greenhouse gas (GHG)-related legal cases, 
widespread or egregious impacts due to corporate GHG emissions, resistance to 
improved practices, and criticism by non- governmental organizations (NGOs) and/or 
other third-party observers. In addition, factors cover whether a company derives 
substantial revenues from the sale of coal or oil and its derivative fuel products, or 
whether the company derives substantial revenues indirectly from the combustion of coal 
or oil and its derivative fuel products. 
 
Negative Impact of Products & Services (ENV-con-G) 
This indicator measures the negative environmental impact of a firm’s products and/or 
services. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, 
products/services that involve regulated substances, the production/consumption of 
hazardous chemicals, and controversial products such as those that use genetically 
modified organisms or nanotechnology. 
 
Land Use & Biodiversity (ENV-con-H) 





management of natural resources. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not 
limited to, a history of involvement in natural resource-related legal cases, widespread or 
egregious impacts due to the firm’s use of natural resources, resistance to improved 
practices, and criticism by NGOs and/or other third-party observers. 
 
Non-Carbon Emissions (ENV-con-I) 
This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to a firm’s non-GHG 
emissions. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, a history of 
involvement in land, air, or water emissions-related legal cases, widespread or egregious 
impacts due to corporate non-GHG emissions, resistance to improved practices, and 
criticism by NGOs and/or other third- party observers. 
 
Other Concern (ENV-con-X) 
This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to a firm’s environmental 
impact. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to widespread or 
egregious environmental impacts, resistance to improved practices, criticism by NGOs 
and/or other third- party observers, and any other environmental controversies not 







Charitable Giving (COM-str-A) 
The company has given 1% or more of trailing three-year net earnings before taxes to 
charity, or has otherwise been notably generous in its giving. 
 
Innovative Giving (COM-str-B) 
The company donates 25% or more of its charitable giving to support NGOs involved 
with affordable housing, access to healthcare, K-12 education, and initiatives to relieve 
hunger and/or other services to disadvantaged communities. 
 
Community Engagement (COM-str-H) 
The company has a notable community engagement program concerning involvement of 
local communities in areas where the firm has major operations. 
 
Other Strength (COM-str-X) 
The company has either an exceptionally strong in-kind giving program or engages in 










This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to a firm’s interactions with 
communities in which it does business. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are 
not limited to, a history of involvement in land use and/or development-related legal 
cases, widespread or egregious community impacts due to company operations, and 
criticism by NGOs and/or other third-party observers. 
 




Indigenous Peoples Relations Strength (HUM-str-D) 
The company has established relations with indigenous peoples near its proposed or 
current operations (either in or outside the U.S.) that respect the sovereignty, land, 
culture, human rights, and intellectual property of indigenous peoples. 
 
Human Rights Policies & Initiatives (HUM-str-X) 
The company has undertaken exceptional human rights initiatives, including outstanding 
transparency or disclosure on human rights issues, or has otherwise shown industry 





Burma Concern (HUM-con-C) 
The company has operations or direct investment in, or sourcing from, Burma. 
 
Sudan Concern (HUM-con-H) 
The company has operations or direct investment in, or sourcing from, Sudan. 
 
Other Concern (HUM-con-X) 
This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to the impact of a firm’s 
operations on human rights. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited 
to, a history of involvement in human rights-related legal cases, widespread or egregious 
complicity in killings, physical abuse, or violation of free speech and other rights, 
resistance to improved practices, substantive involvement in countries with poor human 








Union Relations (EMP-str-A) 






Cash Profit Sharing (EMP-str-C) 
The company has a cash profit-sharing program through which it has recently made 
distributions to a majority of its workforce. 
 
Employee Involvement (EMP-str-D) 
The company strongly encourages worker involvement and/or ownership through stock 
options available to a majority of its employees; gain sharing, stock ownership, sharing of 
financial information, or participation in management decision-making. 
 
Health and Safety Strength (EMP-str-G) 
The company has strong health and safety programs. 
 
Supply Chain Policies, Programs & Initiatives (EMP-str-H) 
This indicator measures a firm’s policy commitments and management systems designed 
to monitor the human and labor rights performance of its suppliers and contractors. 
Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, the protection of supply 
chain workers’ rights, including freedom of association, freedom from forced labor and 
child labor, safe working environments and other rights described by the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) Conventions and other applicable standards, and initiatives 
towards improving the labor conditions of its supply chain workforce. Factors affecting 
this evaluation include, but are not limited to, efforts to use purchasing power to improve 
performance, company-led programs that improve the labor conditions and health of 





Other Benefits & Programs (EMP-str-X) 
The company has strong employee relations initiatives not covered by other MSCI 
ratings. 
 
Union Relations (EMP-con-A) 
The company has a history of notably poor union relations. 
 
Health and Safety Concern (EMP-con-B) 
The company recently has either paid substantial fines or civil penalties for willful 
violations of employee health and safety standards, or has been otherwise involved in 
major health and safety controversies. 
 
Supply Chain Controversies (EMP-con-F) 
This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to a firm’s supply chain. 
Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, a history of involvement 
in supply chain related legal cases, widespread or egregious instances of abuses of supply 





resistance to improved practices, and criticism by NGOs and/or other third-party 
observers. 
 
Labor-Management Relations Controversies (EMP-con-X) 
The company is involved in an employee relations controversy that is not covered by 








The company has made notable progress in the promotion of women and minorities, 
particularly to line positions with profit-and-loss responsibilities in the corporation. 
 
Board of Directors (DIV-str-C) 
This indicator measures the diversity of a firm’s board. Factors affecting this evaluation 
include, but are not limited to, the representation of women and minorities on the board, 
with adjustment for nation-specific demographic conditions. 
 
Work/Life Benefits (DIV-str-D) 
The company has outstanding employee benefits or other programs addressing work/life 
concerns, e.g., childcare, elder care, or flextime. 
 
Women & Minority Contracting (DIV-str-E) 
The company does at least 5% of its subcontracting, or otherwise has a demonstrably 
strong record on purchasing or contracting, with women- and/or minority-owned 
businesses. 
 
Gay & Lesbian Policies (DIV-str-G) 
The company has implemented notably progressive policies toward its gay and lesbian 
employees. In particular, it provides benefits to the domestic partners of its employees. 
 
Employment of Underrepresented Groups (DIV-str-H) 
This indicator measures a firm’s efforts to promote diversity in its workforce. Factors 
affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, its recruitment efforts to women 
and minority communities, and its participation in multi-stakeholder diversity initiatives. 
 
Other Strength (DIV-str-X) 










Workforce Diversity Controversies (DIV-con-A) 
The company has either paid substantial fines or civil penalties as a result of affirmative 
action controversies, or has otherwise been involved in major controversies related to 
affirmative action issues. 
 
Representation (DIV-con-B) 
This indicator measures the diversity of a firm’s workforce. Factors affecting this 
evaluation include, but are not limited to, the percentage of women and minorities in 
senior management. 
 
Board of Directors (DIV-con-C) 
This indicator measures the diversity of a firm’s board. Factors affecting this evaluation 
include, but are not limited to, the representation of women and minorities on the board, 








This indicator measures a firm’s efforts to improve the safety and health effects of its 
products/services. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, 
customer health and safety policies, participation in industry or multi-stakeholder 
initiatives, and openness to third party oversight of its practices. 
 
Benefits to Economically Disadvantaged (PRO-str-C) 
This indicator measures the positive community impact of a firm’s operations. Factors 
affecting this evaluation include bottom-of-the-pyramid efforts that benefit the 
disadvantaged such as access to medicine initiatives, access to education, and appropriate 
technology products. 
 
Access to Capital (PRO-str-D) 
This indicator measures the positive impact of a firm’s products. Factors affecting this 
evaluation include, but are not limited to, strong commitment to microfinance, and 





Product Safety (PRO-con-A) 
This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to the quality/safety of a 
firm’s products and services. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited 





instances of recalls or fines due to defective or unsafe products and services, resistance to 
improved practices, and criticism by NGOs and/or other third-party observers. 
 
Marketing/Contracting Concern (PRO-con-D) 
This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to a firm’s marketing and 
advertising practices. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, 
widespread or egregious instances of false, discriminatory, or improper 
marketing/advertising, marketing targeted at disadvantaged groups, resistance to 
improved practices, and criticism by NGOs and/or other third party observers. 
 
Antitrust (PRO-con-E) 
This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to a firm’s anti-competitive 
business practices. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, a 
history of involvement in anti-trust legal cases, widespread or egregious instances of 
price-fixing, collusion, or bid-rigging, resistance to improved practices, and evidence-
based criticism by NGOs and/or other third-party observers. 
 
Other Concern (PRO-con-X) 
This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to a firm’s customer 
relations. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, a history of 
involvement in customer-related legal cases, predatory lending, widespread or egregious 
instances of discrimination, fraud or unfair treatment, resistance to improved practices, 







Reporting Quality (CGOV-str-D) 
This indicator measures the quality of a firm’s reporting on its corporate social 
responsibility (CSR)/sustainability efforts. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but 
are not limited to, the completeness and specificity of a firm’s reporting, its setting of 
specific goals for its CSR efforts, and quantitative measurement of progress towards 
these goals. This indicator also measures whether a firm follows agreed-upon guidelines, 
such as those established by the Global Reporting Initiative. 
 
Public Policy (CGOV-str-F) 
This indicator measures a firm’s support for public policies that have noteworthy benefit 
s for the environment, communities, employees, or consumers. Factors affecting this 
evaluation include, but are not limited to, support/lack of support for regulations 
addressing climate change, improved labor rights, enhancement of shareholder rights, and 









Reporting Quality (CGOV-str-H) 
This indicator measures the quality of a firm’s reporting on its CSR/sustainability efforts. 
Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, the completeness and 
specificity of a firm’s reporting, its setting of specific goals for its CSR efforts, and 
quantitative measurement of progress towards these goals. This indicator also measures 
whether a firm follows agreed-upon guidelines, such as those established by the Global 
Reporting Initiative. 
 
Public Policy (CGOV-con-J) 
This indicator measures a firm’s lack of support for public policies that have noteworthy 
benefits for the environment, communities, employees, or consumers. Factors affecting 
this evaluation include, but are not limited to, support/lack of support for regulations 
addressing climate change, improved labor rights, enhancement of shareholder rights, and 
protections for consumers. 
 
Governance Structures Controversies (CGOV-con-K) 
This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to a firm’s executive 
compensation and governance practices. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are 
not limited to, a history of involvement in compensation-related legal cases, widespread 
or egregious instances of shareholder or board-level objections to pay practices and 
governance structures, resistance to improved practices, and criticism by NGOs and/or 
other third-party observers. 
 
Other Controversies (CGOV-con-X) 
This indicator measures the severity of controversies related to a firm’s business ethics 
practices. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, a history of 
involvement in widespread or egregious instances of bribery, tax evasion, insider trading, 
accounting irregularities, resistance to improved practices, and criticism by NGOs and/or 






APPENDIX D: LIST OF INDICATORS  INCLUDED IN THE RESPONSIBLE COMPETITIVENESS 
INDEX & COUNTRY RANKINGS 
 







1. Signing and Ratification of Environmental Treaties, specifically:  
a. the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
in New York in 1992; 
b. the Convention on Biological Diversity in Rio de Janeiro in 
1992;  
c. the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change in Kyoto in 1997;  
d. and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety signed in Cartagena in 
2000 
2. Ratification of Basic Workers Conventions, specifically: 
a. Freedom of association and collective bargaining (conventions 
87, 98);  
b. Elimination of forced and compulsory labour (conventions 29, 
105);  
c. Elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation (conventions 100, 111);  
d. Abolition of child labour (conventions 138, 182); 
3. Rigidity of Employment Index, which encompasses three sub-
indexes: a difficulty of hiring index, a rigidity of hours index and 
a difficulty of firing index; 
4. Stringency of Environmental Protection; 
5. Carbon Dioxide Emissions per US$ billion Gross National 
Income; 
6. Private Sector Employment of Women; 
7. Responsible Tax Environment which combines the number of 




1. Efficacy of Corporate Boards; 
2. Ethical Behaviour of Firms; 
3. Wage Equality for Similar Work; 





 5. Extent of Staff Training; 
6. Ratio of ISO 14001 to ISO 9001 certification: the uptake of 
environmental management systems compared to other ISO 
standards; 
7. Occupational Fatalities 
C. Social 
Enablers: 
1. Corruption Perception Index; 
2. The Degree of Customer Orientation; 
3. Freedom of the Press; 
4. Transparency of Transactions; 
5. NGO Membership; 
6. Civil Liberties: the existence of basic political rights and civil 
liberties, gauged by relevant portions of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights; 




























Rank Country RCI Rank Country RCI Rank Country RCI
1 Sweden 81.5 41 Botswana 59.3 81 Zambia 49
2 Denmark 81 42 Mauritius 59.3 82 Uganda 48.1
3 Finland 78.8 43 Kuwait 58.7 83 Kenya 48
4 Iceland 76.7 44 Slovakia 58.2 84 Liberia 48
5 United Kingdom 75.8 45 Hungary 57.7 85 Nigeria 48
6 Norway 75.5 46 Yugoslavia 56.85 86 Russia 48
7 New Zealand 74.9 47 Peru 56.8 87 Bolivia 47.5
8 Ireland 74.6 48 Trinidad and Tobago 56.7 88 Cameroon 47.4
9 Australia 73 49 Namibia 56.4 89 Paraguay 47.3
10 Canada 73 50 Sierra Leone 56.4 90 R. of China 47.2
11 Germany 72.7 51 Indonesia 56.1 91 Zimbabwe 47.2
12 Netherlands 72.6 52 El Salvador 55.9 92 Tanzania 47.1
13 Switzerland 72.5 53 Jordan 55.7 93 Malawi 47
14 Belgium 71.9 54 Turkey 55.6 94 Niger 47
15 Macau 71.3 55 Uruguay 55.6 95 Sudan 47
16 Singapore 71.3 56 Poland 55.4 96 Morocco 46.4
17 Austria 70.9 57 Colombia 55.1 97 Mozambique 46.1
18 France 70.1 58 Brazil 55 98 Ukraine 45.2
19 United States 69.6 59 Mexico 54.8 99 Ghana 45.1
20 Japan 68.8 60 Romania 54.6 100 Guinea 45.1
21 Hong Kong 68.3 61 Bulgaria 54.4 101 Ivory Coast 45.1
22 Portugal 65.9 62 Algeria 54.3 102 The Gambia 45.1
23 Estonia 65 63 Iran 54.3 103 Cambodia 44.3
24 Chile 64 64 Tunisia 54.3 104 Mongolia 43.9
25 Malaysia 63.7 65 Philippines 54 105 Angola 43.4
26 Spain 63.7 66 Panama 53.9 106 Mauritania 41.6
27 R. of Korea 63 67 Georgia 53.4 107 Afghanistan 41.4
28 R.of South Africa 62.5 68 Argentina 53.1 108 Pakistan 41.4
29 Bahrain 62.4 69 Egypt 52.6 109 Ethiopia 40.8
30 United Araba Emirates 62.4 70 Dominican R. 52.4 110 Bangladesh 39.8
31 Lithuania 62.1 71 Sri Lanka 52.4 111 Nepal 37.5
32 Israel 61.6 72 India 52.2
33 Italy 61.2 73 Guatemala 52
34 Greece 61 74 Albania 50.4
35 Taiwan 60.7 75 Iraq 50.3
36 Latvia 60.3 76 Haiti 49.9
37 Costa Rica 60.2 77 Honduras 49.9
38 Thailand 60 78 Venezuela 49.8
39 Jamaica 59.8 79 Nicaragua 49.5





APPENDIX E: ALTERNATIVE MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
The advantage of panel-corrected standard error procedure is that it allows the error ui to 
be correlated over i, and allows uit to be heteroscedastic. The PCSE model specification, 
in tests of Hypotheses 1, 2 a-b and 3, can be expressed as follows:  
Yit = β0 + β1X1it-1 + β2X2it-1 + β3X3it-1 + β4X1it-1 * X2it-1 + βnCit-1 + Uit                           (3) 
where: 
Yit = predicted adoption of CSR practices for focal firm i, year t, 
β0 = the intercept of Yit,  
β1 = the direct effect of X1it-1 on Yit, 
X1it-1 = global business network’s commitment to CSR, firm i, year t-1, 
β2 = the direct effect of X2i on Yit, 
X2it-1 = within global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR, 
firm i, year t-1, 
β3 = the direct effect of X3it-1 on Yit, 
X3it-1 = ties to business partners in countries with more stringent institutional 
requirements, firm i, year t-1, 
β4 = the interaction effect of X1it-1 and X2it-1 on Yit, 
βn = the direct effects of the Cit-1 on Yit, 





Uit = the unique error contributed by firm i year t to β0  
 
The PCSE model specification for testing Hypotheses 4a, b, c and d, can be 
expressed as follows:  
Yit = β0 + β1X1it-1 + β2X2it-1 + β3X3it-1 + β4X1it-1*X2it-1 + β5X4it-1 + β6X5it-1 + β7 X6it-1 + 
β8X4it-1 * X5it-1 + Uit = the unique error contributed by firm i year t to β0                                  
(2) 
where: 
Yit = predicted adoption of CSR practices for focal firm i, year t, 
β0 = the intercept of Yit,  
β1 = the direct effect of X1it-1 on Yit, 
X1it-1 = FDI-based global business network’s commitment to CSR, firm i, year t-
1, 
β2 = the direct effect of X2i on Yit, 
X2it-1 = within FDI-based global business network heterogeneity of commitment 
to CSR, firm i, year t-1, 
β3 = the direct effect of X3it-1 on Yit, 
X3it-1 = FDI ties to countries with more stringent CSR institutional requirements, 
firm i, year t-1, 
β4 = the interaction effect of X1it-1 and X2it-1 on Yit, 
β5 = the direct effect of X4it-1 on Yit, 






β6 = the direct effect of X5it-1 on Yit, 
X5it-1 = within trade-based global business network heterogeneity of commitment 
to CSR, firm i, year t-1, 
β7 = the direct effect of X6it-1 on Yit, 
X6it-1 = trade ties to countries with more stringent CSR institutional requirements, 
firm i, year t-1, 
β8 = the interaction effect of X4it-1 and X5it-1 on Yit, 
βn = the direct effects of the Cit-1 on Yit, 
Ci = vector of control variables for firm i year t-1, 





APPENDIX F: ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS TESTS WITH ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 
OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
Here I describe a second set of alternative specifications of the dependent 
variable, where I consider each individual components of the dependent variable, i.e., 
community relations, diversity, corporate governance, employee relations, environment, 
human rights, and product quality and safety. These tests rely on the main analytical 
approach that was discussed above, i.e., OLS regression with Huber-White estimators, 
and averaged independent and control variables over the four-year 2007-2010 period 
(Hull & Rothenberg, 2008). The dependent variable is measured in the year 2011 to allow 
for lagged effects.  
I follow the convention established by Waddock and Graves (1997) and 
Waldman, Siegel and Javidan (2006), which I have previously illustrated. Here I combine 
strengths and concerns within each category and not across all categories as I did in the 
main analyses that I reported above. I obtain seven new dependent variables, each one 
focusing on a specific set of CSR practices. These variables include:  (1) Adoption of 
Corporate Governance-related CSR practices; (2) Adoption of Community-related CSR 
practices; (3) Adoption of Diversity-related CSR practices; (4) Adoption of Employee-
related CSR practices; (5) Adoption of Environment-related CSR practices; (6) Adoption 
of Human Rights-related CSR practices; and (7) Adoption of Product Quality-related 





hold with these alternative specifications of firm’s adoption of CSR practices. Overall, 
these analyses provide overwhelming support for the presented model. I detail these 
results in the next paragraphs and provide in-depth explanations of these results in the 
discussion section of the dissertation. 
A.F.1 Results 
A.F.1.1 Adoption of Corporate Governance-related CSR practices 
I start by considering the adoption of Corporate Governance-related CSR 
practices. Table F.1 confirms previous findings. As in Tables 6.2 and 6.6, Models 1 and 2 
in Table F.1 provide support for Hypothesis 1, because the coefficient of global business 
network commitment to CSR is positive and significant (β = 0.11; p < .01; β = 0.19; p < 
.01). Results also support for Hypothesis 3, as the coefficient of ties to countries with 
more stringent CSR institutional requirements is positive and significant (β = 0.22; p < 
.01; β = 0.23; p < .01). In addition, Models 4 (β = 0.07; p < .01), 2 (β = 0.19; p < .01) and 
3 (β = 0.31; p < .01) provide support for Hypothesis 2a and confirm that as within global 
business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR decreases, the relationship 
between global business network commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of Corporate 
Governance-related CSR practices becomes more positive. Furthermore, Models 8 (β = 
n.s.), 2 (β = 0.30; p < .01), and 5 (β = 0.55; p < .01) provide support for Hypothesis 2b 
and show that as global business network commitment to CSR decreases, the 
relationships between within global business network heterogeneity of commitment to 
CSR and firm’s adoption of Corporate Governance-related CSR practices becomes more 





Table F.1: OLS regression with Huber-White estimators and alternative 
specification of the dependent variable (Adoption of Corporate Governance-related 





St. E. St. E. St. E.
Size 0.29 *** 0.03 0.29 *** 0.03 0.29 *** 0.03
ROA -0.08 0.34 -0.02 0.34 -0.02 0.34
R&D Intensity 0.31 *** 0.10 0.32 *** 0.10 0.32 *** 0.10
Capital Intensity 0.02 0.01 0.02 * 0.01 0.02 * 0.01
Leverage 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods 0.08 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.15
   Energy & Extractive 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.16
   Food & Agriculture 0.09 0.20 0.12 0.20 0.12 0.20
   Professional and Information Services -0.07 0.14 -0.07 0.14 -0.07 0.14
   Manufacturing 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.11
GBN Commitment to CSR 0.11 *** 0.04 0.19 *** 0.05 0.31 *** 0.07
Within GBN Heterogeneity of Commitment 
to CSR
-0.21 *** 0.08 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.12
GBN Commitment to CSR * Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of Commitment to CSR
-0.33 *** 0.08 -0.33 *** 0.08
Ties to More Stringent CSR Requirements 0.22 *** 0.07 0.23 *** 0.07 0.23 *** 0.07
Intercept -5.52 *** 1.09 -5.76 *** 1.09 -5.82 *** 1.09
Observations 710 710 710
Number of Firms 710 710 710
R
2 27.17% 28.37% 28.37%
F (13, 696) 17.77*** (14, 695) 17.32*** (14, 695) 17.32***
Root MSE 0.89 0.89 0.89
Model 1                                                                                                          Model 2
GBN  
Commitment to 
CSR                                    




CSR                                                                    
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Model 3                                       
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                   
*                                        
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 








St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E.
Size 0.29 *** 0.03 0.29 *** 0.03 0.29 *** 0.03 0.29 *** 0.03 0.29 *** 0.03 0.29 *** 0.03 0.29 *** 0.03
ROA -0.02 0.34 -0.02 0.34 -0.02 0.34 -0.02 0.34 -0.02 0.34 -0.02 0.34 -0.02 0.34
R&D Intensity 0.32 *** 0.10 0.32 *** 0.10 0.32 *** 0.10 0.32 *** 0.10 0.32 *** 0.10 0.32 *** 0.10 0.32 *** 0.10
Capital Intensity 0.02 * 0.01 0.02 * 0.01 0.02 * 0.01 0.02 * 0.01 0.02 * 0.01 0.02 * 0.01 0.02 * 0.01
Leverage 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.15
   Energy & Extractive 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.16
   Food & Agriculture 0.12 0.20 0.12 0.20 0.12 0.20 0.12 0.20 0.12 0.20 0.12 0.20 0.12 0.20
   Professional and Information Services -0.07 0.14 -0.07 0.14 -0.07 0.14 -0.07 0.14 -0.07 0.14 -0.07 0.14 -0.07 0.14
   Manufacturing 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.11
GBN Commitment to CSR 0.07 *** 0.04 0.19 *** 0.05 0.31 *** 0.07 0.07 *** 0.04 0.19 *** 0.05 0.31 *** 0.07 0.07 *** 0.04
Within GBN Heterogeneity of Commitment 
to CSR
0.17 0.12 0.50 *** 0.19 0.50 *** 0.19 0.50 *** 0.19 -0.16 * 0.08 -0.16 * 0.08 -0.16 * 0.08
GBN Commitment to CSR * Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of Commitment to CSR
-0.33 *** 0.08 -0.33 *** 0.08 -0.33 *** 0.08 -0.33 *** 0.08 -0.33 *** 0.08 -0.33 *** 0.08 -0.33 *** 0.08
Ties to More Stringent CSR Requirements 0.23 *** 0.07 0.23 *** 0.07 0.23 *** 0.07 0.23 *** 0.07 0.23 *** 0.07 0.23 *** 0.07 0.23 *** 0.07
Intercept -5.70 *** 1.08 -5.95 *** 1.09 -6.13 *** 1.10 -5.77 *** 1.08 -5.57 *** 1.09 -5.52 *** 1.09 -5.63 *** 1.08
Observations 710 710 710 710 710 710 710
Number of Firms 710 710 710 710 710 710 710
R
2 28.37% 28.37% 28.37% 28.37% 28.37% 28.37% 28.37%
F (14, 695) 17.32*** (14, 695) 17.32*** (14, 695) 17.32*** (14, 695) 17.32*** (14, 695) 17.32*** (14, 695) 17.32*** (14, 695) 17.32***
Root MSE 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
Model 8                                         
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                              
(+1 δ)                                                     
*                                                   
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                                                                    
Model 9                                          
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                
(+1 δ)                                       
*                                        
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                           
(-1 δ)
Model 10                                        
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                              
(+1 δ)                                      




CSR                          
(+1 δ)
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Model 4                                           
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                   




CSR                          
(+1 δ)
Model 5                                    
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                  
(-1 δ)                                                     




CSR                                                                    
Model 6                                           
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                  
(-1 δ)                                                     




CSR                           
(-1 δ)
Model 7                                   
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                 
(-1 δ)                    










Table F.2: Summary of results from Models 2-9 using OLS regression with Huber-White 
estimators and Adoption of Corporate Governance-related CSR practices as the dependent 
variable (Hypotheses 2a-b) 
 
 
Figures F.1 and F.2 provide a visual illustration of the results for Hypotheses 2a and b.  
 
 
Figure F.1: Interaction plot for the moderating effect of within global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR on the relationship between global business network 
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Commit.  -1δ 0.31 Commit.  -1δ 0.19 Commit.  -1δ 0.07
Heter. -1δ 0.50 Heter. 0.50 Heter. +1δ 0.50
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Commit. 0.31 Commit. 0.19 Commit. 0.07
Heter. -1δ 0.17 Heter. 0.17 Heter. +1δ 0.171
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Commit.  +1δ 0.31 Commit.  +1δ 0.19 Commit.  +1δ 0.073







Commitment  -1δ; 
Heterogeneity
Sig.



































commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of Corporate Governance-related CSR practices, 
using OLS regression with Huber-White estimators (Hypothesis 2a) 
 
 
Figure F.2: Interaction plot for the moderating effect of global business network 
commitment to CSR on the relation between within global business network heterogeneity 
of commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of Corporate Governance-related CSR 
practices, using OLS regression with Huber-White estimators (Hypothesis 2b) 
 
 
A.F.1.2 Adoption of Community-related CSR practices  
I then consider the adoption of Community-related CSR practices. Results in Table F.3 
support Hypothesis 1, as shown by the positive and significant coefficient of global business 
network commitment to CSR in Models 1 and 2 (β = 0.10; p < .01; β = 0.17; p < .01). However, 
results do not support Hypothesis 3, as the coefficient of ties to countries with more stringent 
CSR institutional requirements is insignificant in Models 1 and 2 (β = 0.07; n.s.; β = 0.09; n.s.). 
Models 4 (β = 0.07; p < .1), 2 (β = 0.17; p < .01) and 3 (β = 0.28; p < .01) provide support for 
Hypothesis 2a and confirm that as within global business network heterogeneity of commitment 





firm’s adoption of Community-related CSR practices becomes more positive. Furthermore, 
Models 8 (β = 0.11; n.s.), 2 (β = 0.40; p < .01), and 5 (β = 0.68; p < .01) provide support for 
Hypothesis 2b and show that as global business network commitment to CSR decreases, the 
relationships between within global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR and 
firm’s adoption of Community-related CSR practices becomes more positive. Table F.4 further 





































Table F.3: OLS regression with Huber-White estimators and alternative specification of 
the dependent variable (Adoption of Community-related CSR practices; Hypotheses 1, 2a-
b, and 3) 
 
 
St. E. St. E. St. E.
Size 0.22 *** 0.03 0.22 *** 0.03 0.22 *** 0.03
ROA 0.24 0.35 0.29 0.35 0.29 0.35
R&D Intensity 0.45 *** 0.16 0.47 *** 0.16 0.47 *** 0.16
Capital Intensity -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Leverage 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.07
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods 0.48 *** 0.17 0.52 *** 0.17 0.52 *** 0.17
   Energy & Extractive -0.03 0.20 -0.02 0.20 -0.02 0.20
   Food & Agriculture 0.45 *** 0.20 0.48 ** 0.20 0.48 ** 0.20
   Professional and Information Services 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.15
   Manufacturing -0.05 0.11 -0.05 0.11 -0.05 0.11
GBN Commitment to CSR 0.10 *** 0.05 0.17 *** 0.06 0.28 *** 0.08
Within GBN Heterogeneity of Commitment 
to CSR
0.06 0.09 0.40 *** 0.14 0.40 *** 0.14
GBN Commitment to CSR * Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of Commitment to CSR
-0.29 *** 0.09 -0.29 *** 0.09
Ties to More Stringent CSR Requirements 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.07
Intercept -6.45 *** 1.69 -6.66 *** 1.66 -6.80 *** 1.67
Observations 710 710 710
Number of Firms 710 710 710
R
2 18.92% 19.80% 19.80%
F (13, 696) 9.25*** (14, 695) 8.69*** (14, 695) 8.69***
Root MSE 0.94 0.94 0.94
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Model 1                                                                                                          Model 2
GBN  
Commitment to 
CSR                                    




CSR                                                                    
Model 3                                       
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                   
*                                        
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 










St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E.
Size 0.22 *** 0.03 0.22 *** 0.03 0.22 *** 0.03 0.22 *** 0.03 0.22 *** 0.03 0.22 *** 0.03 0.22 *** 0.03
ROA 0.29 0.35 0.29 0.35 0.29 0.35 0.29 0.35 0.29 0.35 0.29 0.35 0.29 0.35
R&D Intensity 0.47 *** 0.16 0.47 *** 0.16 0.47 *** 0.16 0.47 *** 0.16 0.47 *** 0.16 0.47 *** 0.16 0.47 *** 0.16
Capital Intensity 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Leverage 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.07
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods 0.52 *** 0.17 0.52 *** 0.17 0.52 *** 0.17 0.52 *** 0.17 0.52 *** 0.17 0.52 *** 0.17 0.52 *** 0.17
   Energy & Extractive -0.02 0.20 -0.02 0.20 -0.02 0.20 -0.02 0.20 -0.02 0.20 -0.02 0.20 -0.02 0.20
   Food & Agriculture 0.48 ** 0.20 0.48 ** 0.20 0.48 ** 0.20 0.48 ** 0.20 0.48 ** 0.20 0.48 ** 0.20 0.48 ** 0.20
   Professional and Information Services 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.15
   Manufacturing -0.05 0.11 -0.05 0.11 -0.05 0.11 -0.05 0.11 -0.05 0.11 -0.05 0.11 -0.05 0.11
GBN Commitment to CSR 0.07 * 0.04 0.17 *** 0.06 0.28 *** 0.08 0.07 * 0.04 0.17 *** 0.06 0.28 *** 0.08 0.07 * 0.04
Within GBN Heterogeneity of Commitment 
to CSR
0.40 *** 0.14 0.68 *** 0.21 0.68 *** 0.21 0.68 *** 0.21 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10
GBN Commitment to CSR * Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of Commitment to CSR
-0.29 *** 0.09 -0.29 *** 0.09 -0.29 *** 0.09 -0.29 *** 0.09 -0.29 *** 0.09 -0.29 *** 0.09 -0.29 *** 0.09
Ties to More Stringent CSR Requirements 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.07
Intercept -6.52 *** 1.66 -6.83 *** 1.67 -7.07 *** 1.68 -6.59 *** 1.66 -6.49 *** 1.66 -6.53 *** 1.67 -6.45 *** 1.66
Observations 710 710 710 710 710 710 710
Number of Firms 710 710 710 710 710 710 710
R
2 19.80% 19.80% 19.80% 19.80% 19.80% 19.80% 19.80%
F (14, 695) 8.69*** (14, 695) 8.69*** (14, 695) 8.69*** (14, 695) 8.69*** (14, 695) 8.69*** (14, 695) 8.69*** (14, 695) 8.69***
Root MSE 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.Coeff. Coeff.
Model 6                                           
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                  
(-1 δ)                                                     




CSR                           
(-1 δ)
Model 7                                   
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                  
(-1 δ)                                    




CSR                          
(+1 δ)
Model 8                                         
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                              
(+1 δ)                                      
*                                       
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                                                                    
Model 9                                          
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                
(+1 δ)                                       
*                                        
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                           
(-1 δ)
Model 10                                        
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                              
(+1 δ)                                      




CSR                          
(+1 δ)
Model 4                                           
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                   




CSR                          
(+1 δ)
Model 5                                    
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                 
(-1 δ)                                                    









Table F.4: Summary of results from Models 2-9 using OLS regression with Huber-White 
estimators and Adoption of Community-related CSR practices as the dependent variable 




Figures F.3 and F.4 provide a visual illustration of the results for Hypotheses 2a and b.  
 
 
Figure F.3: Interaction plot for the moderating effect of within global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR on the relationship between global business network 
commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of Community-related CSR practices, using OLS 
regression with Huber-White estimators (Hypothesis 2a) 
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Commit.  -1δ 0.278 Commit.  -1δ 0.17 Commit.  -1δ 0.07
Heter. -1δ 0.678 Heter. 0.68 Heter. +1δ 0.68
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Commit. 0.28 Commit. 0.17 Commit. 0.07
Heter. -1δ 0.40 Heter. 0.40 Heter. +1δ 0.40
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Commit.  +1δ 0.278 Commit.  +1δ 0.17 Commit.  +1δ 0.071







Commitment  -1δ; 
Heterogeneity
Sig.







































Figure F.4: Interaction plot for the moderating effect of global business network 
commitment to CSR on the relation between within global business network heterogeneity 
of commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of Community-related CSR practices, using 
OLS regression with Huber-White estimators (Hypothesis 2b) 
 
 
A.F.1.3 Adoption of Diversity-related CSR practices 
I then consider the adoption of Diversity-related CSR practices. Table F.5 provides 
partial support for Hypothesis 1, because the coefficient of global business network commitment 
to CSR is positive and significant in Model 2 (β = 0.10; p < .05), but insignificant in Model 1 (β 
= 0.05; n.s.). Results do not support Hypothesis 3, as the coefficient of ties to business partners 
in countries with more stringent CSR institutional requirements is insignificant in Models 1 and 
2 (β = 0.07; n.s.; β = 0.08; n.s.). Models 4 (β = 0.03; n.s.), 2 (β = 0.10; p < .05) and 3 (β = 0.17; p 
< .01) provide support for Hypothesis 2a and confirm that as within global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR decreases, the relationship between global business 
network commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of Diversity-related CSR practices becomes 





.05) provide support for Hypothesis 2b and show that as global business network commitment to 
CSR decreases, the relationships between within global business network heterogeneity of 
commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of Diversity-related CSR practices becomes more 
positive. Table F.6 further summarizes the results for Hypotheses 2a and 2b. 
 
Table F.5: OLS regression with Huber-White estimators and alternative specification of 




St. E. St. E. St. E.
Size 0.38 *** 0.02 0.38 *** 0.02 0.38 *** 0.02
ROA 0.32 0.31 0.36 0.31 0.36 0.31
R&D Intensity 0.44 *** 0.14 0.45 *** 0.14 0.45 *** 0.14
Capital Intensity 0.04 *** 0.01 0.04 *** 0.01 0.04 *** 0.01
Leverage 0.10 * 0.06 0.11 * 0.06 0.11 * 0.06
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods 0.33 *** 0.12 0.36 *** 0.12 0.36 *** 0.12
   Energy & Extractive -0.18 0.13 -0.18 0.13 -0.18 0.13
   Food & Agriculture 0.41 *** 0.16 0.43 *** 0.16 0.43 *** 0.16
   Professional and Information Services -0.06 0.12 -0.07 0.12 -0.07 0.12
   Manufacturing -0.08 0.09 -0.07 0.09 -0.07 0.09
GBN Commitment to CSR 0.05 0.03 0.10 ** 0.04 0.17 *** 0.06
Within GBN Heterogeneity of Commitment 
to CSR
-0.02 0.09 0.21 * 0.11 0.21 * 0.11
GBN Commitment to CSR * Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of Commitment to CSR
-0.19 *** 0.07 -0.19 *** 0.07
Ties to More Stringent CSR Requirements 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07
Intercept -7.44 *** 1.41 -7.58 *** 1.40 -7.65 *** 1.41
Observations 710 710 710
Number of Firms 710 710 710
R
2 44.06% 44.49% 44.49%
F (13, 696) 32.54*** (14, 695) 30.41*** (14, 695) 30.41***
Root MSE 0.77 0.76 0.76
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Model 1                                                                                                          Model 2
GBN  
Commitment to 
CSR                                    




CSR                                                                    
Model 3                                       
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                   
*                                        
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 











St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E.
Size 0.38 *** 0.02 0.38 *** 0.02 0.38 *** 0.02 0.38 *** 0.02 0.38 *** 0.02 0.38 *** 0.02 0.38 *** 0.02
ROA 0.36 0.31 0.36 0.31 0.36 0.31 0.36 0.31 0.36 0.31 0.36 0.31 0.36 0.31
R&D Intensity 0.45 *** 0.14 0.45 *** 0.14 0.45 *** 0.14 0.45 *** 0.14 0.45 *** 0.14 0.45 *** 0.14 0.45 *** 0.14
Capital Intensity 0.04 *** 0.01 0.04 *** 0.01 0.04 *** 0.01 0.04 *** 0.01 0.04 *** 0.01 0.04 *** 0.01 0.04 *** 0.01
Leverage 0.11 * 0.06 0.11 * 0.06 0.11 * 0.06 0.11 * 0.06 0.11 * 0.06 0.11 * 0.06 0.11 * 0.06
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods 0.36 *** 0.12 0.36 *** 0.12 0.36 *** 0.12 0.36 *** 0.12 0.36 *** 0.12 0.36 *** 0.12 0.36 *** 0.12
   Energy & Extractive -0.18 0.13 -0.18 0.13 -0.18 0.13 -0.18 0.13 -0.18 0.13 -0.18 0.13 -0.18 0.13
   Food & Agriculture 0.43 *** 0.16 0.43 *** 0.16 0.43 *** 0.16 0.43 *** 0.16 0.43 *** 0.16 0.43 *** 0.16 0.43 *** 0.16
   Professional and Information Services -0.07 0.12 -0.07 0.12 -0.07 0.12 -0.07 0.12 -0.07 0.12 -0.07 0.12 -0.07 0.12
   Manufacturing -0.07 0.09 -0.07 0.09 -0.07 0.09 -0.07 0.09 -0.07 0.09 -0.07 0.09 -0.07 0.09
GBN Commitment to CSR 0.03 0.03 0.10 ** 0.04 0.17 *** 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.10 ** 0.04 0.17 *** 0.06 0.03 0.03
Within GBN Heterogeneity of Commitment 
to CSR
0.21 * 0.11 0.40 ** 0.17 0.40 ** 0.17 0.40 ** 0.17 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.08
GBN Commitment to CSR * Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of Commitment to CSR
-0.19 *** 0.07 -0.19 *** 0.07 -0.19 *** 0.07 -0.19 *** 0.07 -0.19 *** 0.07 -0.19 *** 0.07 -0.19 *** 0.07
Ties to More Stringent CSR Requirements 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07
Intercept -7.51 *** 1.40 -7.68 *** 1.41 -7.82 *** 1.41 -7.54 *** 1.40 -7.48 *** 1.40 -7.49 *** 1.41 -7.48 *** 1.40
Observations 710 710 710 710 710 710 710
Number of Firms 710 710 710 710 710 710 710
R
2 44.49% 44.49% 44.49% 44.49% 44.49% 44.49% 44.49%
F (14, 695) 30.41*** (14, 695) 30.41*** (14, 695) 30.41*** (14, 695) 30.41*** (14, 695) 30.41*** (14, 695) 30.41*** (14, 695) 30.41***
Root MSE 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.Coeff. Coeff.
Model 6                                           
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                  
(-1 δ)                                                     




CSR                           
(-1 δ)
Model 7                                   
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                  
(-1 δ)                                    




CSR                          
(+1 δ)
Model 8                                         
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                              
(+1 δ)                                      
*                                       
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                                                                    
Model 9                                          
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                
(+1 δ)                                       
*                                        
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                           
(-1 δ)
Model 10                                        
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                              
(+1 δ)                                      




CSR                          
(+1 δ)
Model 4                                           
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                   




CSR                          
(+1 δ)
Model 5                                    
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                 
(-1 δ)                                                    









Table F.6: Summary of results from Models 2-9 using OLS regression with Huber-
White estimators and Adoption of Diversity-related CSR practices as the dependent 




Figures F.5 and F.6 provide a visual illustration of the results for Hypotheses 2a 
and b.  
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Commit.  -1δ 0.17 Commit.  -1δ 0.10 Commit.  -1δ 0.03
Heter. -1δ 0.40 Heter. 0.40 Heter. +1δ 0.40
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Commit. 0.17 Commit. 0.10 Commit. 0.03
Heter. -1δ 0.21 Heter. 0.21 Heter. +1δ 0.21
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Commit.  +1δ 0.17 Commit.  +1δ 0.10 Commit.  +1δ 0.03







Commitment  -1δ; 
Heterogeneity
Sig.

































Figure F.5: Interaction plot for the moderating effect of within global business 
network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR on the relationship between global 
business network commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of Diversity-related CSR 





Figure F.6: Interaction plot for the moderating effect of global business network 
commitment to CSR on the relation between within global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of Diversity-related CSR 





A.F.1.4 Adoption of Employee-related CSR practices 
I then consider the adoption of Employee-related CSR practices. Table F.7 provides 
partial support for Hypothesis 1, because the coefficient of global business network commitment 
to CSR is positive and significant in Model 2 (β = 0.28; p < .05), but this coefficient is 
insignificant in Model 1. Results do not support Hypothesis 3, as the coefficient ties to business 
partners in countries with more stringent CSR requirements is insignificant in Models 1 and 2 (β 
= 0.02; n.s.; β = 0.03; n.s.). In addition, Models 4 (β = -0.02; n.s.), 2 (β = 0.04; n.s.) and 3 (β = 
0.10; n.s.) do not support Hypothesis 2a as the coefficient of global business network 
commitment to CSR is insignificant. However, Models 8 (β = 0.12; n.s.), 2 (β = 0.28; p < .10), 
and 5 (β = 0.44; p < .10) support Hypothesis 2b and show that as global business network 
commitment to CSR decreases, the relationships between within global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of Employee-related CSR practices 
















Table F.7: OLS regression with Huber-White estimators and alternative specification of 






St. E. St. E. St. E.
Size -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03
ROA 0.56 0.39 0.59 0.39 0.59 0.39
R&D Intensity 0.30 0.20 0.31 0.20 0.31 0.20
Capital Intensity 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
Leverage -0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.07
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods 0.06 0.16 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.16
   Energy & Extractive -0.23 0.16 -0.23 0.16 -0.23 0.16
   Food & Agriculture 0.02 0.24 0.04 0.24 0.04 0.24
   Professional and Information Services -0.05 0.17 -0.06 0.17 -0.06 0.17
   Manufacturing -0.18 0.11 -0.18 0.11 -0.18 0.11
GBN Commitment to CSR 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.08
Within GBN Heterogeneity of Commitment 
to CSR
0.09 0.14 0.28 * 0.16 0.28 * 0.16
GBN Commitment to CSR * Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of Commitment to CSR
-0.16 * 0.09 -0.16 * 0.09
Ties to More Stringent CSR Requirements 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.09
Intercept -2.92 2.09 -3.04 2.07 -3.14 2.08
Observations 710 710 710
Number of Firms 710 710 710
R
2 44.06% 1.95% 1.95%
F (13, 696) 32.54*** (14, 695) 1.4 (14, 695) 1.4
Root MSE 0.77 1.03 1.03
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Model 1                                                                                                          Model 2
GBN  
Commitment to 
CSR                                    




CSR                                                                    
Model 3                                       
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                   
*                                        
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 











St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E.
Size -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03
ROA 0.59 0.39 0.59 0.39 0.59 0.39 0.59 0.39 0.59 0.39 0.59 0.39 0.59 0.39
R&D Intensity 0.31 0.20 0.31 0.20 0.31 0.20 0.31 0.20 0.31 0.20 0.31 0.20 0.31 0.20
Capital Intensity 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
Leverage -0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.07
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.16
   Energy & Extractive -0.23 0.16 -0.23 0.16 -0.23 0.16 -0.23 0.16 -0.23 0.16 -0.23 0.16 -0.23 0.16
   Food & Agriculture 0.04 0.24 0.04 0.24 0.04 0.24 0.04 0.24 0.04 0.24 0.04 0.24 0.04 0.24
   Professional and Information Services -0.06 0.17 -0.06 0.17 -0.06 0.17 -0.06 0.17 -0.06 0.17 -0.06 0.17 -0.06 0.17
   Manufacturing -0.18 0.11 -0.18 0.11 -0.18 0.11 -0.18 0.11 -0.18 0.11 -0.18 0.11 -0.18 0.11
GBN Commitment to CSR -0.02 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.08 -0.02 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.08 -0.02 0.04
Within GBN Heterogeneity of Commitment 
to CSR
0.28 * 0.16 0.44 * 0.23 0.44 * 0.23 0.44 * 0.23 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
GBN Commitment to CSR * Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of Commitment to CSR
-0.16 * 0.09 -0.16 * 0.09 -0.16 * 0.09 -0.16 * 0.09 -0.16 * 0.09 -0.16 * 0.09 -0.16 * 0.09
Ties to More Stringent CSR Requirements 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.09
Intercept -2.94 2.07 -3.08 2.07 -3.24 2.08 -2.92 2.06 -3.00 2.08 -3.05 2.08 -2.96 2.07
Observations 710 710 710 710 710 710 710
Number of Firms 710 710 710 710 710 710 710
R
2 1.95% 1.95% 1.95% 1.95% 1.95% 1.95% 1.95%
F (14, 695) 1.4 (14, 695) 1.4 (14, 695) 1.4 (14, 695) 1.4 (14, 695) 1.4 (14, 695) 1.4 (14, 695) 1.4
Root MSE 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Model 10                                           
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                              
(+1 δ)                                                     




CSR                          
(+1 δ)
Coeff. Coeff.
Model 6                                           
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                  
(-1 δ)                                                     




CSR                           
(-1 δ)
Model 7                                   
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                  
(-1 δ)                                    




CSR                          
(+1 δ)
Model 8                                         
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                              
(+1 δ)                                      
*                                       
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                                                                   
Model 9                                     
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                
(+1 δ)                      
*                         
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                           
(-1 δ)
Model 4                                           
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                   




CSR                          
(+1 δ)
Model 5                                    
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                 
(-1 δ)                                                    









Table F.8: Summary of results from Models 2-9 using OLS regression with Huber-
White estimators and Adoption of Employee-related CSR practices as the 
dependent variable (Hypotheses 2a-b) 
 
 
Figures F.7 and F.8 provide a visual illustration of the results for Hypotheses 2a 






Commit.  -1δ 0.10 Commit.  -1δ 0.04 Commit.  -1δ -0.02
Heter. -1δ 0.44 Heter. 0.44 Heter. +1δ 0.44
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Commit. 0.10 Commit. 0.04 Commit. -0.02
Heter. -1δ 0.28 Heter. 0.28 Heter. +1δ 0.28
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Commit.  +1δ 0.10 Commit.  +1δ 0.04 Commit.  +1δ -0.02







Commitment  -1δ; 
Heterogeneity
Sig.


























Figure F.7: Interaction plot for the moderating effect of within global business 
network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR on the relationship between global 
business network commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of Employee-related 





Figure F.8: Interaction plot for the moderating effect of global business network 
commitment to CSR on the relation between within global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of Employee-related CSR 





A.F.1.5 Adoption of Environment-related CSR practices 
Next I look at the adoption of Environment-related CSR practices. Results in Table F.9 
do not support Hypothesis 1, because the coefficient of global business network commitment to 
CSR is insignificant both in Models1 and 2. However, results support Hypothesis 3, as the 
coefficient of ties to business partners in countries with more stringent CSR requirements is 
significant both in Model 1 and 2 (β = 0.27; p < .01; β = 0.28; p < .28). Finally, results do not 
support Hypotheses 2a and b, as the main interaction term between global business network 































Table F.9: OLS regression with Huber-White estimators and alternative specification of 
the dependent variable (Adoption of Environment-related CSR practices; Hypotheses 1, 




A.F.1.6 Adoption of Human Rights-related CSR practices 
I then consider the adoption of Human Rights-related CSR practices. Table F.10 provides 
partial support for Hypothesis 1, because the coefficient of global business network commitment 
St. E. St. E.
Size 0.27 *** 0.03 0.27 *** 0.03
ROA 1.01 *** 0.35 1.03 *** 0.35
R&D Intensity 0.64 *** 0.16 0.64 *** 0.16
Capital Intensity 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Leverage 0.23 *** 0.08 0.24 *** 0.08
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods -0.01 0.12 0.01 0.12
   Energy & Extractive -0.56 *** 0.17 -0.56 *** 0.18
   Food & Agriculture 0.14 0.22 0.15 0.22
   Professional and Information Services 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.12
   Manufacturing 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.10
GBN Commitment to CSR 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.05
Within GBN Heterogeneity of Commitment 
to CSR
0.11 0.08 0.23 0.14
GBN Commitment to CSR * Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of Commitment to CSR
-0.10 0.09
Ties to More Stringent CSR Requirements 0.27 *** 0.07 0.28 *** 0.07
Intercept -8.78 *** 1.66 -8.86 *** 1.65
Observations 710 710
Number of Firms 710 710
R
2 24.20% 1.95%
F (13, 696) 15.9*** (14, 695) 1.4
Root MSE 0.92 1.03
Model 1                                                                                                          Model 2
GBN  
Commitment to 
CSR                                    










to CSR is positive and significant in Model 2 (β = 0.12; p < .10), but insignificant in Model 1. 
Results do not support Hypothesis 3, as the coefficient of ties to business partners in countries 
with more stringent CSR requirements is insignificant in Models 1 and 2. Results in Models 4 (β 
= 0.07; n.s.), 2 (β = 0.12; p < .10.) and 3 (β = 0.18; p < .10) provide support for Hypothesis 2a 
and confirm that as within global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR 
decreases, the relationship between global business network commitment to CSR and firm’s 
adoption of Human Rights-related CSR practices becomes more positive. However, Models 8 (β 
= 0.12; n.s.), 2 (β = 0.23; n.s.), and 5 (β = 0.39; n.s.) do not support Hypothesis 2b as the 
coefficient of within global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR is 


















Table F.10: OLS regression with Huber-White estimators and alternative specification of 
the dependent variable (Adoption of Human Rights-related CSR practices; Hypotheses 1, 
2a-b, and 3) 
 
 
St. E. St. E. St. E.
Size 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04
ROA 0.11 0.25 0.15 0.25 0.15 0.25
R&D Intensity 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.10
Capital Intensity 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Leverage 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.10
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods 0.24 0.18 0.27 0.18 0.27 0.18
   Energy & Extractive -0.15 0.20 -0.15 0.20 -0.15 0.20
   Food & Agriculture 0.08 0.23 0.09 0.23 0.09 0.23
   Professional and Information Services 0.07 0.18 0.07 0.18 0.07 0.18
   Manufacturing -0.07 0.13 -0.06 0.13 -0.06 0.13
GBN Commitment to CSR 0.08 0.05 0.12 * 0.06 0.18 * 0.09
Within GBN Heterogeneity of Commitment 
to CSR
0.04 0.09 0.23 0.16 0.23 0.16
GBN Commitment to CSR * Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of Commitment to CSR
-0.16 * 0.09 -0.16 * 0.09
Ties to More Stringent CSR Requirements 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07
Intercept -0.98 1.18 -1.10 1.18 -1.18 1.19
Observations 710 710 710
Number of Firms 710 710 710
R
2 1.82% 1.95% 1.95%
F (13, 696) 1.13 (14, 695) 1.08 (14, 695) 1.08
Root MSE 1.05 1.05 1.05
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Model 3                                       
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                   
*                                          
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                  
(-1 δ)
Model 1                                                                                                          Model 2
GBN  
Commitment to 
CSR                                 














St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E. St. E.
Size 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04
ROA 0.15 0.25 0.15 0.25 0.15 0.25 0.15 0.25 0.15 0.25 0.15 0.25 0.15 0.25
R&D Intensity 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.10
Capital Intensity 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Leverage 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.10
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods 0.27 0.18 0.27 0.18 0.27 0.18 0.27 0.18 0.27 0.18 0.27 0.18 0.27 0.18
   Energy & Extractive -0.15 0.20 -0.15 0.20 -0.15 0.20 -0.15 0.20 -0.15 0.20 -0.15 0.20 -0.15 0.20
   Food & Agriculture 0.09 0.23 0.09 0.23 0.09 0.23 0.09 0.23 0.09 0.23 0.09 0.23 0.09 0.23
   Professional and Information Services 0.07 0.18 0.07 0.18 0.07 0.18 0.07 0.18 0.07 0.18 0.07 0.18 0.07 0.18
   Manufacturing -0.06 0.13 -0.06 0.13 -0.06 0.13 -0.06 0.13 -0.06 0.13 -0.06 0.13 -0.06 0.13
GBN Commitment to CSR 0.06 0.04 0.12 * 0.06 0.18 * 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.12 * 0.06 0.18 * 0.09 0.06 0.04
Within GBN Heterogeneity of Commitment 
to CSR
0.23 0.16 0.39 0.25 0.39 0.25 0.39 0.25 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.09
GBN Commitment to CSR * Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of Commitment to CSR
-0.16 * 0.09 -0.16 * 0.09 -0.16 * 0.09 -0.16 * 0.09 -0.16 * 0.09 -0.16 * 0.09 -0.16 * 0.09
Ties to More Stringent CSR Requirements 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07
Intercept -1.02 1.18 -1.22 1.19 -1.36 1.21 -1.08 1.18 -0.98 1.18 -1.01 1.18 -0.96 1.18
Observations 710 710 710 710 710 710 710
Number of Firms 710 710 710 710 710 710 710
R
2 1.95% 1.95% 1.95% 1.95% 1.95% 1.95% 1.95%
F (14, 695) 1.08 (14, 695) 1.08 (14, 695) 1.08 (14, 695) 1.08 (14, 695) 1.08 (14, 695) 1.08 (14, 695) 1.08
Root MSE 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05
Model 9                                          
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                
(+1 δ)                                                     
*                                                    
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                           
(-1 δ)
Model 10                                        
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                              
(+1 δ)                                      




CSR                          
(+1 δ)
Coeff.
Model 8                                         
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                              
(+1 δ)                                      
*                                      
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                                                                 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Model 4                                           
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                   




CSR                          
(+1 δ)
Model 5                                    
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                  
(-1 δ)                                                     




CSR                                                                    
Model 6                                           
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                  
(-1 δ)                                                     




CSR                           
(-1 δ)
Model 7                                   
GBN  Commitment 
to CSR                                 
(-1 δ)                    










Table F.11: Summary of results from Models 2-9 using OLS regression with Huber-
White estimators and Adoption of Human Rights-related CSR practices as the 




Figures F.9 and F.10 provide a visual illustration of the results for Hypotheses 2a 





Commit.  -1δ 0.179 Commit.  -1δ 0.1199 Commit.  -1δ 0.061
Heter. -1δ 0.389 Heter. 0.3895 Heter. +1δ 0.389
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Commit. 0.179 Commit. 0.1199 Commit. 0.061
Heter. -1δ 0.228 Heter. 0.2283 Heter. +1δ 0.228
Coef. Coef. Coef.
Commit.  +1δ 0.179 Commit.  +1δ 0.1199 Commit.  +1δ 0.061







Commitment  -1δ; 
Heterogeneity
Sig.





























Figure F.9: Interaction plot for the moderating effect of within global business network 
heterogeneity of commitment to CSR on the relationship between global business network 
commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of Human Rights-related CSR practices, using 





Figure F.10: Interaction plot for the moderating effect of global business network 
commitment to CSR on the relation between within global business network heterogeneity 
of commitment to CSR and firm’s adoption of Human Rights-related CSR practices, using 





A.F.1.7 Adoption of Product Quality-related CSR practices 
Next I look at the adoption of Product Quality-related CSR practices. Results in 
Table F.12 partially support Hypothesis 1, because the coefficient of global business 
network commitment to CSR is insignificant in Model 1, but significant in Model 2 (β = 
0.11; p < .10). Results also do not support Hypothesis 3, as the coefficient of ties to 
business partners in countries with more stringent CSR requirements is insignificant both 
in Models 1 and 2. Finally, results do not support Hypotheses 2a and b, as the main 
interaction of term between global business network commitment to CSR and within 



















Table F.12: OLS regression with Huber-White estimators and alternative 
specification of the dependent variable (Adoption of Product Quality-related CSR 




Table F.13 below summarizes robustness tests with the alternative dependent 
variable specification that considers each individual components of the main dependent 
St. E. St. E.
Size -0.08 ** 0.03 -0.08 ** 0.03
ROA 0.02 0.44 0.06 0.44
R&D Intensity -0.07 0.12 -0.06 0.12
Capital Intensity -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02
Leverage -0.14 0.11 -0.13 0.12
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods 0.02 0.17 0.05 0.17
   Energy & Extractive -0.02 0.17 -0.02 0.17
   Food & Agriculture -0.08 0.21 -0.06 0.21
   Professional and Information Services -0.19 0.16 -0.20 0.16
   Manufacturing -0.02 0.10 -0.02 0.10
GBN Commitment to CSR 0.06 0.06 0.11 * 0.06
Within GBN Heterogeneity of Commitment 
to CSR
0.00 0.09 0.24 0.20
GBN Commitment to CSR * Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of Commitment to CSR
0.09 -0.20 0.17
Ties to More Stringent CSR Requirements 0.04 1.30 0.05 0.10
Intercept 1.36 1.21 1.31
Observations 710 710
Number of Firms 710 710
R
2 3.04% 3.48%
F (13, 696) 0.83 (14, 695) 1
Root MSE 1.04 1.03
Coeff. Coeff.
Model 1                                                                                                          Model 2
GBN  
Commitment to 
CSR                                    









variable, i.e., community relations, diversity, corporate governance, employee relations, 
environment, human rights, and product quality and safety. I further elaborate on their 
relevance in the discussion section of the dissertation. 
Table F.13: Summary of robustness tests results using individual components of the 
main dependent variable of interest 
 
Adoption of Corporate Governance-Related CSR 
Practices 
Support for H1? Yes 
Support for H2a? Yes 
Support for H2b? Yes 
Support for H3? Yes 
Adoption of Community-Related CSR Practices 
Support for H1? 
Yes 
Support for H2a? Yes 
Support for H2b? Yes 
Support for H3? No 
Adoption of Diversity-Related CSR Practices 
Support for H1? Yes 
Support for H2a? Yes 
Support for H2b? Yes 
Support for H3? No 
Adoption of Employee-Related CSR Practices 
Support for H1? Yes 
Support for H2a? No 
Support for H2b? Yes 
Support for H3? No 
Adoption of Environment-Related CSR Practices 
Support for H1? No 
Support for H2a? No 
Support for H2b? No 
Support for H3? Yes 
Adoption of Human Rights-Related CSR Practices 
Support for H1? Yes 
Support for H2a? Yes 
Support for H2b? No 
Support for H3? No 
Adoption of Product-Related CSR Practices 
Support for H1? Yes 
Support for H2a? No 
Support for H2b? No 





A.F.2 Discussion of robustness tests results 
  
This additional set of robustness tests also provides general support for the 
proposed model, as well as some unexpected results, which I illustrate in the next few 
paragraphs. Specifically, results for the models explaining adoption of corporate 
governance-related CSR practices provided full support for all the hypotheses in the 
model. Results concerning the adoption of community-related CSR practices and 
diversity-related CSR practices supported all the presented hypotheses, with the 
exception of Hypothesis 3. This indicates that for these practices, the focal firm is more 
likely to learn from the network level forces to which it is exposed, rather than from 
specific relationships with business partners located in countries with more favorable 
CSR institutional environments. This could depend on the more controversial nature of 
some the practices associated with these areas (e.g., broad philanthropic giving, whether 
the firm has progressive policies towards its women, minority, gay and lesbian 
employees), which would explain the firm’s inclination to adopt such practices only if 
exposed to strong pressures to do so or extensive learning opportunities in this area from 
its entire network.  
Results for the adoption of employee-related CSR practices provide support 
Hypotheses 1 and 2b, but not 2a and 3. This indicates that while the degree of global 
business network commitment to CSR matters towards the firm’s decision to adopt these 
practices (H1), within global business network heterogeneity of commitment to CSR only 
matters to firm’s learning in this area when CSR-related commitment is low (H2b), but it 
does not affect the effect of commitment on the firm’s decision to adopt CSR practices. 





environments for CSR is not relevant towards its decision to adopt employee-related CSR 
practices (H3). This suggests that strong isomorphic pressures to adopt employee-related 
CSR practices are the most important drivers within a firm’s global business network. 
Learning from a multiplicity of heterogeneous institutional pressures is not as important 
in this area. These are reasonable findings if one considers the strong regulations that 
dominate this area in the United States, which make the firm more inclined to adopt new 
practices in this area only if it is exposed to strong pressures to do so from across its 
entire network of operations.  
Findings for the models exploring the adoption of environment-related CSR 
practices provide support only for hypothesis 3 and show that embeddedness in the global 
business network matters for firm’s adoption only to the extent to which the firm is 
exposed to contexts with more stringent CSR-related requirements than those found in 
the United States. I believe that the rationale for this finding lies in the unique 
characteristics of environmental issues when compared with other social issues. As 
suggested by Tashman and Rivera (2010), environmental protection has had a more 
lengthy regulatory history in the United States than other CSR areas (Hoffman, 1999). In 
addition, environmental regulations have been one of the fastest growing in complexity 
and compliance in the United States in the last decade (Tashman & Rivera, 2010; Kraft & 
Vig, 2006).  Because of the extensive framework of regulations in this area, it is not 
surprising that firms would be affected by the influences emanating from their global 
business network only when confronted with more stringent requirements in this area. 
Results for the adoption of human rights-related CSR practices provide support 





to shaping firm’s behavior in this area (H1), and that higher levels of within global 
business network heterogeneity might weaken this relationship (H2a). In addition, they 
indicate that the degree to which the firm is connected to institutional contexts with more 
stringent CSR-related requirements does not affect its decision to adopt these practices 
(H3). An explanation for these results can be found in the more challenging nature 
associated with the adoption of these practices, which reflect the degree to which the 
focal firm would be able to respect local labor and human rights through its business 
dealings with local business partners. While FDI-based relationships might provide a 
better conduit for the firm’s ability to affect change locally, as responsibility for these 
initiatives would befell onto their local subsidiaries, similar tasks would be harder to 
implement in the context of import/export based transactions. This is because such 
transactions involve third parties over which the firm might have limited power to affect 
their implementation of such practices. Therefore it is understandable that the focal firm 
would be more likely to engage in the adoption of these practices when there are broad 
network level forces at play that favor this outcome.  
Finally, results for the adoption of product-related CSR practices only support 
Hypothesis 1. This indicates that a firm’s decision to adopt these practices is shaped by 
the pressures to do so that emanate from its global business network, rather than by the 
learning opportunities that are available within it. I believe that an explanation for this 
finding can be found in the nature of this set of practices as defined by the KLD 
indicators, which focus predominantly on the presence of quality standards attributes in 





existing standards emphasize the importance of isomorphic pressures for the firm to do 





APPENDIX G: RESULTS OF MODELS WITH SUM OF ALL THE KLD WEAKNESSES AS THE 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
For the purpose of completeness, Tables G.1 and G.2 report the results for the 
analyses with adoption of CSiR practices as the dependent variable. In both tables, Model 
1 includes all controls and independent variables but no interaction terms, which are is 
instead included in Model 2.  
 
Table G.1: OLS regression with Huber-White estimators and adoption of CSiR 
practices as the dependent variable ( = Sum of all the weaknesses components of 
each KLD category) 
 
St. E. St. E.
Size 0.24 *** 0.03 0.25 *** 0.03
ROA -0.79 *** 0.39 -0.81 *** 0.39
R&D Intensity 0.18 * 0.11 0.18 * 0.11
Capital Intensity -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.02
Leverage -0.05 0.11 -0.05 0.11
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods -0.36 *** 0.16 -0.38 *** 0.16
   Energy & Extractive 0.46 *** 0.19 0.46 *** 0.19
   Food & Agriculture 0.19 0.23 0.18 0.23
   Professional and Information Services -0.05 0.14 -0.04 0.14
   Manufacturing 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.12
GBN Commitment to CSR 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.05
Within GBN Heterogeneity of Commitment 
to CSR
-0.02 0.08 -0.15 0.15
GBN Commitment to CSR * Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of Commitment to CSR
0.11 0.11
Ties to More Stringent CSR Requirements -0.04 0.08 -0.05 0.08
Intercept -3.64 *** 1.19 -3.56 *** 1.2
Observations 710 710
Number of Firms 710 710
R
2 17.62% 53.14%
F (13, 696) 7.5*** (14, 695) 6.9***
Root MSE 0.95 0.95
Model 2                                      
GBN  
Commitment to 
CSR                                    




CSR                                                                    Coeff. Coeff.





Table G.2: OLS regression with Huber-White estimators and adoption of CSiR 
practices as the dependent variable ( = Sum of all the weaknesses components of 
each KLD category) 
 
 
St. E. St. E.
Size 0.25 *** 0.03 0.25 *** 0.03
ROA -0.75 *** 0.38 -0.81 *** 0.37
R&D Intensity 0.20 * 0.11 0.19 * 0.11
Capital Intensity -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.02
Leverage -0.05 0.11 -0.06 0.11
Industry Controls
   Consumer Goods -0.38 ** 0.15 -0.37 ** 0.15
   Energy & Extractive 0.42 ** 0.19 0.43 ** 0.19
   Food & Agriculture 0.13 0.23 0.17 0.23
   Professional and Information Services -0.04 0.14 -0.05 0.14
   Manufacturing 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.12
FDI-based GBN Commitment to CSR -0.19 ** 0.08 -0.28 *** 0.08
Within FDI-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR 0.30 0.30 -1.38 *** 0.46
FDI-based GBN Commitment to CSR * 
Within FDI-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR 1.36 *** 0.42
FDI Ties to More Stringent CSR 
Requirements -0.04 0.09 0.01 0.10
Trade-based GBN Commitment to CSR 0.11 ** 0.05 0.13 ** 0.06
Within Trade-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR -0.23 * 0.12 -0.12 0.17
Trade-based GBN Commitment to CSR * 
Within Trade-based GBN Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR -0.11 0.14
Trade Ties to More Stringent CSR 
Requirements 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.10
Intercept -3.82 *** 1.19 -3.76 *** 1.18
Observations 710 710




F (16, 693) 6.6*** (18, 691) 6.14***
Root MSE 0.95 0.94
Model 1                                                                                                          Model 2                                      
GBN  Commitment to 
CSR                                    
*                                          
Within GBN 
Heterogeneity of 
Commitment to CSR                                                                    
Coeff. Coeff.
